

## 11 WORLD WAR II



Figure 49 Clockwise from top left: Chinese forces in the Battle of Wanjialing, Australian 25-pounder guns during the First Battle of El Alamein, German Stuka dive bombers on the Eastern Front winter 1943–1944, US naval force in the Lingayen Gulf, Wilhelm Keitel signing the German Surrender, Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad

Clockwise from top left: Chinese forces in the Battle of Wanjialing, Australian 25-pounder guns during the First Battle of El Alamein, German Stuka dive bombers on the Eastern Front winter 1943–1944, US naval force in the Lingayen Gulf, Wilhelm Keitel signing the German Surrender, Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad

<b>Date</b>	1 September 1939 – 2 September 1945
<b>Location</b>	Europe, Pacific, Atlantic, South-East Asia, China, Middle East, Mediterranean and Africa, briefly North America
<b>Result</b>	Allied victory <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dissolution of the Third Reich</li> <li>• Creation of the United</li> </ul>

<p>Nations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers</li> <li>• Beginning of the Cold War. (more...)</li> </ul>			
<b>Belligerents</b>			
<b>Allies</b>			
 Soviet Union (1941–45) <sup>1b</sup>	<sup>1)</sup>		
 United States (1941–45)			
 British Empire			
 China (at war 1937–45)			
 France <sup>1b</sup>	<sup>2)</sup>		
 Poland			
 Canada			
 Australia			
 New Zealand			
 South Africa			
 Yugoslavia (1941–45)			
 Greece (1940–45)			
 Norway (1940–45)			
 Netherlands (1940–45)			
 Belgium (1940–45)			
 Czechoslovakia			
 Brazil (1942–45)			
<i>...and others</i>			
<b>Axis</b>			
 Germany			
 Japan (at war 1937–45)			
 Italy (1940–43)			
 Hungary (1941–45)			
 Romania (1941–44)			
 Bulgaria (1941–44)			
 Thailand (1942–45)			
<b>Co-belligerents</b>			
 Finland (1941–44)			
 Iraq (1941)			
<b>Puppet states</b>			
 Manchukuo			
 Croatia (1941–45)			
 Slovakia			
<i>...and others</i>			
<b>Commanders and leaders</b>			
<b>Allied leaders</b>			
 Joseph Stalin			
 Franklin D. Roosevelt			
 Winston Churchill			
<i>...and others</i>			
<b>Axis leaders</b>			
 Adolf Hitler			
 Hirohito			
 Benito Mussolini			
<i>...and others</i>			
<b>Casualties and losses</b>			
<b>Military</b>	<b>dead:</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>dead:</b>
Over 16,000,000		Over 8,000,000	
<b>Civilian</b>	<b>dead:</b>	<b>Civilian</b>	<b>dead:</b>
Over 45,000,000		Over 4,000,000	
<b>Total</b>	<b>dead:</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>dead:</b>
Over 61,000,000 (1937–45)		Over 12,000,000 (1937–45)	

<i>...further details</i>	<i>...further details</i>
<b>World War II series v · d · e</b>	
Precursors	
Asian events · European events · Timeline	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> <p>[show] v · d · e <b>Campaigns of World War II</b></p> </div>	
<p>1939 · 1940 · 1941 · 1942 · 1943 · 1944 · 1945                  Eastern front · Western Front · Pacific War · Battles                  · Mediterranean, Middle East and African Campaigns · Commanders                  Technology · Military operations · Manhattan Project                  Air warfare of World War II · Home front                  · Collaboration · Resistance</p>	
Aftermath	
<p>Casualties · Further effects · War crimes · Japanese war crimes · Consequences of Nazism</p>	
Depictions	
<p><b>World War II articles</b>                  Alphabetical index: 0-9 A B C D E F G H I J K L                  M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z                  Campaigns   Countries   Equipment                  Lists   Outline   Timeline   Portal   Category</p>	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> <p>[show] v · d · e <b>History of World War II by country and region</b></p> </div>	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> <p>[show] v · d · e <b>World War II</b></p> </div>	
<p><b>Allies (Leaders)</b></p>	<p>Ethiopia · China                  · Czechoslovakia                  · Poland · United Kingdom · India                  · France · Australia                  · New Zealand                  · South Africa                  · Canada · Norway                  · Belgium                  · Netherlands                  · Luxembourg                  · Greece                  · Yugoslavia</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Soviet Union</li> <li>•United States</li> <li>•Philippines</li> <li>•Mexico •Brazil</li> </ul>
<b>Axis and Axis-aligned (Leaders)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Bulgaria</li> <li>•Reorganized National Government of China •Croatia</li> <li>•Finland</li> <li>•Germany</li> <li>•Hungary •Iraq</li> <li>•Italy •Italian Social Republic</li> <li>•Japan</li> <li>•Manchukuo</li> <li>•Romania</li> <li>•Slovakia</li> <li>•Thailand •Vichy France</li> </ul>
<b>Resistance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Albania •Austria</li> <li>•Baltic States</li> <li>•Belgium •Czech lands •Denmark</li> <li>•Estonia</li> <li>•Ethiopia •France</li> <li>•Germany</li> <li>•Greece •Hong Kong •India •Italy</li> <li>•Jewish •Korea</li> <li>•Latvia</li> <li>•Luxembourg</li> <li>•Netherlands</li> <li>•Norway</li> <li>•Philippines</li> <li>•Poland (Anti-communist)</li> <li>•Romania</li> <li>•Thailand •Soviet Union •Slovakia</li> <li>•Western Ukraine</li> <li>•Vietnam</li> <li>•Yugoslavia</li> </ul>
<b>Prelude</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Africa •Asia</li> <li>•Europe</li> </ul>
<b>1939</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Invasion of Poland •Phoney War •Winter War</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Atlantic</li> <li>•Changsha (1939)</li> <li>•China</li> </ul>
1940	<p><i>Weserübung</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Netherlands</li> <li>•Belgium •France</li> <li>•UK •North Africa</li> <li>•British Somaliland</li> <li>•Baltic States</li> <li>•Moldova</li> <li>•Indochina</li> <li>•Greece •<i>Compass</i></li> </ul>
1941	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>East Africa</li> <li>•Invasion of Yugoslavia</li> <li>•Yugoslav Front</li> <li>•Greece •Crete •Soviet Union</li> <li>(<i>Barbarossa</i>) •Karelia •Lithuania</li> <li>•Middle East</li> <li>•Kiev •Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran</li> <li>•Leningrad</li> <li>•Moscow</li> <li>•Sevastopol •Pearl Harbor</li> <li>•Hong Kong •Philippines</li> <li>•Changsha (1941)</li> <li>•Malaya •Borneo</li> </ul>
1942	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Burma •Changsha (1942)</li> <li>• Coral Sea</li> <li>• Gazala •Midway</li> <li>•<i>Blue</i> •Stalingrad</li> <li>•Dieppe •El Alamein</li> <li>•<i>Torch</i></li> <li>•Guadalcanal</li> </ul>
1943	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>End in Africa</li> <li>•Kursk •Smolensk</li> <li>•Solomon Islands</li> <li>•Sicily •Lower Dnieper</li> <li>•Italy</li> <li>•Gilbert and Marshall</li> <li>•Changde</li> </ul>
1944	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monte Cassino and <i>Shingle</i></li> <li>•Narva</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Cherkassy</li> <li>•<i>Tempest</i></li> <li>•<i>Ichi-Go</i></li> <li>•Normandy</li> <li>•Mariana and Palau</li> <li>•<i>Bagratiion</i></li> <li>•Western Ukraine</li> <li>•Tannenberg Line</li> <li>•Warsaw Uprising</li> <li>•Eastern Romania</li> <li>•Yugoslavia</li> <li>•Paris</li> <li>•Gothic Line</li> <li>•<i>Market Garden</i></li> <li>•Estonia</li> <li>•<i>Crossbow</i></li> <li>•<i>Pointblank</i></li> <li>•Lapland</li> <li>•Hungary</li> <li>•Leyte</li> <li>•Bulge</li> <li>•Burma</li> </ul>
<b>1945</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Vistula-Oder</li> <li>•Iwo Jima</li> <li>•Okinawa</li> <li>•Surrender of Italy</li> <li>•Berlin</li> <li>•Czechoslovakia</li> <li>•Budapest</li> <li>•West Hunan</li> <li>•Surrender of Germany</li> <li>•Manchuria</li> <li>•Philippines</li> <li>•Borneo</li> <li>•Atomic bombings</li> <li>•Surrender of Japan</li> </ul>
<b>General</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Air warfare of World War II</li> <li>•Attacks on North America</li> <li>•Blitzkrieg</li> <li>•Comparative military ranks</li> <li>•Cryptography</li> <li>•Home front</li> <li>•Manhattan Project</li> <li>•Military awards</li> <li>•Military equipment</li> <li>•Military production</li> <li>•Nazi plunder</li> <li>•Technology</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Total war</li> <li>•Strategic bombing</li> <li>•Bengal famine of 1943</li> </ul>
<b>Aftermath</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effects</li> <li>•Expulsion of Germans</li> <li>•Operation <i>Paperclip</i></li> <li>•Operation <i>Keelhaul</i></li> <li>•Occupation of Germany</li> <li>•Morgenthau Plan</li> <li>•Territorial changes</li> <li>•Soviet occupations (Romania, Poland, Hungary, Baltic States)</li> <li>•Occupation of Japan</li> <li>•First Indochina War</li> <li>•Indonesian National Revolution</li> <li>•Cold War</li> <li>•Decolonization</li> <li>•Popular culture</li> </ul>
<b>War crimes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>German and <i>Wehrmacht</i> war crimes</li> <li>•The Holocaust</li> <li>•Italian war crimes</li> <li>•Japanese war crimes</li> <li>•Allied war crimes</li> <li>•Soviet war crimes</li> <li>•United States war crimes</li> </ul>
<b>War rape</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rape during the occupation of Japan</li> <li>•Comfort women</li> <li>•Rape of Nanking</li> <li>•Rape during the occupation of Germany</li> </ul>

<b>Prisoners</b>	Nazi crimes against Soviet POWs •Italian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union •Japanese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union •Japanese prisoners of war in World War II •German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union •Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union •Polish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union •Romanian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union •German prisoners of war in the United States
------------------	--

**World War II**, or the **Second World War**<sup>[1]</sup> (often abbreviated as **WWII** or **WW2**), was a global military conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945, which involved most of the world's nations, including all of the great powers: eventually forming two opposing military alliances, the Allies and the Axis. It was the most widespread war in history, with more than 100 million military personnel mobilised. In a state of "total war," the major participants placed their entire economic, industrial, and scientific capabilities at the service of the war effort, erasing the distinction between civilian and military resources. Marked by significant events involving the mass death of civilians, including the Holocaust and the only use of nuclear weapons in warfare, it was the deadliest conflict in human history,<sup>[2]</sup> resulting in 50 million to over 70 million fatalities.

The war is generally accepted to have begun on 1 September 1939, with the invasion of Poland by Germany, and subsequent declarations of war on Germany by France and most of the countries of the British Empire and Commonwealth. Germany set out to establish a large empire in Europe. From late 1939 to early 1941, in a series of campaigns and treaties, Germany conquered or subdued much of continental Europe; amid Nazi-Soviet agreements, the nominally neutral Soviet Union fully or partially occupied and annexed territories of its six European neighbours. Britain and the Commonwealth remained the only major force continuing the fight against the Axis in North Africa and in extensive naval warfare. In June 1941, the European Axis launched an invasion of the Soviet Union, giving a start to the largest land theatre of war in history, which, from that moment on, tied down the major part of the Axis military power. In December 1941, Japan, which had been at war with China since 1937,<sup>[3]</sup> and aimed to dominate Asia, attacked the United States and European possessions in the Pacific Ocean, quickly conquering much of the region.

The Axis advance was stopped in 1942 after the defeat of Japan in a series of naval battles and after defeats of European Axis troops in North Africa and, decisively, at Stalingrad. In 1943, with a series of German defeats in Eastern Europe, the Allied invasion of Fascist Italy, and American victories in the Pacific, the Axis lost the

initiative and undertook strategic retreat on all fronts. In 1944, the Western Allies invaded France, while the Soviet Union regained all territorial losses and invaded Germany and its allies.

The war in Europe ended with the capture of Berlin by Soviet and Polish troops and the subsequent German unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945. The Japanese Navy was defeated by the United States, and invasion of the Japanese Archipelago ("Home Islands") became imminent. The war in Asia ended on 15 August 1945 when Japan agreed to surrender.

The war ended with the total victory of the Allies over Germany and Japan in 1945. World War II altered the political alignment and social structure of the world. The United Nations (UN) was established to foster international cooperation and prevent future conflicts. The Soviet Union and the United States emerged as rival superpowers, setting the stage for the Cold War, which lasted for the next 46 years. Meanwhile, the influence of European great powers started to decline, while the decolonisation of Asia and Africa began. Most countries whose industries had been damaged moved towards economic recovery. Political integration, especially in Europe, emerged as an effort to stabilise postwar relations.

## Contents

[hide]

- 1 Chronology
- 2 Background
- 3 Pre-war events
  - 3.1 Invasion of Ethiopia
  - 3.2 Spanish Civil War
  - 3.3 Japanese invasion of China
  - 3.4 Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union and Mongolia
  - 3.5 European occupations and agreements
- 4 Course of the war
  - 4.1 War breaks out in Europe
  - 4.2 Axis advances
  - 4.3 The war becomes global
  - 4.4 Axis advance stalls
  - 4.5 Allies gain momentum
  - 4.6 Allies close in
  - 4.7 Axis collapse, Allied victory
- 5 Aftermath
- 6 Impact
  - 6.1 Casualties and war crimes
  - 6.2 Concentration camps and slave work
  - 6.3 Home fronts and production
  - 6.4 Occupation
  - 6.5 Advances in technology and warfare
- 7 See also
- 8 Notes
- 9 References
- 10 Further reading
- 11 External links

## Chronology

*See also: Timeline of World War II*

The start of the war is generally held to be 1 September 1939, beginning with the German invasion of Poland; Britain and France declared war on Germany two days later. Other dates for the beginning of war include the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War on 7 July 1937.<sup>[4][5]</sup>

Others follow British historian A. J. P. Taylor, who held that there was a simultaneous Sino-Japanese War in East Asia, and a Second European War in Europe and her colonies. The two wars merged in 1941, becoming

a single global conflict, at which point the war continued until 1945. This article uses the conventional dating.<sup>[6]</sup>

The exact date of the war's end is not universally agreed upon. It has been suggested that the war ended at the armistice of 14 August 1945 (V-J Day), rather than the formal surrender of Japan (2 September 1945); in some European histories, it ended on V-E Day (8 May 1945). However, the Treaty of Peace with Japan was not signed until 1951.<sup>[7]</sup>



Figure 50 WW II started with the bombing of Pearl Harbor




Figure 51 Pearl Harbor Dec. 7, 1941

## Attack on Pearl Harbor

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: [navigation](#), [search](#)

**Attack on Pearl Harbor**

Part of the [Pacific Theater](#) of [World War II](#)



Photograph from a Japanese plane of [Battleship Row](#) at the beginning of the attack. The explosion in the center

<p>is a torpedo strike on the <a href="#">USS Oklahoma</a>. Two attacking Japanese planes can be seen: one over the <a href="#">USS Neosho</a> and one over the Naval Yard.</p>	
<b>Date</b>	December 7, 1941
<b>Location</b>	Primarily <a href="#">Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Territory</a> , United States
<b>Result</b>	<p>Japanese major tactical victory</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">United States declaration of war on the Empire of Japan</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Nazi German and fascist Italian declaration of war on the United States</a>.</li> </ul>
<b>Belligerents</b>	
 <a href="#">United States</a>	 <a href="#">Empire of Japan</a>
<b>Commanders and leaders</b>	
 <a href="#">Husband Kimmel</a>	 <a href="#">Chuichi Nagumo</a>
 <a href="#">Walter Short</a>	 <a href="#">Isoroku Yamamoto</a>
 <a href="#">Isaac Kidd †</a>	
<b>Strength</b>	
<p>8 battleships              8 cruisers              30 destroyers              4 submarines              49 other ships<sup>[1]</sup>              ~390 aircraft</p>	<p><b>Mobile Unit:</b>              6 aircraft carriers              2 battleships              2 heavy cruisers              1 light cruiser              9 destroyers              8 tankers              23 fleet submarines</p>

	5 midget submarines 414 aircraft
<b>Casualties and losses</b>	
4 battleships sunk 3 battleships damaged 1 battleship grounded 2 destroyers sunk 1 other ship sunk 3 cruisers damaged <sup>[nb 1]</sup> 1 destroyer damaged 3 other ships damaged 188 aircraft destroyed 155 aircraft damaged 2,402 killed 1,247 wounded <sup>[3][4]</sup>	4 midget submarines sunk 1 midget submarine grounded 29 aircraft destroyed 64 killed 1 captured <sup>[5]</sup>
<b>Civilian casualties:</b>	
57 killed 35 wounded <sup>[3]</sup>	

[\[show\]](#) [v](#) · [d](#) · [e](#)

[Pacific Campaigns 1940–42](#)

[\[show\]](#) [v](#) · [d](#) · [e](#)

[Pacific Ocean theater](#)

The **attack on Pearl Harbor** (called **Hawaii Operation** or **Operation AI**<sup>[6][7]</sup> by the Japanese **Imperial General Headquarters** (**Operation Z** in planning)<sup>[8]</sup> and the **Battle of Pearl Harbor**<sup>[9]</sup>) was a surprise **military strike** conducted by the **Imperial Japanese Navy** against the United States **naval base** at **Pearl Harbor**, Hawaii, on the morning of December 7, 1941 (December 8 in Japan).

The attack was intended as a [preventive](#) action in order to keep the [U.S. Pacific Fleet](#) from interfering with military actions the [Empire of Japan](#) was planning in [Southeast Asia](#) against overseas territories of the [United Kingdom](#), the [Netherlands](#), and the United States.

The base was attacked by 353<sup>[10]</sup> Japanese fighters, bombers and torpedo planes in two waves, launched from six [aircraft carriers](#).<sup>[10]</sup> Four [U.S. Navy battleships](#) were sunk (two of which were raised and returned to service later in the war) and the four others present were damaged. The Japanese also sank or damaged three [cruisers](#), three [destroyers](#), an anti-aircraft training ship,<sup>[nb 2]</sup> and one [minelayer](#). 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed; 2,402 Americans were killed<sup>[12]</sup> and 1,282 wounded. The power station, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of the [intelligence section](#)) were not attacked. Japanese losses were light: 29 aircraft and five [midget submarines](#) lost, and 65 servicemen killed or wounded. [One Japanese sailor](#) was captured.

The attack came as a profound shock to the American people and led directly to the American entry into [World War II](#) in both the [Pacific](#) and [European theaters](#). The following day (December 8) the United States [declared war](#) on Japan. Domestic support for [isolationism](#), which had been strong, disappeared. Clandestine support of Britain (for example the [Neutrality Patrol](#)) was replaced by active alliance. Subsequent operations by the U.S. prompted Germany and Italy to [declare war](#) on the U.S. on December 11, which was reciprocated by the U.S. the same day. Despite numerous historical precedents for unannounced military action by Japan, the lack of any formal warning, particularly while negotiations were still apparently ongoing, led [President Franklin D. Roosevelt](#) to proclaim December 7, 1941, "[a date which will live in infamy](#)".

## Contents

[\[hide\]](#)

- [1 Background to conflict](#)
  - [1.1 Anticipating war](#)
  - [1.2 Objectives](#)
- [2 Approach and attack](#)
  - [2.1 Submarines](#)
  - [2.2 Japanese declaration of war](#)
  - [2.3 First wave composition](#)
  - [2.4 Second wave composition](#)
  - [2.5 Possible third wave](#)
- [3 Photographs](#)
- [4 Ship losses](#)
  - [4.1 Battleships](#)
  - [4.2 Ex-battleship \(target/AA training ship\)](#)
  - [4.3 Cruisers](#)
  - [4.4 Destroyers](#)
  - [4.5 Auxiliaries](#)
- [5 Salvage](#)
- [6 Aftermath](#)
  - [6.1 Strategic implications](#)
- [7 Media](#)
  - [7.1 Fiction](#)
  - [7.2 Historical fiction](#)
  - [7.3 Non-fiction/historical](#)
  - [7.4 Alternate history](#)
- [8 See also](#)
- [9 Notes](#)
- [10 References](#)
  - [10.1 Bibliography](#)
- [11 Further reading](#)
- [12 External links](#)

### [\[edit\]](#) [Background to conflict](#)

*Main article:* [Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor](#)

### [\[edit\]](#) [Anticipating war](#)

The attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and hence protect Japan's advance into [Malaya](#) and the [Dutch East Indies](#), where Japan sought access to [natural resources](#) such as [oil](#) and rubber. War between Japan and the United States had been a possibility each nation had been aware of (and developed contingency plans for) since the 1920s, though tensions did not begin to grow seriously until [Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria](#). Over the next decade, Japan continued to expand into China, leading to [all-out war](#) in 1937. Japan spent

considerable effort trying to isolate China and achieve sufficient resource independence to attain victory on the mainland; the "Southern Operation" was designed to assist these efforts.<sup>[13]</sup>

From December 1937 events such as the Japanese attack on the [USS Panay](#) and the [Nanking Massacre](#) (more than 200,000 killed in indiscriminate massacres) swung public opinion in the West sharply against Japan and increased their fear of Japanese expansion,<sup>[14]</sup> which prompted the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to provide loan assistance for war supply contracts to the [Republic of China](#).

In 1940, Japan [invaded French Indochina](#) in an effort to control supplies reaching China. The United States halted shipments of airplanes, parts, [machine tools](#), and [aviation gasoline](#), which was perceived by Japan as an unfriendly act.<sup>[15]</sup> The U.S. did not stop oil exports to Japan at that time in part because prevailing sentiment in Washington was that such an action would be an extreme step, given Japanese dependence on U.S. oil,<sup>[16][17]</sup> and likely to be considered a provocation by Japan.

Early in 1941, [President Franklin D. Roosevelt](#) moved the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii from its previous base in [San Diego](#) and ordered a military buildup in the [Philippines](#) in the hope of discouraging Japanese aggression in the Far East. Because the Japanese high command was (mistakenly)<sup>[18]</sup> certain any attack on the British Southeast Asian colonies would bring the U.S. into the war,<sup>[18]</sup> a devastating preventive strike appeared to be the only way<sup>[18]</sup> to avoid U.S. naval interference. An invasion of the Philippines was also considered to be necessary by Japanese war planners. The U.S. [War Plan Orange](#) had envisioned defending the Philippines with a 40,000 man elite force. This was opposed by [Douglas MacArthur](#), who felt that he would need a force ten times that size, and was never implemented.<sup>[19]</sup> By 1941, U.S. planners anticipated abandonment of the Philippines at the outbreak of war and orders to that effect were given in late 1941 to [Admiral Thomas Hart](#), commander of the [Asiatic Fleet](#).<sup>[20]</sup>



Pearl Harbor on October 30, 1941.

The U.S. ceased [oil exports](#) to Japan in July 1941, following Japanese expansion into French Indochina after the fall of France, in part because of new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption.<sup>[21]</sup> This in turn caused the Japanese to proceed with plans to take the Dutch East Indies, an oil-rich territory.<sup>[22]</sup> The Japanese were faced with the option of either withdrawing from China and losing face or seizing and securing new sources of raw materials in the resource-rich, European-controlled colonies of South East Asia.

Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally) had begun very early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral [Isoroku Yamamoto](#), then commanding Japan's [Combined Fleet](#).<sup>[23]</sup> He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the [Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff](#) only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command.<sup>[24]</sup> Full-scale planning was underway by early spring 1941, primarily by Captain [Minoru Genda](#).<sup>[citation needed]</sup> Japanese planning staff studied the [1940 British air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto](#) intensively. It was of great use to them when planning their attack on U.S. naval forces in Pearl Harbor.<sup>[nb 5][nb 6]</sup>

Over the next several months, pilots trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence collected. Despite these preparations, the attack plan was not approved by [Emperor Hirohito](#) until November 5, after the third of four Imperial Conferences called to consider the matter.<sup>[27]</sup> Final authorization was not given by the emperor until December 1, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the "[Hull Note](#)" would "destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger [Manchukuo](#) and undermine Japanese control of Korea."<sup>[28]</sup> Though by late 1941 many observers believed that hostilities between the U.S. and Japan were imminent, and U.S. Pacific bases and facilities had been placed on alert on multiple occasions, U.S. officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target. They expected the Philippines to be attacked first, due to the threat that air bases there, as well as the naval base at Manila, would pose to [sea lanes](#), hence supplies to and from territory to the south,<sup>[29]</sup> which were Japan's main objective.<sup>[13]</sup> They also incorrectly believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval operation at a time.<sup>[30]</sup>

### [\[edit\]](#) Objectives


The attack had several major aims. First, it intended to destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 [Vinson-Walsh Act](#) erased any chance of victory.<sup>[31][32]</sup> Finally, it was meant to deliver a severe blow to American morale, one which would discourage Americans from committing to a war extending into the western Pacific Ocean and Dutch East Indies. To maximize the effect on morale, battleships were chosen as the main targets, since they were the prestige ships of any navy at the time. The overall intention was to enable Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference.<sup>[31]</sup>

Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor carried two distinct disadvantages: the targeted ships would be in very shallow water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair them; and most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on [shore leave](#) or would be rescued from the harbor. A further important disadvantage—this of timing, and known to the Japanese—was the absence from Pearl Harbor of all three of the U.S. Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers ([Enterprise](#), [Lexington](#), and [Saratoga](#)). Ironically, the IJN top command was so imbued with [Admiral Mahan](#)'s "decisive battle" doctrine—especially that of destroying the maximum number of battleships—that, despite these concerns, Yamamoto decided to press ahead.

Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious war also meant other targets in the harbor, especially the navy yard, oil tank farms, and submarine base, could safely be ignored, since—by their thinking—the war would be over before the influence of these facilities would be felt.<sup>[33]</sup>

## [edit] Approach and attack

See also: [Order of battle of the Attack on Pearl Harbor](#)



Route followed by the Japanese fleet to Pearl Harbor and back

On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force (the [Striking Force](#)) of six aircraft carriers ([Akagi](#), [Kaga](#), [Sōryū](#), [Hiryū](#), [Shōkaku](#), and [Zuikaku](#)) departed northern Japan *en route* to a position northwest of Hawaii, intending to launch its aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor. In all, 408 aircraft were intended to be used: 360 for the two attack waves, 48 on defensive [combat air patrol](#) (CAP), including nine fighters from the first wave.

The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to finish whatever tasks remained. The first wave contained the bulk of the weapons to attack [capital ships](#), mainly specially adapted [Type 91 aerial torpedoes](#) which were designed with an anti-roll mechanism and a [rudder](#) extension that let them operate in shallow water.<sup>[34]</sup> The aircrews were ordered to select the highest value targets (battleships and [aircraft carriers](#)) or, if these were not present, any other high value ships (cruisers and destroyers). [Dive bombers](#) were to attack ground targets. Fighters were ordered to strafe and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not get into the air to counterattack the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the fighters' fuel got low they were to refuel at the aircraft carriers and return to combat. Fighters were to serve CAP duties where needed, especially over US airfields.

Before the attack commenced, two [reconnaissance aircraft](#) launched from cruisers were sent to scout over Oahu and report on enemy fleet composition and location. Another four scout planes patrolled the area between the Japanese carrier force (the [Kido Butai](#)) and [Niihau](#), in order to prevent the task force from being caught by a surprise counterattack.<sup>[35]</sup>

## [edit] Submarines

Fleet submarines [I-16](#), [I-18](#), [I-20](#), [I-22](#), and [I-24](#) each embarked a [Type A midget submarine](#) for transport to the waters off Oahu.<sup>[36]</sup> The five I-boats left [Kure Naval District](#) on November 25, 1941,<sup>[37]</sup> coming to 10 Nm (19 km) off the mouth of Pearl Harbor<sup>[38]</sup> and launched their charges, at about 01:00 December 7.<sup>[39]</sup> At 03:42<sup>[40]</sup> [Hawaiian Time](#), the [minesweeper USS Condor](#) spotted a midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted the destroyer [USS Ward](#).<sup>[41]</sup> The midget may have entered Pearl Harbor. However, *Ward* sank another midget submarine at 06:37<sup>[41][nb 7]</sup> in the [first American shots fired in World War II](#). A midget on the north side of Ford Island missed the seaplane tender [Curtiss](#) with her first torpedo

and missed the attacking destroyer [Monaghan](#) with her other one before being sunk by [Monaghan](#) at 08:43.<sup>[41]</sup>

A third midget submarine grounded twice, once outside the harbor entrance and again on the east side of Oahu, where it was captured on December 8.<sup>[43]</sup> Ensign [Kazuo Sakamaki](#) swam ashore and was captured, becoming the first Japanese [prisoner of war](#).<sup>[nb 8]</sup> A fourth had been damaged by a depth charge attack and was abandoned by its crew before it could fire its torpedoes.<sup>[44]</sup> A [United States Naval Institute](#) analysis of photographs from the attack conducted in 1999 indicated a midget may have successfully fired a torpedo into [USS West Virginia](#). Japanese forces received a radio message from a midget submarine at 00:41 December 8 claiming damage to one or more large war vessels inside Pearl Harbor.<sup>[45]</sup> The submarine's final disposition has been unknown,<sup>[46]</sup> but she did not return to her "mother" sub.<sup>[47]</sup> On December 7, 2009 the [Los Angeles Times](#) reported that there is circumstantial evidence that three pieces of a submarine discovered three miles south of Pearl Harbor between 1994 and 2001 could be that of the missing submarine. The publication also reported that there is strong circumstantial evidence that the submarine fired two torpedoes at Battleship Row. The debris was dumped outside the harbor as part of an effort to conceal the [West Loch Disaster](#), a 1944 ammunition explosion that destroyed six [tank landing ships](#) preparing for the secret invasion of [Saipan](#).<sup>[48]</sup>


#### [\[edit\]](#) Japanese declaration of war

See also: [Japanese declaration of war on the United States and the British Empire](#)

The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made by Japan, but this was not Admiral Yamamoto's intention. He originally stipulated that the attack should not commence until thirty minutes after Japan had informed the United States that peace negotiations were at an end.<sup>[49][50]</sup> The Japanese tried to uphold the conventions of war while still achieving surprise, but the attack began before the notice could be delivered. Tokyo transmitted the 5,000-word notification (commonly called the "14-Part Message") in two blocks to the [Japanese Embassy in Washington](#), but transcribing the message took too long for the Japanese Ambassador to deliver it in time. (In fact, U.S. code breakers had already deciphered and translated most of the message hours before he was scheduled to deliver it.)<sup>[51]</sup> The final part of the "14-Part Message" is sometimes described as a declaration of war, but in fact it "neither declared war nor severed diplomatic relations".<sup>[52]</sup> A declaration of war was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8,<sup>[53]</sup> but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.

For decades, conventional wisdom held that Japan attacked without any official warning of a break in relations only because of accidents and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document to Washington hinting at war. In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and international relations at the [International Christian University](#) in Tokyo, discovered documents that pointed to a vigorous debate inside the government over how, indeed whether, to notify Washington of Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations ... [a]nd they clearly prevailed."<sup>[54]</sup>

[\[edit\]](#) First wave composition



The Japanese attacked in two waves. The first wave was detected by U.S. Army radar at 136 nautical miles (252 km), but was misidentified as USAAF bombers arriving from mainland U.S.A.

Top:

A. Ford Island NAS B. Hickam Field C. Bellows Field D. Wheeler Field

E. Kaneohe NAS F. Ewa MCAS R-1. Opana Radar Station R-2. Kawaihoa RS R-3. Kaaawa RS

G. Haleiwa H. Kahuku I. Wahiawa J. Kaneohe K. Honolulu

0. B-17s from mainland 1. First strike group 1-1. Level bombers 1-2. Torpedo bombers 1-3. Dive bombers

2. Second strike group 2-1. Level bombers 2-1F. Fighters 2-2. Dive bombers

Bottom:

A. Wake Island B. Midway Islands C. Johnston Island D. Hawaii

D-1. Oahu 1. USS *Lexington* 2. USS *Enterprise* 3. First Air Fleet



<21 feet (6.4 m)

22–23 feet (6.7–7.0 m)

29 feet (8.8 m)

30–32 feet (9.1–9.8 m)

33–34 feet (10.1–10.4 m)

34–35 feet (10.4–10.7 m)

36–37 feet (11.0–11.3 m)

38–39 feet (11.6–11.9 m)

40–41 feet (12.2–12.5 m)

42–48 feet (12.8–14.6 m)

>49 feet (14.9 m)

City

Army base

Navy base

Attacked targets:

- 1: [USS California](#)
- 2: [USS Maryland](#)
- 3: [USS Oklahoma](#)
- 4: [USS Tennessee](#)
- 5: [USS West Virginia](#)
- 6: [USS Arizona](#)
- 7: [USS Nevada](#)
- 8: [USS Pennsylvania](#)
- 9: [Ford Island NAS](#)
- 10: [Hickam field](#)

Ignored infrastructure targets:

- A: Oil storage tanks
- B: CINCPAC headquarters building
- C: Submarine base
- D: Navy Yard

The first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu, commanded by [Captain Mitsuo Fuchida](#). It included:<sup>[nb 9]</sup>

- **1st Group** (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)<sup>[56]</sup>
  - 50 [Nakajima B5N Kate](#) bombers armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) [armor piercing bombs](#), organized in four sections
  - 40 B5N bombers armed with [Type 91 torpedoes](#), also in four sections
- **2nd Group** – (targets: [Ford Island](#) and [Wheeler Field](#))
  - 54 [Aichi D3A Val](#) dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) [general purpose bombs](#)
- **3rd Group** – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, Kaneohe)
  - 45 [Mitsubishi A6M Zeke](#) fighters for air control and [strafing](#)<sup>[55]</sup>

Six planes failed to launch due to technical difficulties.<sup>[35]</sup>



A destroyed [Vindicator](#) at [Ewa field](#), the victim of one of the smaller attacks on the approach to Pearl Harbor.

As the first wave approached Oahu a U.S. Army [SCR-270 radar](#) at [Opana Point](#) near the island's northern tip (a post not yet operational, having been in training mode for months) detected them and called in a warning. Although the operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard,<sup>[57]</sup> reported a target, a newly assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, Lieutenant [Kermit A. Tyler](#), presumed the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers was the source. The direction from which the aircraft were coming was close (only a few degrees separated the two inbound courses),<sup>[58]</sup> while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar;<sup>[59]</sup> they neglected to tell Tyler of its size,<sup>[60]</sup> while Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell them the B-17s were due<sup>[60]</sup> (even though it was widely known).<sup>[60]</sup>

Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the first wave approached land, and one at least radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the attacking planes began bombing and strafing. Nevertheless it is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even if they had been interpreted correctly and much more promptly. The results the Japanese achieved in the [Philippines](#) were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though [MacArthur](#) had almost nine hours warning that the Japanese had already attacked at Pearl and specific orders to commence operations before they actually struck his command.

The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time<sup>[61]</sup> (3:18 a.m. December 8 [Japanese Standard Time](#), as kept by ships of the *Kido Butai*),<sup>[62]</sup> with the attack on Kaneohe. A total of 353<sup>[10]</sup> Japanese planes in two waves reached Oahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main U.S. Army Air Force fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Air Corps' [Bellows Field](#) near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and [Ford Island](#). The only aerial opposition came from a handful of [P-36 Hawks](#), [P-40 Warhawks](#) and some [SBD Dauntless](#) dive bombers from the carrier [USS Enterprise](#).<sup>[nb 10]</sup>

Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting bleary-eyed men into dressing as they ran to [General Quarters](#) stations. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.",<sup>[nb 11]</sup> was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian command to respond.) The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to deter sabotage,<sup>[63]</sup> guns unmanned (none of the Navy's [5"/38s](#), only a quarter of its [machine guns](#), and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action).<sup>[63]</sup> Despite this low [alert status](#), many American military personnel responded effectively during the battle.<sup>[nb 12]</sup> Ensign Joe Taussig, Jr., the only commissioned officer aboard [USS Nevada](#), got the ship underway during the attack but lost a leg. The ship was beached in the harbor by the Senior Quartermaster.<sup>[64]</sup> One of the destroyers, [USS Aylwin](#), got underway with only four officers aboard, all ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty; she operated at sea for 36 hours before her commanding officer managed to get back aboard.<sup>[65]</sup> Captain [Mervyn Bennion](#), commanding [USS West Virginia](#) (Kimmel's flagship), led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit [USS Tennessee](#), moored alongside.


### [\[edit\]](#) Second wave composition

The second wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by [Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki](#).<sup>[55]</sup> Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties.<sup>[35]</sup> This wave and its targets comprised:<sup>[55]</sup>

- **1st Group** – 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg) general purpose bombs<sup>[56]</sup>
  - 27 B5Ns – aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point
  - 27 B5Ns – hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
- **2nd Group** (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers)
  - 81 D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs, in four sections
- **3rd Group** – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
  - 36 A6Ms for defense and strafing

The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to attack Kāneʻohe, the rest Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously, from several directions.

Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,386 Americans died (55 were civilians, most killed by unexploded American anti-aircraft shells landing in civilian areas), a further 1,139 wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk or run aground, including five battleships.<sup>[nb 13][4]</sup>



USS Arizona (BB-39) during the attack

Of the American fatalities, nearly half of the total (1,177) were due to the explosion of [Arizona's](#) forward [magazine](#) after it was hit by a modified 40 cm (16 in.) shell.<sup>[nb 14]</sup>

Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire amidships, *Nevada* attempted to exit the harbor. She was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got under way and sustained more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs which started further fires. She was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance.

[California](#) was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from *Arizona* and *West Virginia* drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed [target ship Utah](#) was holed twice by torpedoes. [West Virginia](#) was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. [Oklahoma](#) was hit by four torpedoes, the

last two above her [belt armor](#), which caused her to [capsize](#). [Maryland](#) was hit by two of the converted 40 cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.

Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The [light cruiser Helena](#) was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer [Oglala](#). Two destroyers in [dry dock](#), [Cassin](#) and [Downes](#) were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel [bunkers](#). The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and both were burned out. [Cassin](#) slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against [Downes](#). The light cruiser [Raleigh](#) was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser [Honolulu](#) was damaged but remained in service. The repair vessel [Vestal](#), moored alongside [Arizona](#), was heavily damaged and beached. The [seaplane tender Curtiss](#) was also damaged. The destroyer [Shaw](#) was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.<sup>[66]</sup>

Of the 402<sup>[10]</sup> American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159 damaged,<sup>[10]</sup> 155 of them on the ground. Almost none was actually ready to take off to defend the base. Eight Army Air Corps pilots managed to get airborne during the battle<sup>[67]</sup> and six were credited with downing at least one Japanese aircraft during the attack, 1st Lt. Lewis M. Sanders, 2nd Lt. [Philip M. Rasmussen](#), 2nd Lt. [Kenneth M. Taylor](#), 2nd Lt. [George S. Welch](#), 2nd Lt. [Harry W. Brown](#), and 2nd Lt. Gordon H. Sterling Jr. Sterling was shot down and killed by friendly fire returning from the fight.<sup>[68]</sup> Of 33 [PBYS](#) in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, and six others damaged beyond repair. (The three on patrol returned undamaged.) [Friendly fire](#) brought down some U.S. planes on top of that, including five from an inbound flight from [Enterprise](#). Japanese attacks on barracks killed additional personnel.

Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action, and one was captured. Of Japan's 414<sup>[55]</sup> available planes, 29 were lost during the battle<sup>[69]</sup> (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second),<sup>[nb 15]</sup> with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.

### [\[edit\]](#) Possible third wave

Several Japanese junior officers, including [Mitsuo Fuchida](#) and [Minoru Genda](#), the chief architect of the attack, urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's fuel and torpedo<sup>[nb 16]</sup> storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities as possible.<sup>[70]</sup> Military historians have suggested the destruction of these would have hampered the U.S. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than loss of its battleships.<sup>[71]</sup> If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year";<sup>[72]</sup> according to American Admiral [Chester Nimitz](#), later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the war another two years."<sup>[73]</sup> Nagumo, however, decided to withdraw for several reasons:

- American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave.<sup>[74]</sup> Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.<sup>[74]</sup>
- The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers.<sup>[74]</sup> Nagumo was uncertain whether the U.S. had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against his carriers.<sup>[75]</sup>

- A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the (British) Royal Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.<sup>[76]</sup>
- The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very limit of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.<sup>[77]</sup>
- He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission—the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet—and did not wish to risk further losses.<sup>[78]</sup> Moreover, it was Japanese Navy practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of the enemy.<sup>[79]</sup>

At a conference aboard *Yamato* the following morning, Yamamoto initially supported Nagumo.<sup>[78]</sup> In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and oil depots meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.<sup>[80]</sup>

### [\[edit\]](#) Photographs

The first [aerial photographs](#) of the attack on Pearl Harbor were taken by [Lee Embree](#), who was aboard a [Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress](#) en route from [Hamilton Field, California](#), to the [Philippines](#).<sup>[81]</sup> Lee's [38th Reconnaissance Squadron](#) had scheduled a refueling stop at [Hickam Field](#) at the time of the attack.<sup>[81]</sup>



Crew members aboard [Shokaku](#) launching the attack



A Japanese [Mitsubishi A6M2 "Zero"](#) fighter airplane of the second wave takes off from the aircraft carrier [Akagi](#) on the morning of December 7, 1941.



Zeroes of the second wave preparing to take off from [Shokaku](#) for Pearl Harbor



A Japanese [Nakajima B5N2 "Kate"](#) torpedo bomber takes off from *Shokaku*.



Japanese [Aichi D3A1 "Val"](#) dive bombers of the second wave preparing for take off. Aircraft carrier [Soryu](#) in the background.



Battleship [USS California](#) sinking



Battleship [USS Arizona](#) explodes.



Destroyer [USS Shaw](#) exploding after her forward magazine was detonated



Battleship [USS Nevada](#) attempting to escape from the harbor.



Battleship [USS West Virginia](#) took two aerial bombs, both duds, and seven torpedo hits, one of which may have come from a midget submarine.



A destroyed [B-17](#) after the attack on Hickam Field.



Hangar in [Ford Island](#) burns



Aftermath: [USS West Virginia](#) (severely damaged), [USS Tennessee](#) (damaged), and the [USS Arizona](#) (sunk).

## [\[edit\]](#) Ship losses

### [\[edit\]](#) Battleships

- [Arizona](#): Exploded; total loss. 1,177 dead.
- [Oklahoma](#): Capsized; refloated November 1943; capsized and lost while under tow to the mainland May 1947 <sup>[82]</sup> 429 dead.
- [West Virginia](#): two bombs, seven torpedoes, sunk; returned to service July 1944. 106 dead.
- [California](#): two bombs, two torpedoes, sunk; returned to service January 1944. 100 dead.
- [Nevada](#): six bombs, one torpedo, beached; returned to service October 1942. 60 dead.
- [Tennessee](#): two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 5 dead.
- [Maryland](#): two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 4 dead (including floatplane pilot shot down).
- [Pennsylvania](#): in [drydock](#) with *Cassin* and *Downes*, one bomb, debris from USS *Cassin*; remained in service. 9 dead.

### [\[edit\]](#) Ex-battleship (target/AA training ship)

- [Utah](#): Capsized; total loss. 58 dead.

### [\[edit\]](#) Cruisers

- [Helena](#): One torpedo; returned to service January 1942. 20 dead.
- [Raleigh](#): One torpedo; remained in service.
- [Honolulu](#): Near miss, light damage; remained in service.

### [\[edit\]](#) Destroyers

- [Cassin](#): in drydock with *Downes* and *Pennsylvania*, One bomb, burned; returned to service February 1944.
- [Downes](#): in drydock with *Cassin* and *Pennsylvania*, caught fire from *Cassin*, burned; returned to service November 1943.
- [Shaw](#): Three bombs; returned to service June 1942.

### [\[edit\]](#) Auxiliaries

- [Oglala](#) (minelayer): Damaged by torpedo hit on *Helena*, capsized; returned to service (as engine-repair ship) February 1944.
- [Vestal](#) (repair ship): Two bombs, blast and fire from *Arizona*, beached; returned to service by August 1942.
- [Curtiss](#) (seaplane tender): One bomb, one Japanese aircraft; returned to service January 1942. 19 dead.

## [\[edit\]](#) Salvage



Captain [Homer N. Wallin](#) (center) supervises salvage operations aboard [USS California](#), early 1942

After a systematic search for survivors, formal salvage operations began. Captain [Homer N. Wallin](#), Material Officer for Commander, Battle Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was immediately retained to lead salvage operations.<sup>[nb 17]</sup>

Around Pearl Harbor, divers from the Navy (shore and tenders), the [Naval Shipyard](#), and civilian contractors (Pacific Bridge and others) began work on the ships that could be refloated. They patched holes, cleared debris, and pumped water out of ships. Navy divers worked inside the damaged ships. Within six months, five battleships and two cruisers were patched or refloated so they could be sent to shipyards in Pearl and on the mainland for extensive repair.

Intensive salvage operations continued for another year, a total of some 20,000 man-hours under water.<sup>[84]</sup> *Oklahoma*, while successfully raised, was never repaired, and capsized while under tow to the mainland in 1947. *Arizona* and the target ship *Utah* were too heavily damaged for salvage, though much of their armament and equipment was removed and put to use aboard other vessels. Today, the two hulks remain where they were sunk,<sup>[85]</sup> with *Arizona* becoming a [war memorial](#).

## [\[edit\]](#) Aftermath

Main article: [Results of the attack on Pearl Harbor](#)

See also: [Infamy Speech](#), [Declaration of war by the United States](#), [United States declaration of war upon Japan](#), and [United Kingdom declaration of war on Japan \(1941\)](#)



[USS Pennsylvania](#), behind the wreckage of the [USS Downes](#) and [USS Cassin](#).

In the wake of the attack, 15 [Medals of Honor](#), 51 [Navy Crosses](#), 53 Silver Crosses, four [Navy and Marine Corps Medals](#), one [Distinguished Flying Cross](#), four [Distinguished Service Crosses](#), one [Distinguished Service Medal](#), and three [Bronze Stars](#) were awarded to the American servicemen who distinguished themselves in combat at Pearl Harbor.<sup>[86]</sup> Additionally, a special [military award](#), the [Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal](#), was later authorized for all military veterans of the attack.

The day after the attack, Roosevelt delivered his famous [Infamy Speech](#) to a [Joint Session of Congress](#), calling for a [formal declaration of war on the Empire of Japan](#). Congress obliged his request less than an hour later.

In [Europe](#), [Nazi Germany](#) and the [Kingdom of Italy](#) subsequently [declared war on the United States](#) on December 11, after they began operations against a fellow Axis member. The [United States Congress](#) reciprocated the [declaration of war against Germany](#) and [against Italy](#) later that same day. Britain actually declared war on Japan nine hours before the US did, partially due to Japanese attacks on Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong, and partially due to Winston Churchill's promise to declare war "within the hour" of a Japanese attack on the United States.<sup>[87]</sup>

The attack was an initial shock to all the Allies in the Pacific Theater. Further losses compounded the alarming setback. Japan [attacked the Philippines](#) hours later (because of the time difference, it was December 8 in the Philippines). Only three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the [Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk](#) off the coast of [Malaya](#), causing British Prime Minister [Winston Churchill](#) later to recollect "In all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the [Indian Ocean](#) or the [Pacific](#) except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to California. Over this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked".<sup>[88]</sup>

Throughout the war, Pearl Harbor was frequently used in [American propaganda](#).<sup>[89]</sup>

One further consequence of the attacks on Pearl Harbor and its aftermath (notably the [Niihau Incident](#)) was that Japanese American residents and citizens were relocated to nearby [Japanese-](#)

[American internment](#) camps. Within hours of the attack, hundreds of Japanese American leaders were rounded up and brought to high-security camps such as [Sand Island](#) at the mouth of Honolulu harbor and [Kilauea Military Camp](#) on the [island of Hawaii](#).<sup>[90][91]</sup> Later, over 110,000 Japanese Americans, including United States citizens, were removed from their homes and transferred to internment camps in California, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Wyoming, Colorado, and Arkansas.<sup>[92][93]</sup>

Today, the USS Arizona Memorial on the island of Oahu honors the lives lost on the day of the attack. Visitors to the memorial access it via boats from the naval base at Pearl Harbor. Alfred Preis is the architect responsible for the memorial's design. The structure has a sagging center and its ends strong and vigorous. It commemorates "initial defeat and ultimate victory" of all lives lost on December 7, 1941.<sup>[94]</sup> Although December 7 is known as Pearl Harbor Day, it is not considered a federal holiday in the United States. The nation does however, continue to pay homage remembering the thousands injured and killed when attacked by the Japanese in 1941. Schools and other establishments across the country respectfully lower the American flag to half-staff.<sup>[95]</sup>

### [\[edit\]](#) Strategic implications

Admiral [Hara Tadaichi](#) summed up the Japanese result by saying, "We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war."<sup>[96]</sup> While the attack accomplished its intended objective, it turned out to be largely unnecessary. Unbeknownst to Yamamoto, who conceived the original plan, the U.S. Navy had decided as far back as 1935 to abandon 'charging' across the Pacific towards the Philippines in response to an outbreak of war (in keeping with the evolution of Plan Orange).<sup>[18]</sup> The U.S. instead adopted "[Plan Dog](#)" in 1940, which emphasized keeping the IJN out of the eastern Pacific and away from the shipping lanes to Australia while the U.S. concentrated on defeating Nazi Germany.<sup>[97]</sup>

Fortunately for the United States, the American aircraft carriers were untouched by the Japanese attack, otherwise the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations would have been crippled for a year or so (given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to rely on its aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance. Six of the eight battleships were repaired and returned to service, but their slow speed limited their deployment, serving mainly in shore bombardment roles. A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by battleships, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain [Alfred Thayer Mahan](#). As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened.<sup>[98]</sup>

Ultimately, targets not on Genda's list, such as the submarine base and the old headquarters building, proved more important than any battleship. It was submarines that immobilized the Imperial Japanese Navy's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a virtual standstill by crippling the transportation of oil and raw materials: import of raw materials was down by half what it had been at the end of 1942, "to a disastrous ten million tons", while oil import "was almost completely stopped".<sup>[99]</sup> Also, the basement of the Old Administration Building was the home of the [cryptanalytic unit](#) which contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarine Force's success.

## [\[edit\]](#) Media

### [FDR Pearl Harbor speech](#)



Speech given before Joint Session of Congress in entirety. (3.1 [MB](#), [ogg/Vorbis](#) format).

[Read full text on Wikisource](#)



---

### ["A date which will live in infamy"](#)



Section of Pearl Harbor speech with famous phrase. (168 [KB](#), [ogg/Vorbis](#) format).

---

*Problems listening to these files? See [media help](#).*

## [\[edit\]](#) Fiction

- [The Final Countdown](#) is a movie set around Pearl Harbor, in which the nuclear [aircraft carrier](#), [USS Nimitz](#), from 1980 is [time-warped](#) back to December 6, 1941, one day before the attack on the base.
- [From Here to Eternity](#) by [James Jones](#). The attack on Pearl Harbor plays a crucial role for Robert E. Lee Prewitt.
- [In Harm's Way](#), a 1965 [Otto Preminger](#) film version of a [James Bassett](#) novel which opens on the eve of 6 December 1941 in Hawaii, and depicts the attack from the point of view of the men of a ship that is able to leave the harbor.
- [Pearl Harbor](#) is a 2001 film directed by [Michael Bay](#), a love story of little historical accuracy.

## [\[edit\]](#) Historical fiction

- [Air Force](#), a 1943 [propaganda](#) film depicting the fate of the crew of the *Mary-Ann*, one of the [B-17 Flying Fortress](#) bombers that fly into [Hickam Field](#) during the attack.
- [December 7th](#), directed by [John Ford](#) for the U.S. Navy in 1943, is a film that recreates the attacks of the Japanese forces. Other documentaries, as well as media stories, have mistakenly replayed images from this film, passing them off as authentic footage of the actual Pearl Harbor attack.<sup>[100]</sup>
- [Storm Over the Pacific](#) also known as *Hawai Middouei daikaikusen: Taiheiyo no arashi* (Hawaii - Midway Battle of the Sea and Sky: Storm in the Pacific Ocean) was produced by the Japanese studio [Toho Company Ltd.](#) in 1960 telling the story of Japanese airmen who served in the Pearl Harbor Raid and Battle of Midway. An edited version dubbed into English as *I Bombed Pearl Harbor* was given U.S. release in 1961.

- [\*Tora! Tora! Tora!\*](#) is a 1970 movie about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which is meticulous in its approach to dissecting the situation leading up to the December 7, 1941. It depicts the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor from both American and Japanese points of view, with attention to historical fact, including the U.S. use of [cryptanalysis](#) (known as [MAGIC](#)).<sup>[101]</sup>
- [\*The Winds of War\*](#), a novel by American writer [Herman Wouk](#), written between 1963 and 1971. The novel finishes in December 1941 with the aftermath of the attack. The TV miniseries based on the book was produced by Dan Curtis, airing in 1984. It starred [Robert Mitchum](#) and [Ali MacGraw](#), with [Ralph Bellamy](#) as President Roosevelt.

### [\[edit\]](#) Non-fiction/historical

- [\*The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History\*](#) by Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis is a careful recreation of the "Day of Infamy" using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD. From the early stages of Japanese planning, through the attack on [Battleship Row](#), to the salvage of the U.S. Pacific fleet, this book provides a detailed overview of the attack.
- [\*At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor\*](#) by [Gordon W. Prange](#) is an extremely comprehensive account of the events leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and is considered by most scholars to be the best single work about the raid. It is a balanced account that gives both the Japanese and American perspectives. Prange spent 37 years researching the book by studying documents about Pearl Harbor and interviewing surviving participants to attempt the most exhaustive account of what happened: the Japanese planning and execution, why US intelligence failed to warn of it, and why a peace agreement was not attained. *The Village* called the book, "By far the most exhaustive and complete account we are likely to have of exactly what happened and how and why."<sup>[citation needed]</sup> The book is the first in the so-called "Prange Trilogy" of Pearl Harbor books co-written with Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, the other two being:
  - [\*Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History\*](#) – a dissection of the various [revisionist](#) theories surrounding the attack.
  - [\*December 7, 1941: The Day The Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor\*](#) – a recollection of the attack as narrated by eyewitnesses.
- [\*Day of Infamy\*](#) by [Walter Lord](#) was one of the most popular nonfiction accounts of the attack on Pearl Harbor.<sup>[102]</sup>
- [\*Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment\*](#) by [Henry C. Clausen](#) and Bruce Lee tells of Clausen's top-secret investigation of the events leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. Much of the information in this book was still classified when previous books were published.
- [\*Pearl Harbor Countdown: Admiral James O. Richardson\*](#) by Skipper Steely is an insightful and detailed account of the events leading up to the attack. Through his comprehensive treatment of the life and times of Admiral [James O. Richardson](#), Steely explores four decades of American foreign policy, traditional military practice, U.S. intelligence, and the administrative side of the military, exposing the largely untold story of the events leading up to the Japanese attack.

- *Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans*, released by Goldstein and Dillon in 1993, used materials from Prange's library to further flesh out the Japanese perspective of the attack, including diaries from some officers and ship logs.

### [\[edit\]](#) Alternate history

- *Days of Infamy* is a novel by [Harry Turtledove](#) in which the Japanese attack on Hawaii is not limited to a strike on Pearl Harbor, but is instead a full-scale invasion and eventual occupation after U.S. forces are driven off the islands (something one of the key planners of the attack, Commander [Minoru Genda](#) wanted but the senior officers realized was impossible).<sup>[103]</sup> The many viewpoint characters (a Turtledove trademark) are drawn from Hawaiian civilians (both white and Japanese) as well as soldiers and sailors from both Japan and the USA. Turtledove has to date written one sequel, *The End of the Beginning*.
- The airstrike and Hawaii-invasion premise of *Days of Infamy* was earlier used in the first episode of the anime OVA series *Konpeki no Kantai*. In the episode, Japan carries out the attack in the early hours of the morning, having perfected night carrier operations. The raid begins with a [flare](#) drop by pathfinders. The entire base (including the repair facilities) and a number of supply ships in the harbor are destroyed by daybreak. As for the main body of the Pacific Fleet, the Combined Fleet regroups and annihilates them while they return to Pearl Harbor. The episode, which is divided into three stages in the series' game version, ends with Japanese troops landing at all islands in Hawaii.

### [\[edit\]](#) See also



[World War II portal](#)



[Military of the United States portal](#)



[War portal](#)

- [Air warfare of World War II](#)
- [Attack on Howland Island](#)
- [List of United States Navy ships present at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941](#)
- [Nagai Kita](#)
- [National Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day](#)
- [Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory](#)
- [Pearl Harbor Survivors Association](#)
- [USS Arizona Memorial](#)
- [Winds Code](#)

### [\[edit\]](#) Notes

1. <sup>^</sup> Unless otherwise stated, all vessels listed were salvageable.<sup>[2]</sup>
2. <sup>^</sup> [USS Utah](#) (AG-16, formerly BB-31); the *Utah* was moored in the space intended to have been occupied by the carrier *Enterprise* which, returning with a task force, had been expected to enter the

- channel at 0730 on 7 December. Strong headwinds delayed the refueling of the destroyers, and the task force didn't reach Pearl Harbor until dusk the following day.<sup>[11]</sup>
3. [^](#) After it was announced in September iron and steel scrap export would also be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940 warning this might be considered an "unfriendly act".<sup>[15]</sup>
  4. [^](#) This was mainly a Japanese Navy preference; the Japanese Army would have chosen to attack the Soviet Union.<sup>[22]</sup>
  5. [^](#) "The Dorn report did not state with certainty that Kimmel and Short knew about Taranto. There is, however, no doubt that they did know, as did the Japanese. Lt. Cdr. Takeshi Naito, the assistance [naval attaché](#) to Berlin, flew to Taranto to investigate the attack first hand, and Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with Cdr. [Mitsuo Fuchida](#) about his observations. Fichida led the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941."<sup>[25]</sup>
  6. [^](#) "A [torpedo bomber](#) needed a long, level flight, and when released, its conventional torpedo would plunge nearly a hundred feet deep before swerving upward to strike a hull. Pearl Harbor deep averages 42 feet. But the Japanese borrowed an idea from the British carrier-based torpedo raid on the Italian naval base of Taranto. They fashioned auxiliary wooden tail fins to keep the torpedoes horizontal, so they would dive to only 35 feet, and they added a breakaway "nosecone" of soft wood to cushion the impact with the surface of the water."<sup>[26]</sup>
  7. [^](#) She was located by a [University of Hawaii](#) research submersible on August 28, 2002 in 400 meters of water, five miles outside the harbor.<sup>[42]</sup>
  8. [^](#) While the nine sailors who died in the attack were quickly lionized by the Japanese government as *kyūgunshin* (The Nine War Heroes), the news of Sakamaki's capture, which had been publicized in US news broadcasts, was kept secret. Even after the war, however, he would receive recriminating correspondence from those who despised him for not sacrificing his own life.
  9. [^](#) The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Planning and Execution. First wave: 189 planes, 50 Kates w/bombs, 40 Kates with torpedoes, 54 Vals, 45 Zekes Second wave: 171 planes, 54 Kates w/bombs, 81 Vals, 36 Zekes. The Combat Air Patrol over the carriers alternated 18 plane shifts every two hours with 18 more ready for takeoff on the flight decks and an additional 18 ready on hangar decks.<sup>[51]</sup>
  10. [^](#) In the twenty-five sorties flown, USAF Historical Study No.85 credits six pilots with ten planes destroyed: 1st Lt Lewis M. Sanders (P-36) and 2nd Lts Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr. (P-36, [killed in action](#)), Harry W. Brown (P-36), [Kenneth M. Taylor](#) (P-40, 2), and [George S. Welch](#) (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were not verified by the Japanese and may have been shot down by naval [anti-aircraft](#) fire.
  11. [^](#) Odd though it may sound, "not" is correct, in keeping with standard Navy telegraphic practice. This was confirmed by Beloit and Beloit after years of research and debate.
  12. [^](#) The gunners that did get in action scored most of the victories against Japanese aircraft that morning, including the first of the attack by [Tautog](#), and [Dorie Miller's Navy Cross](#)-worthy effort. Miller was an [African-American](#) cook aboard *West Virginia* who took over an unattended [anti-aircraft gun](#) on which he had no training. He was the first African-American sailor to be awarded the Navy Cross.
  13. [^](#) Navy and Marines: 2,117 killed in action or died of wounds, 779 wounded; Army 215 killed in action or died of wounds, 360 wounded.<sup>[3]</sup>
  14. [^](#) The wreck has become a [memorial](#) to those lost that day, most of whom remain within the ship. She continues to leak small amounts of [fuel oil](#), over 60 years after the attack.
  15. [^](#) [USAAF](#) pilots of the 46th and 47th Pursuit Squadrons, 15th Pursuit Group, claim to have destroyed 10.
  16. [^](#) In the event, loss of these might have been a net benefit to the U.S. Blair, *passim*.
  17. [^](#) Commander [Edward Ellsberg](#) was ordered to [Massawa](#) as his replacement, to assist the British in clearing [scuttled](#) Italian and German ships. This arguably delayed by several months British hopes for a useful port on the Red Sea. Commander [Edward Ellsberg](#), O.B.E.<sup>[83]</sup>

## [edit] References

1. <sup>^</sup> ["Ships present at Pearl Harbor 0800 December 7, 1941 US Navy Historical Center"](http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-2.htm). History.navy.mil. <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-2.htm>. Retrieved 2011-07-17.
2. <sup>^</sup> [CinCP report of damage to ships in Pearl Harbor](http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar) from www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar.
3. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> <sup>c</sup> [Conn 2000](#), p. 194
4. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> [GPO 1946](#), pp. 64–65
5. <sup>^</sup> [Gilbert 2009](#), p. 272.
6. <sup>^</sup> Prange, Gordon W., Goldstein, Donald, & Dillon, Katherine. *The Pearl Harbor Papers* (Brassey's, 2000), p.17ff; [Google Books entry](#) on Prange *et al.*
7. <sup>^</sup> For the Japanese designator of Oahu. Wilford, Timothy. "Decoding Pearl Harbor", in *The Northern Mariner*, XII, #1 (January 2002), p.32fn81.
8. <sup>^</sup> Fukudome, Shigeru, "Hawaii Operation". United States Naval Institute, *Proceedings*, 81 (December 1955), pp.1315–1331
9. <sup>^</sup> [Morison 2001](#), pp. 101, 120, 250
10. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> <sup>c</sup> <sup>d</sup> <sup>e</sup> [Parillo 2006](#), p. 288
11. <sup>^</sup> [Thomas 2007](#), pp. 57–59.
12. <sup>^</sup> ["Full Pearl Harbor casualty list"](#). Usswestvirginia.org. <http://www.usswestvirginia.org/ph/phlist.php>. Retrieved 2011-07-17.
13. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> [Barnhart 1987](#).
14. <sup>^</sup> Werner Gruhl (2007). *Imperial Japan's World War Two, 1931-1945*. Transaction Publishers. p.39. ISBN 978-0-7658-0352-8
15. <sup>^</sup> [GPO 1943](#), p. 96
16. <sup>^</sup> [GPO 1943](#), p. 94
17. <sup>^</sup> Toland, *Japan's War*. <sup>[clarification needed]</sup>
18. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> <sup>c</sup> <sup>d</sup> [Peattie 1997](#)
19. <sup>^</sup> William Chalek (2002), "8. War Plan Orange", *Guest of the Emperor*, iUniverse, pp. 45–52, ISBN 9780595239962, <http://books.google.com/books?id=30KUgALzEF8C&pg=PA45>
20. <sup>^</sup> Edward S. Miller (2007), *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945*, Naval Institute Press, pp. 63, ISBN 9781591145004, <http://books.google.com/books?id=uZ0Bw4c8vKwC>
21. <sup>^</sup> [GPO 1943](#), p. 125
22. <sup>^</sup> [Peattie 1997](#); Coox, *Kobun*.
23. <sup>^</sup> [Gailey 1995](#), p. 68
24. <sup>^</sup> [Gailey 1995](#), p. 70
25. <sup>^</sup> [Borch & Martinez 2005](#), pp. 53–54.
26. <sup>^</sup> *Hellions of the Deep: The Development of American Torpedoes in World War II*. By Robert Gannon, Published by Penn State Press, 1996, page 49. ISBN 0-271-01508-X
27. <sup>^</sup> [Wetzler 1998](#), p. 39.
28. <sup>^</sup> [Bix 2000](#), p. 417, citing the Sugiyama memo
29. <sup>^</sup> Noted by [Arthur MacArthur](#) in the 1890s. Manchester, William. *American Caesar*
30. <sup>^</sup> Peattie & Evans, *Kaigun*
31. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> [Willmott 1983](#), p. 14.
32. <sup>^</sup> [Fukudome, Shigeru](#). *Shikan: Shinjuwan Kogeki* (Tokyo, 1955), p.150.
33. <sup>^</sup> [Willmott 1983](#)
34. <sup>^</sup> [Peattie 2001](#) p. 145.
35. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> <sup>c</sup> Tony DiGiulian. "Order of Battle – Pearl Harbor – December 7, 1941". Navweaps.com. [http://www.navweaps.com/index\\_oob/OOB\\_WWII\\_Pacific/OOB\\_WWII\\_Pearl\\_Harbor.htm](http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Pearl_Harbor.htm). Retrieved 2011-07-17.
36. <sup>^</sup> Stewart, A.J., Lieutenant Commander, USN. "Those Mysterious Midgets", *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1974, p.56
37. <sup>^</sup> Stewart, p.56

38. [^ Goldstein 2000](#), p. 146
39. [^ Stewart](#), "Those Mysterious Midgets", p.57
40. [^ Smith 1999](#), p. 36
41. [^ <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> <sup>c</sup> Stewart](#), "Those Mysterious Midgets", p.58
42. [^ "Japanese Midget Submarine"](#). <http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/HURL/midget.html>. Retrieved 2008-09-07.
43. [^ Stewart](#), pp.59–61
44. [^ Stewart](#), "Those Mysterious Midgets", p.61–2
45. [^ Ofstie, R.A.](#), Rear Admiral, USN. *The Campaigns of the Pacific War* (United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p.19
46. [^ Rodgaard 1999](#)
47. [^ Mochitsura Hashimoto](#) (1954), *Sunk*, p. 31
48. [^ Maugh, Thomas H.](#) (2009-12-07). "[Pearl Harbor mini-submarine mystery solved? Researchers think they have found the remains of a Japanese mini-submarine that probably fired on U.S. battleships on Dec. 7, 1941](#)". Los Angeles Times. [http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-sci-minisub7-2009dec07\\_0\\_6991792.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-sci-minisub7-2009dec07_0_6991792.story). Retrieved 2011-07-17.
49. [^ Hixson 2003](#), p. 73
50. [^ Calvocoressi et al.](#), *The Penguin History of the Second World War*, p.952
51. [^ Toland](#), *Infamy*
52. [^ Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1988](#), p. 58
53. [^ Declaration of War handout](#) <sup>[[dead link](#)]</sup>
54. [^ Howard W. French](#) (December 9, 1999). "[Pearl Harbor Truly a Sneak Attack, Papers Show](#)". The New York Times. <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/09/world/pearl-harbor-truly-a-sneak-attack-papers-show.html?pagewanted=1>.
55. [^ <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> <sup>c</sup> <sup>d</sup> <sup>e</sup> "Aircraft Attack Organization"](#). Ibiblio.org. <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/PTO-Campaigns/USSBS-PTO-2.html#appendix3>. Retrieved 2011-07-17.
56. [^ <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> NavSource 2003](#)
57. [^ The American Century](#), Harold Evans, Jonathan Cape, London, 1998 p.309
58. [^ Prange 1999](#), p. 98 <sup>[[citation needed](#)]</sup>
59. [^ Prange et al.](#), *At Dawn We Slept*, p.500.
60. [^ <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> <sup>c</sup> Prange et al.](#), *At Dawn We Slept*, p.501.
61. [^ Prange et al.](#) *December 7, 1941*, p.174.
62. [^ Symonds, Craig L.](#) *The Battle Of Midway*, (Oxford University Press, 2011), p.218.
63. [^ <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> Parillo 2006](#), p. 293
64. [^ Final Voyages](#), by Kermit Bonner.
65. [^ Aylwin](#), *Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships*.
66. [^ USS Shaw \(DD-373\)](#)
67. [^ DORR, Robert F.; FRED L. BORCH.](#) "[Pyjama-clad pilot took on Japanese at Pearl Harbor](#)". *Army Times*. United States Army. [http://www.armytimes.com/offduty/travel/airforce\\_history\\_120808w/](http://www.armytimes.com/offduty/travel/airforce_history_120808w/). Retrieved 12/10/2010.
68. [^ Potter, Lt Col Joseph V.](#) (Winter 1982). "[A Handful of Pilots](#)". *JOURNAL*. American Aviation Historical Society. pp. 282–285. <http://hawaii.gov/hawaiiaviation/world-war-ii/december-7-1941/A%20Handful%20of%20Pilots.pdf>. Retrieved 12/10/2010.
69. [^ Ofstie 1946](#), p. 18
70. [^ Gailey 1997](#), p. 68
71. [^ Willmott 1983](#); Blair, *Silent Victory*.
72. [^ Gailey 1997](#), pp. 97–98
73. [^ Yergin, Daniel](#) (1991), *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*, New York: Simon & Schuster, ISBN 0-671-79932-0 p. 327
74. [^ <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> <sup>c</sup> Hoyt 2000](#), p. 190

75. <sup>^</sup> [Hoyt 2000](#), p. 191
76. <sup>^</sup> Stephen, Martin; Grove, Eric (Ed) (1988), *Sea Battles in Close-up: World War 2, Volume 1*, Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allan, pp. 34–38, [ISBN 0711015961](#)
77. <sup>^</sup> [Prange 1999](#)<sup>[*citation needed*]</sup>
78. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a b</sup> [Gailey 1997](#), p. 97
79. <sup>^</sup> [Willmott 1983](#), p. 16.
80. <sup>^</sup> [Gailey 1997](#), p. 98
81. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a b</sup> Casey, Jim (2008-01-24). "[Lee Embree, first photographer to fly into 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, dies in Port Angeles](#)". *Peninsula Daily News*.  
<http://www.peninsuladailynews.com/article/20080125/NEWS/801250302>. Retrieved 2011-02-01.
82. <sup>^</sup> Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History, Prange et al.
83. <sup>^</sup> [Under the Red Sea Sun](#) (Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1946).
84. <sup>^</sup> Raymer, E.C: "Descent Into Darkness", Presidio Press, 1996.
85. <sup>^</sup> ["Post-attack ship salvage 1942–1944"](#). Web.archive.org. 2009-10-27. Archived from [the original](#) on 2009-10-27.  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20091027095237/http://geocities.com/bb37usa/postattacksalvage.html>. Retrieved 2011-07-17.
86. <sup>^</sup> [Smith 1999](#), p.<sup>[*page needed*]</sup>.
87. <sup>^</sup> <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,772812,00.html>
88. <sup>^</sup> [Churchill, Winston](#); Martin Gilbert (2001), "[December 1941](#)", *The Churchill War Papers: The Ever-Widening War, Volume 3: 1941*, London, New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 1593–1594, [ISBN 0393019594](#), <http://books.google.com/?id=vx3lMi6AKmIC&pg=PA1593>
89. <sup>^</sup> Anthony Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p257 1976, Chelsea House Publishers, New York
90. <sup>^</sup> ["World War II Internment in Hawai'i"](#). Education through Cultural & Historical Organizations.  
<http://www.hawaiiinternment.org/history-of-internment>. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
91. <sup>^</sup> Levine, E. (1995). A fence away from freedom: Japanese Americans and World War II. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
92. <sup>^</sup> [\[1\]](#) Pearl Harbor Oahu website, retrieved on November 12, 2011.
93. <sup>^</sup> Daniels, R. (1972). Concentration camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
94. <sup>^</sup> [\[2\]](#) Glencoe Online website, retrieved on November 10, 2011.
95. <sup>^</sup> [\[3\]](#) 24SevenPost website, December 7 2010. retrieved on November 10, 2011.
96. <sup>^</sup> Haufler, Herve. *Codebreaker's Victory: How the Allied Cryptographers Won World War II* (New York: NAL, 2003), quoted p.127.
97. <sup>^</sup> [Hakim 1995](#)
98. <sup>^</sup> [Willmott 1983](#), *War Plan Orange*<sup>[*clarification needed*]</sup>.
99. <sup>^</sup> Blair, pp.360 & 816.
100. <sup>^</sup> [History News Network](#) (2001-06-10). "[CNN's Pearl Harbor Mistake](#)". [History News Network](#).  
<http://hnn.us/articles/88.html>. Retrieved 2009-03-13.
101. <sup>^</sup> [Tora! Tora! Tora! : A Film Review by James Berardinelli, reelviews.net.](#)
102. <sup>^</sup> Walter Lord, *Day of Infamy* (Henry Holt and Co., 1957. ASIN: B002A503FA; Holt Paperbacks, 60th ed. 2001, [ISBN 0-8050-6803-1](#), [ISBN 978-0-8050-6803-0](#))
103. <sup>^</sup> John J. Stephan, *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun*.

## [\[edit\]](#) Bibliography

### Books

- Barnhart, Michael A. (1987), *Japan prepares for total war: the search for economic security, 1919–1941*, Cornell University Press, ISBN 9780801419157, <http://books.google.com/books?id=q6hgAAAAIAAJ>
- Bix, Herbert P. (2000), *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, Diane Pub Co, ISBN 9780756757809, <http://books.google.com/books?id=FP2mPwAACAAJ>
- Borch, Frederic L.; Martinez, Daniel (2005), *Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: the final report revealed*, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 9781591140900, <http://books.google.com/books?id=7jQfiAmaX9IC>
- Conn, Stetson; Fairchild, Byron; Engelman, Rose C. (2000), "7 – The Attack on Pearl Harbor", *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*, Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, <http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/guard-us/ch7.htm>
- Gailey, Harry A. (1997), *War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay*, Presidio, ISBN 0891416161
- Gilbert, Martin (2009), *The Second World War*, Phoenix, ISBN 9780753826768, <http://books.google.com/books?id=qTVLPwAACAAJ>
- Goldstein, Donald M. (2000). Goldstein, Donald M.; Dillon, Katherine V.. eds. *The Pearl Harbor papers: inside the Japanese plans*. Brassey's. ISBN 978-1-57488-222-3. <http://books.google.com/books?id=q2pFnALHfykC>.
- Hakim, Joy (1995). *A History of US: Book 9: War, Peace, and All that Jazz*. Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN 978-0-19-509514-2. <http://books.google.com/books?id=RrPgQgAACAAJ>.
- Hixson, Walter L. (2003), *The American Experience in World War II: The United States and the road to war in Europe*, Taylor & Francis, ISBN 9780415940290, <http://books.google.com/books?id=CAEyh6EY9kYC>
- Hoyt, Edwin P. (2000), *Pearl Harbor*, G. K. Hall, ISBN 0783893035, <http://books.google.com/?id=lq8LAAAACAAJ>
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (2001), *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: The rising sun in the Pacific, 1931 – April 1942*, University of Illinois Press, ISBN 0252069730
- Ofstie, Ralph, A., RADM USN, Naval Analysis Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) (1946), *The Campaigns of the Pacific War*, United States Government Printing Office
- Peattie, Mark R.; Evans, David C. (1997), *Kaikun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy*, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 0870211927, <http://books.google.com/?id=ogwJAAAACAAJ>
- Peattie, Mark R. (2001), *Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941*, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 159114664X
- Parillo, Mark (2006), "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin; Harris, Stephen, *Why Air Forces Fail: the Anatomy of Defeat*, The University Press of Kentucky, ISBN 9780813123745, [http://books.google.com/books?id=T0gt\\_RjeCrgC&pg=PA287&vq=%22The+United+States+in+the+Pacific%22](http://books.google.com/books?id=T0gt_RjeCrgC&pg=PA287&vq=%22The+United+States+in+the+Pacific%22)
- Prange, Gordon William; Goldstein, Donald M.; Dillon, Katherine V. (1988), *December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor*, McGraw-Hill, ISBN 9780070506824, <http://books.google.com/?id=iydtAAAAIAAJ>
- Smith, Carl (1999), *Pearl Harbor 1941: The Day of Infamy*, Osprey, ISBN 1855327988
- Thomas, Evan (2007), *Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941–1945*, Simon and Schuster, ISBN 9780743252225, <http://books.google.com/books?id=G-bOZnz2AtOC>

- Willmott, H. P. (1983). *The barrier and the javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific strategies, February to June 1942*. Naval Institute Press.  
<http://books.google.com/books?id=Uid6AAAIAAJ>.

#### U.S. Government Documents

- "[Document text](#)", *US Navy Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor*, United States National Archives, Modern Military Branch, 1942, <http://ww2db.com/doc.php?q=45>, retrieved 2007-12-25
- "[Document text](#)", *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931–1941*, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/Peace%20and%20War.html>, retrieved 2007-12-08
- "[Damage to United States Naval Forces and Installations as a Result of the Attack](#)", *Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946, [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part\\_2.html](http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_2.html), retrieved 2007-12-08

#### Magazine articles

- Rodgaard, John; Peter Hsu, Carroll Lucas, and Captain Andrew Biach (December 1999), "[Pearl Harbor – Attack from Below](#)", *Naval History (United States Naval Institute)* **13** (6), <http://www.usni.org/navalhistory/Articles99/Nhrodgaard.htm>(requires subscription)
- Wetzler, Peter (1998), *Hirohito and war: imperial tradition and military decision making in prewar Japan*, University of Hawaii Press, ISBN 9780824819255, <http://books.google.com/books?id=BWqEkWH1KRMC>

#### Online sources

- [Organization of the Japanese Air Attack Units December 7, 1941](#), NavSource Naval History, 2003, <http://www.navsource.org/Naval/ijnaf.htm>, retrieved 2007-12-08
- [USS Shaw](#), destroyerhistory.org, <http://www.destroyerhistory.org/goldplater/danfs373.html>, retrieved 2007-12-08<sup>[[dead link](#)]</sup>
- [Homer N. Wallin](#), "[Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal](#)", *Hyperwar (ibiblio.org)*, <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/Wallin/index.html#contents>, retrieved 2011-10-10

#### [\[edit\]](#) Further reading

- James Dorsey. "Literary Tropes, Rhetorical Looping, and the Nine Gods of War: 'Fascist Proclivities' Made Real," in *The Culture of Japanese Fascism*, ed. by Alan Tansman (Durham & London: Duke UP, 2009), pp 409–431. A study of Japanese wartime media representations of the submarine component of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
- [McCollum memo](#) A 1940 memo from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining possible provocations to Japan, which might lead to war (declassified in 1994).
- [Gordon W. Prange](#), *At Dawn We Slept* (McGraw-Hill, 1981), *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* (McGraw-Hill, 1986), and *December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor*

- (McGraw-Hill, 1988). This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.
- Larry Kimmitt and Margaret Regis, [The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History](#) (NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War II.
  - [Walter Lord](#), *Day of Infamy* (Henry Holt, 1957) is a very readable, and entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
  - W. J. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II* (Naval Institute, 1979) contains some important material, such as Holmes' argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
  - Michael V. Gannon, *Pearl Harbor Betrayed* (Henry Holt, 2001) is a recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
  - Frederick D. Parker, [Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941](#) (Center for Cryptologic History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
  - Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment*, (HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "[Clausen Inquiry](#)" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War [Henry L. Stimson](#).
  - [Robert A. Theobald](#), *Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* (Devin-Adair Pub, 1954) [ISBN 0-8159-5503-0](#) [ISBN 0-317-65928-6](#) Foreword by Fleet Admiral [William F. Halsey, Jr.](#)
  - [Albert C. Wedemeyer](#), *Wedemeyer Reports!* (Henry Holt Co, 1958) [ISBN 0-89275-011-1](#) [ISBN 0-8159-7216-4](#)
  - [Hamilton Fish](#), *Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II* (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983) [ISBN 0-8159-6917-1](#)
  - John Toland, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (Berkley Reissue edition, 1986 [ISBN 0-425-09040-X](#)).
  - [Robert Stinnett](#), [Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor](#) (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short. [ISBN 0-7432-0129-9](#)
  - [Edward L. Beach, Jr.](#), *Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor* [ISBN 1-55750-059-2](#)
  - Andrew Krepinevich, [\[4\]](#)<sup>PDF (186 KB)</sup> (*Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*) contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
  - Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, (Stanford University Press: 1962). Regarded by many as the most important work in the attempt to understand the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence failures.
  - John Hughes-Wilson, *Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups*. Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and broader overview of what causes them.
  - Horn, Steve (2005), *The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K And Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II*, Naval Institute Press, [ISBN 1-59114-388-8](#)
  - Seki, Eiji. (2006). [Mrs. Ferguson's Tea-Set, Japan and the Second World War: The Global Consequences Following Germany's Sinking of the SS Automedon in 1940.](#)<sup>[dead link]</sup> London: [Global Oriental](#). [ISBN 1-905246-28-5](#); [ISBN 978-1-905246-28-1](#) (cloth) Reprinted by [University of Hawaii](#)

[Press](#), Honolulu, 2007. Previously announced as *Sinking of the SS Automedon and the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation*.

- Daniel Madsen, *Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor*. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. Highly readable and thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.
- Takeo, Iguchi, *Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective From Japan*, I-House Press, 2010, ASIN: B003RJ1AZA.

## [\[edit\]](#) External links

Listen to this article (2 parts) · [\(info\)](#)

[Part 1](#) • [Part 2](#)



This audio file was created from a revision of Attack on Pearl Harbor dated 2006-01-12, and does not reflect subsequent edits to the article. ([Audio help](#))

[More spoken articles](#)



Wikimedia Commons has media related to: [Pearl Harbor attack](#)

- ["Remembering Pearl Harbor: The USS Arizona Memorial", a National Park Service Teaching with Historic Places \(TwHP\) lesson plan](#)
- [Hawaii War Records Depository](#), Archives & Manuscripts Department, University of Hawaii at Manoa Library
- [Pearl Harbor: December 7, 1941](#) – slideshow by *Life magazine*
- [7 December 1941, The Air Force Story](#)

## Accounts

- [Guarding The United States And Its Outposts](#), in *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts* Official U.S. Army history of Pearl Harbor by the [United States Army Center of Military History](#)
- [War comes to Hawaii](#) *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, Monday, September 13, 1999

## Media

- [Video of first Newsreel from December 23, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor](#)
- [Attack on Pearl Harbor 1](#), *Nippon News*, No. 82. in the official website of [NHK](#).
- [Attack on Pearl Harbor 2](#), *Nippon News*, No. 84. in the official website of [NHK](#).
- [Historic footage of Pearl Harbor during and immediately following attack on December 7, 1941](#)

Historic documents

- [WW2DB: US Navy Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor](#)
- [Second World War – USA Declaration of War on Japan.](#)
- [Collection of extensive Japanese preparation military documents](#)

<a href="#">[show]</a> <a href="#">v</a> · <a href="#">d</a> · <a href="#">e</a> <b>Pearl Harbor attack</b>	
<a href="#">Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor</a>	
<b>Attack on Pearl Harbor</b>	
<a href="#">Results of the attack on Pearl Harbor</a>	
<a href="#">Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate</a>	
<a href="#">[show]</a> <a href="#">v</a> · <a href="#">d</a> · <a href="#">e</a> <b>United States in World War II</b>	
<b>American Women</b>	<a href="#">Women Airforce Service Pilots</a> • <a href="#">Women's Army Corps</a> • <a href="#">Woman's Land Army of America</a> • <a href="#">Rosie the Riveter</a>
<b>Minorities</b>	<a href="#">Hispanic Americans in World War II</a> • <a href="#">Native Americans and World War II</a> • <a href="#">Puerto Ricans in World War II</a>
<b>Events</b>	<a href="#">List of Battles</a> • <b>Attack on Pearl Harbor</b> • <a href="#">Normandy landings</a> • <a href="#">Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki</a>
<b>Minorities</b>	<a href="#">African Americans (Tuskegee Airmen)</a> • <a href="#">Asian Americans (Japanese Americans)</a> • <a href="#">Jewish Americans</a>
<a href="#">[show]</a> <a href="#">v</a> · <a href="#">d</a> · <a href="#">e</a> <b>World War II</b>	
•	
<b>Allies (Leaders)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Ethiopia</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">China</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Czechoslovakia</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Poland</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">United Kingdom</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">India</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">France</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Australia</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">New Zealand</a></li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">South Africa</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Canada</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Norway</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Belgium</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Netherlands</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Luxembourg</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Greece</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Yugoslavia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Soviet Union</a></li><li>• <a href="#">United States</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Philippines</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Mexico</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Brazil</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">Axis and Axis-aligned (Leaders)</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Bulgaria</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Reorganized National Government of China</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Croatia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Finland</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Germany</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Hungary</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Iraq</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Italy</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Italian Social Republic</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Japan</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Manchukuo</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Romania</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Slovakia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Thailand</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Vichy France</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">Resistance</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Albania</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Austria</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Baltic States</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Belgium</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Czech lands</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Denmark</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Estonia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Ethiopia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">France</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Germany</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Greece</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Hong Kong</a></li><li>• <a href="#">India</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Italy</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Jewish</a></li></ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Korea</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Latvia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Luxembourg</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Netherlands</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Norway</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Philippines</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Poland (Anti-communist)</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Romania</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Thailand</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Soviet Union</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Slovakia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Western Ukraine</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Vietnam</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Yugoslavia</a></li></ul>
	<a href="#">Prelude</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Africa</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Asia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Europe</a></li></ul>
	<a href="#">1939</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Invasion of Poland</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Phoney War</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Winter War</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Atlantic</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Changsha (1939)</a></li><li>• <a href="#">China</a></li></ul>
	<a href="#">1940</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Weserübung</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Netherlands</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Belgium</a></li><li>• <a href="#">France</a></li><li>• <a href="#">UK</a></li><li>• <a href="#">North Africa</a></li><li>• <a href="#">British Somaliland</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Baltic States</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Moldova</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Indochina</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Greece</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Compass</a></li></ul>
	<a href="#">1941</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">East Africa</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Invasion of Yugoslavia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Yugoslav Front</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Greece</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Crete</a></li></ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Soviet Union (<i>Barbarossa</i>)</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Finland</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Lithuania</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Middle East</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Kiev</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Leningrad</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Moscow</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Sevastopol</a></li><li>• <b>Pearl Harbor</b></li><li>• <a href="#">Hong Kong</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Philippines</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Changsha (1941)</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Malaya</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Borneo</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">1942</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Burma</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Changsha (1942)</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Coral Sea</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Gazala</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Midway</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Blue</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Stalingrad</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Dieppe</a></li><li>• <a href="#">El Alamein</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Torch</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Guadalcanal</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">1943</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">End in Africa</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Kursk</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Smolensk</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Solomon Islands</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Sicily</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Lower Dnieper</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Italy</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Gilbert and Marshall</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Changde</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">1944</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Monte Cassino</a> and <a href="#">Shingle</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Narva</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Cherkassy</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Tempest</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Ichi-Go</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Normandy</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Mariana and Palau</a></li></ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#"><u>Bagration</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Western Ukraine</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Tannenberg Line</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Warsaw</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Eastern Romania</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Yugoslavia</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Paris</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Gothic Line</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Market Garden</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Estonia</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Crossbow</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Pointblank</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Lapland</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Hungary</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Leyte</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Bulge</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Burma</u></a></li></ul>
	<a href="#"><u>1945</u></a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#"><u>Vistula-Oder</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Iwo Jima</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Okinawa</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Surrender of Italy</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Berlin</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Czechoslovakia</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Budapest</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>West Hunan</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Surrender of Germany</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Manchuria</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Philippines</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Borneo</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Atomic bombings</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Surrender of Japan</u></a></li></ul>
	<b>General</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#"><u>Air warfare of World War II</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Attacks on North America</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Blitzkrieg</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Comparative military ranks</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Cryptography</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Home front</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Manhattan Project</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Military awards</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Military equipment</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Military production</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Nazi plunder</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Technology</u></a></li></ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Total war</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Strategic bombing</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Bengal famine of 1943</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">Aftermath</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Effects</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Expulsion of Germans</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Operation Paperclip</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Operation Keelhaul</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Occupation of Germany</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Morgenthau Plan</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Territorial changes</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Soviet occupations</a> (<a href="#">Romania</a>, <a href="#">Poland</a>, <a href="#">Hungary</a>, <a href="#">Baltic States</a>)</li><li>• <a href="#">Occupation of Japan</a></li><li>• <a href="#">First Indochina War</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Indonesian National Revolution</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Cold War</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Decolonization</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Popular culture</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">War crimes</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">German</a> and <a href="#">Wehrmacht war crimes</a></li><li>• <a href="#">The Holocaust</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Italian war crimes</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Japanese war crimes</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Unit 731</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Allied war crimes</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Soviet war crimes</a></li><li>• <a href="#">United States war crimes</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">War rape</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">German military brothels</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Camp brothels</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Rape during the occupation of Japan</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Comfort women</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Rape of Nanking</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Rape during the occupation of Germany</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">Prisoners</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Nazi crimes against Soviet POWs</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Italian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Japanese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Japanese prisoners of war in World War II</a></li><li>• <a href="#">German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Polish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Romanian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li></ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><a href="#">German prisoners of war in the United States</a></li></ul>
•
<span>[show]</span> <span>v</span> · <span>d</span> · <span>e</span> <a href="#">Empire of Japan</a>
<div><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li></ul></div>

**Coordinates:**  [21°22′N 157°57′W](#)[21.367°N 157.95°W](#)

Retrieved from

["http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Attack\\_on\\_Pearl\\_Harbor&oldid=461128347"](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor&oldid=461128347)

[View page ratings](#)

## Rate this page

[Categories:](#)

- [Attack on Pearl Harbor](#)

Hidden categories:

- [All pages needing cleanup](#)
- [Wikipedia articles needing clarification from September 2010](#)
- [All articles with dead external links](#)
- [Articles with dead external links from July 2011](#)
- [All articles with unsourced statements](#)
- [Articles with unsourced statements from October 2011](#)

- [Wikipedia articles needing page number citations from September 2010](#)
- [Wikipedia articles needing clarification from October 2011](#)
- [Articles with unsourced statements from September 2010](#)
- [Articles with hAudio microformats](#)
- [Articles with unsourced statements from June 2010](#)
- [Spoken articles](#)

#### Personal tools

- [Log in / create account](#)

#### Namespaces

- [Article](#)
- [Discussion](#)

#### Variants

#### Views

- [Read](#)
- [Edit](#)
- [View history](#)

#### Navigation

- [Main page](#)
- [Contents](#)
- [Featured content](#)
- [Current events](#)
- [Random article](#)
- [Donate to Wikipedia](#)

#### Interaction

- [Help](#)
- [About Wikipedia](#)
- [Community portal](#)
- [Recent changes](#)
- [Contact Wikipedia](#)

#### Toolbox

- [What links here](#)
- [Related changes](#)

- [Upload file](#)
- [Special pages](#)
- [Permanent link](#)
- [Cite this page](#)
- [Rate this page](#)

Print/export

- [Create a book](#)
- [Download as PDF](#)
- [Printable version](#)

Languages


- [العربية](#)
- [Azərbaycanca](#)
- [বাংলা](#)
- [Bikol Central](#)
- [Brezhoneg](#)
- [Български](#)
- [Català](#)
- [Česky](#)
- [Cymraeg](#)
- [Dansk](#)
- [Deutsch](#)
- [Eesti](#)
- [Español](#)
- [Esperanto](#)
- [فارسی](#)
- [Français](#)
- [Frysk](#)
- [Galego](#)
- [한국어](#)
- [Hrvatski](#)
- [Bahasa Indonesia](#)
- [Íslenska](#)
- [Italiano](#)
- [עברית](#)
- [Latviešu](#)
- [Lëtzebuergesch](#)
- [Magyar](#)
- [Македонски](#)
- [मराठी](#)
- [Bahasa Melayu](#)
- [Nederlands](#)
- [日本語](#)

- [Norsk \(bokmål\)](#)
  - [O'zbek](#)
  - [Polski](#)
  - [Português](#)
  - [Română](#)
  - [Русский](#)
  - [Simple English](#)
  - [Slovenčina](#)
  - [Slovenščina](#)
  - [Српски / Srpski](#)
  - [Srpskohrvatski / Српскохрватски](#)
  - [Suomi](#)
  - [Svenska](#)
  - [தமிழ்](#)
  - [ไทย](#)
  - [GWY](#)
  - [Türkçe](#)
  - [Українська](#)
  - [اردو](#)
  - [Tiếng Việt](#)
  - [吴语](#)
  - [粵語](#)
  - [中文](#)
- This page was last modified on 17 November 2011 at 16:22.
  - Text is available under the [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License](#); additional terms may apply. See [Terms of use](#) for details.  
Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the [Wikimedia Foundation, Inc.](#), a non-profit organization.
  - [Contact us](#)
  - [Privacy policy](#)
  - [About Wikipedia](#)
  - [Disclaimers](#)
  - [Mobile view](#)





Figure 52 Red Tails flown by Tuskegee Airmen



***Red Tails Strike Again***

Painstakingly researched with the cooperation of the actual participants and recreated in oil by artist Michael Hagel, Red Tails Strike Again depicts Tuskegee Airmen Col. "Wild" Bill Campbell and his wingman Lt. Col. William Holloman protecting U.S. bombers from German Me-109 fighters in 1944.

The Tuskegee Airmen were known as "Red-Tails" because of the distinctive red tails of their P-51 Mustangs.

*Painting by Michael Hagel*

**The Tuskegee Airmen**

In 1941, the Army Air Force, having been forced by the courts to train blacks as airmen, set up a pilot's training center for blacks at Alabama's Tuskegee Institute. The first Tuskegee Airmen graduated on March 7, 1942. The Army was initially reluctant to commit the black airmen-who many in the Army feared were congenitally unsuited for both combat and aviation-to battle. Subsequent events would prove these fears unfounded. Operating mainly in Italy with the 15th Air Force and flying aircraft with distinctive red tails, the Tuskegee Airmen shot down over 250 planes while losing only 66. And never was a bomber escorted by the Tuskegee Airmen shot down by enemy fighters.

The German opponents of the Tuskegee Airmen, in an expression of mixed dread and awe, dubbed them the "schwartzte Vogelmenschen," or "black birdmen."

The 445 Tuskegee Airmen sent overseas for combat duty won over 850 decorations, including 150 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 8 Purple Hearts, 14 Bronze Stars, and 744 Air Medals.

Figure 53 Tuskegee Airmen




Figure 54 WW II with Japan ended shortly after the two atomic bomb strikes.



Figure 55 Veterans museum in Branson, Missouri



Figure 56 Nurses uniforms worn in WW II



Figure 57 Intense fire fight



Figure 58 WW II rifles and shotguns



Figure 59 M1 and Springfield 03




Figure 60 Horse Cavalry



Figure 61 M1 rifles and carbines



Figure 62 Hitting the beach



Figure 63 D-Day: Omaha Beach




Figure 64 D-Day: Omaha Beach Army Rangers




Figure 65 D-Day Omaha Beach U.S. 29th Division



Figure 66 Saving Lt. McMorrow painting




Figure 67 Saving Lt McMorrow May 28, 1944




Figure 68 50 Soldiers storming a beach sculpture



Figure 69 50 Soldiers storming a beach

Edgar Leonard Hall



Figure 70 Edgar Leonard Hall



Figure 71 E. L. Hall and squad

U.S. World War II Army Enlistment Records, 1938-1946 about Edgar L Hall	
Name:	<b>Edgar L Hall</b>
Birth Year:	1914
Race:	White, citizen (White)
Nativity State or Country:	Missouri
State of Residence:	Missouri
County or City:	Ripley

## Veterans Day – A Tribute to the Military Service of our Ancestors RESEARCH DRAFT 2013

Enlistment Date:	29 Nov 1943
Enlistment State:	California
Enlistment City:	Los Angeles
Branch:	No branch assignment
Branch Code:	No branch assignment
Grade:	Private
Grade Code:	Private
Term of Enlistment:	Enlistment for the duration of the War or other emergency, plus six months, subject to the discretion of the President or otherwise according to law
Component:	Selectees (Enlisted Men)
Source:	Civil Life
Education:	Grammar school
Civil Occupation:	Farm hands, general farms
Marital Status:	Married
Height:	00
Weight:	080

Edgar Leonard Hall (1914 - 1973)

### is your father

[Ernest Lenard Hall](#)

### January 1945 - 12 April 1945

In January 1945 the SS issued orders from Berlin to Duesseldorf which resulted in the mass execution of German and overseas workers, as well as political dissidents and opposition party representatives, in the closing days of World War Two.

Following the orders from Duesseldorf Gestapo officers in Dortmund rounded up more and more people and took them to the police cells '**Steinwache**' and the Gestapo cells in the '**Benninghoferstrasse**.' In addition, forced labourers (Dutch, Belgian, French, Polish, Yugoslavian and Russian) from all over the local government district of Arnsberg were also brought to Dortmund.

The executions commenced from the 7th March 1945 onwards as lorries systematically carried groups of prisoners to the fields in the **Rombergpark** and the **Bittermark** (suburbs of Dortmund) and Gestapo officers shot them. This continued until 12th April 1945, when American soldiers were already in the near vicinity.

Shortly after Easter, the 150-strong Gestapo execution commando fled via Hemer and Iserlohn for destinations all over the world. 27 of them were brought to trial in Dortmund in 1951 and 1952. 15 of the accused were found not guilty and no-one was found guilty of murder. However, 12 were found guilty of being accomplices to murder and received between 2 and 6 years in prison.

Around 300 people - the exact number has never been established - were killed in the days over Easter 1945.

One of the victims was the resistance member Martha Gillessen (born 30.11.1901), who took in a Jewish woman. She was betrayed by a comrade and arrested by the Gestapo on 08. February 1945, along with many

other resistance members. A street in the north of Dortmund is named after Martha Gillessen.

[Excerpt from] Ulrich Sander, 1945: *Mass murder in Romberg Park and the Bittermark*

---

Soon after liberation, a US soldier examines an emaciated forced laborer, a Soviet prisoner of war. Dortmund, Germany, April 30, 1945.

## The 95th Infantry Division

[Back](#) | [Related Articles](#) | [Related Links](#) | [Comments](#) | [E-mail updates](#) | [How to cite this article](#)



Insignia of the 95th Infantry Division. The 95th Infantry Division, the "Victory" division, gained its nickname from the divisional insignia approved in 1942: the arabic numeral "9" combined with the roman numeral "V" to represent "95." The "V" led to the nickname, since the letter "V" was universally recognized as an Allied symbol for resistance and victory over the Axis during World War II.

— *US Holocaust Memorial Museum - Collections*

**View Photograph**



**View Maps**



Formed in 1942, the 95th Infantry Division landed in France on September 15, 1944, some three months after the Allies invaded France on [D-Day](#) (June 6, 1944). In October, the "Victory" division advanced to the Moselle in Lorraine, where it repelled German military efforts to cross the river.

The following month, the division captured the French city of Metz and entered Germany, establishing a bridgehead on the Saar River. In February 1945, the "Victory" division was redeployed to the Limburg province of the Netherlands, near the city of Maastricht. From there, the 95th moved into Germany and advanced into the industrial Ruhr region. **On April 13, 1945, it captured the city of Dortmund.**

In April 1945, the "Victory" division uncovered a German prison and civilian labor camp in the town of Werl. On April 7, the unit reported discovering a camp housing some 4,500 undernourished French officers and 800 enlisted men. The 95th provided the prisoners with emergency rations from the division's own supplies.

**The 95th Infantry Division was recognized as a liberating unit by the US Army's Center of Military History and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1995.**

*Casualty figures for the 95th Infantry Division, European theater of operations*

Total battle casualties: 6,591

Total deaths in battle: 1,387

*Division nickname*

The 95th Infantry Division, the "Victory" division, gained its nickname from the divisional insignia approved in 1942: the arabic numeral "9" combined with the roman numeral "V" to represent "95." The "V" led to the nickname, since the letter "V" was universally

recognized as an Allied symbol for resistance and victory over the Axis during World War II.




Figure 72 E.L. Hall's citation for Silver Star



Figure 73 Silver Star

## **World War II**

On 15 July 1942, the division was ordered into active military service and reorganized at Camp Swift, Texas.<sup>[4]</sup> The 189th and 190th Infantry Brigades were disbanded as part of an army-wide elimination of infantry brigades. Instead, the division was based around three infantry regiments, the 377th Infantry Regiment, the 378th Infantry Regiment, and the 379th Infantry Regiment.<sup>[7]</sup> Also assigned to the division were the 358th, 359th, 360th, and 920th Field Artillery Battalions, the 95th Signal Company, the 795th Ordnance Company, the 95th Quartermaster Company, the 95th Reconnaissance Troop, the 320th Engineer Battalion, the 320th Medical Battalion, and the 95th Counter-Intelligence Detachment.<sup>[7]</sup> Major General Harry L. Twaddle took command of the division, a command he held for its entire duration in World War II,<sup>[8]</sup> making him one of only eleven generals to do so.<sup>[9]</sup> The division also received a Shoulder Sleeve Insignia this year.<sup>[10]</sup> Over the next two years, the division trained extensively in locations throughout the United States.<sup>[6]</sup>

## ***Europe***



Figure 74 Men of the 378th Infantry Division entering Metz (1944)



Men of the 378th Infantry, 95th Division enter Metz (1944).

The 95th Infantry Division was assigned to XIII Corps of the Ninth United States Army, Twelfth United States Army Group.<sup>[11]</sup> The division sailed for Europe on 10 August 1944.<sup>[12]</sup> The 95th Infantry Division arrived in England on 17 August. After receiving additional training, it moved to France one month later on 15 September. During this time it was reassigned to III Corps.<sup>[11]</sup> The division bivouacked near Norroy-le-Sec, from 1 to 14 October.<sup>[12]</sup> It was then assigned to XX Corps of the Third United States Army.<sup>[11]</sup> The division was sent into combat on 19 October in the Moselle bridgehead sector east of Moselle and South of Metz and patrolled the Seille near Cheminot, capturing the forts surrounding Metz and repulsing enemy attempts to cross the river.<sup>[12]</sup> It was during the defense of this town from repeated German attacks that the division received its nickname, "The Iron Men of Metz."<sup>[11]</sup> On 1 November, elements went over to the offensive, reducing an enemy pocket east of Maizières-lès-Metz. On the 8 November, these units crossed the Moselle River and advanced to Bertrange. Against heavy resistance, the 95th captured the forts surrounding Metz and captured the city by 22 November.<sup>[12]</sup>

The division pushed toward the Saar on 25 November and entered Germany on the 28th. The 95th seized a Saar River bridge on 3 December and engaged in bitter house-to-house fighting for Saarlautern.<sup>[12]</sup> Suburbs of the city fell and, although the enemy resisted fiercely, the Saar bridgehead was firmly established by 19 December. While some units went to an assembly area, others held the area against strong German attacks.<sup>[12]</sup> On 2 February 1945, the Division began moving to the Maastricht area in the Netherlands, and by 14 February, elements were in the line near Meerselo in relief of British units.<sup>[12]</sup> During this time the division returned to the Ninth Army under XIX Corps, though it would see temporary assignments to several other Corps through the spring.<sup>[11]</sup>

**On 23 February, the division was relieved, and the 95th assembled near Jülich, Germany, on 1 March. It forced the enemy into a pocket near the Hitler Bridge at Uerdingen and cleared the pocket on 5 March, while elements advanced to the Rhine.<sup>[12]</sup> From 12 March, the 95th established defenses in the vicinity of Neuss. Assembling east of the Rhine at Beckum on 3 April, it launched an attack across the Lippe River the next day and captured Hamm and Kamen on the 6th.<sup>[12]</sup> After clearing the enemy pocket between the Ruhr and the Mohne Rivers, the Division took Dortmund on 13 April and maintained positions on the north bank of the Ruhr.<sup>[12]</sup> It held this position until the end of the war.**

#### ***Demobilization***

The division returned to the United States on 29 June 1945 where it began the process of demobilizing and releasing its soldiers from Army service. It was inactivated on 15 October 1945 at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.<sup>[12]</sup> The division spent 151 days in combat, suffering 1,128 killed in action, 4,783 wounded in

action, 394 missing in action, and 65 prisoners of war. The division also suffered 3,834 non-battle casualties, for a total of 10,204 casualties during World War II. The division in turn took 31,988 German prisoners.<sup>[13]</sup> Soldiers of the division were awarded one Medal of Honor, 18 Distinguished Service Crosses, 14 Legion of Merit Medals, 665 Silver Star Medals, 15 Soldier's Medals, 2,992 Bronze Star Medals, and 162 Air Medals. The division was awarded one Presidential Unit Citation and four campaign streamers during its time in combat.<sup>[13]</sup>

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/95th\\_Infantry\\_Division\\_\(United\\_States\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/95th_Infantry_Division_(United_States))

**Dortmund** [<sup>i</sup>/dɔːrtmʊnt/] (listen) is a city in Germany. It is located in the Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia, in the Ruhr area. Its population of 587,830 (in June 2005) makes it the 8th largest city in Germany and the 34th largest in the European Union.

The Ruhr river flows south of the city, and the small river Emscher flows through the municipal area. The Dortmund-Ems Canal also terminates in the Dortmund Port, which is the largest European canal port, and links Dortmund to the North Sea.

Dortmund is known as Westphalia's "green metropolis." Nearly half the municipal territory consists of waterways, woodland, agriculture and green spaces with spacious parks such as Westfalenpark and the Rombergpark. This contrasts with nearly a hundred years of extensive coal mining and steel milling within the city limits.

## Contents

[hide]

- 1 History
- 2 Main sights
- 3 Sports
- 4 Transportation
- 5 Economy
- 6 Politics
- 7 Culture
- 8 Twin towns — sister cities
- 9 References
- 10 External links

## History



Figure 75 Dortmund, Germany 1647.



Dortmund 1647

A small village at the location of Dortmund was mentioned in official documents from 880 to 885 as **Throtmanni**. After it was destroyed by a fire, the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I (Barbarossa) had the town rebuilt in 1152 and resided there for two years. It became an Imperial Free City in 1220. During that century, it was the "chief city" of the Rhine, Westphalia, the Netherlands Circle of the Hanseatic League.

## Dortmund

ca.	1250:	Hanseatic	<b>nations:</b>
1532:	Lower	Rhenish-Westphalian	League
1803:	Principality	of	Circle
1806:		French	Nassau-Orange-Fulda
1808:	Grand	Duchy	occupation
1815:	Kingdom	of	Berg
			Prussia

1918:			Weimar			Republic
1933:			Nazi			Germany
1945:	British	Zone	of	Allied-occupied		Germany
1949:			West			Germany
1990:	Germany					

After 1320, the city appeared in writing as "Dorpmunde", and the 1661 earthquake collapsed the Reinoldikirche. Within the Prussian Province of Westphalia, Dortmund was a district seat within Regierungsbezirk Arnsberg until 1875, after which it was an urban district within the region. During the industrialization of Prussia, Dortmund became a major centre for coal and steel.

Under Nazi Germany, the synagogue was destroyed in 1938. Also, the Aplerbeck Hospital in Dortmund transferred mentally and/or physically disabled patients for euthanasia at the Hadamar mental hospital as part of the Action T4 (an additional 229 children were killed in the "Children's Specialist Department", which was transferred from Marburg in 1941). Dortmund bombing targets of the Oil Campaign of World War II included Hoesch-Westfalenhütte AG, the "Hoesch-Benzin GmbH" synthetic oil plant, and the **Zeche Hansa coking plant**;<sup>[2]</sup> and bombing destroyed about 80% of the Dortmund homes.<sup>[citation needed]</sup> The code word *Dortmund* was radioed to initiate the 1941 Operation Barbarossa campaign against the Soviet Union.

Post-war, buildings such as the Reinoldikirche and Marienkirche (churches) were restored/rebuilt, and extensive parks and gardens were laid out. The LWL-Industriemuseum began in 1969,<sup>[3]</sup> and the city subsequently became a centre for hi-tech industry.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dortmund>

**Action T4** (German: *Aktion T4*) was the name used after World War II<sup>[1]</sup> for the **Euthanasia Program** in Nazi Germany officially spanning September 1939<sup>[2][3]</sup> until August 1941 but continued unofficially<sup>[4]</sup> until the demise of the Nazi regime in 1945 and even beyond,<sup>[5]</sup> during which physicians killed thousands of people specified in Adolf Hitler's secret memo of September 1, 1939, as suffering patients "judged incurably sick, by critical medical examination".<sup>[6]</sup>

Although officially started in September 1939 it is stated that *Euthanasia Program (Action T4)* initiated with a sort of *trial balloon*<sup>[7]</sup> with the instruction of Adolf Hitler to his personal physician Karl Brandt in late 1938 to evaluate the factual accuracy of a family's petition for the "mercy killing" of their blind, retarded and disabled infant boy, who was actually killed in July 1939.<sup>[8]</sup> Hitler also instructed Brandt to proceed in the same manner in similar cases.<sup>[9]</sup> The foundation of the *Committee for the Scientific Treatment of Severe, Genetically Determined Illness* in order to prepare and proceed with the massive secret killing of infants took place in May 1939 and the respective secret order to start the registration of ill children, took place in 18 August 1939, three weeks after the euthanasia of the mentioned boy.<sup>[10]</sup>

From the official Nazi files, there is evidence that during the official stage 70,273 people were killed.<sup>[11]</sup> The Nuremberg Trials found evidence that German and Austrian physicians continued the extermination of patients after October 1941 and evidence that about 275,000 people were killed under T4.<sup>[12]</sup> More recent research based on files that were recovered after 1990 gives a figure of at least 200,000 physically or mentally handicapped people that were killed by medication, starvation, or in the gas chambers between 1939 and 1945.<sup>[13]</sup>

The name T4 was an abbreviation of "Tiergartenstraße 4", the address of a villa in the Berlin borough of Tiergarten which was the headquarters of the *Gemeinnützige Stiftung für Heil- und Anstaltspflege*, bearing the euphemistic name literally translating into English: as *Charitable Foundation for Cure and Institutional Care*.<sup>[14]</sup> This body operated under the direction of Philipp Bouhler, the head of Hitler's private chancellery,<sup>[15]</sup> and Dr. Karl Brandt, Hitler's personal physician. This villa no longer exists, but a plaque set in the pavement on Tiergartenstraße marks its location.

The "euthanasia decree", written on Adolf Hitler's personal stationery and dated 1 September 1939, reads as follows:

Reich Leader Bouhler and Dr. Brandt are charged with the responsibility for expanding the authority of physicians, to be designated by name, to the end that patients considered incurable according to the best

available human judgment [*menschlichem Ermessen*] of their state of health, can be granted a mercy death [*Gnadentod*].<sup>[16]</sup>

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action\\_T4](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_T4)

### **Killing of children**



Figure 76 Schonbrunn Psychiatric Hospital 1914



Schönbrunn Psychiatric Hospital, 1934. Photo by SS photographer; Franz Bauer

In the summer of 1939, the parents of a severely deformed child (recently identified as Gerhard Kretschmar),<sup>[29]</sup> born near Leipzig, wrote to Hitler seeking his permission for their child to be put to death.<sup>[30]</sup> Hitler approved this, and authorized the creation of the Reich Committee for the Scientific Registering of Serious Hereditary and Congenital Illnesses (*Reichsausschuss zur wissenschaftlichen Erfassung erb- und anlagebedingter schwerer Leiden*), headed by Karl Brandt, his personal physician, and administered by Herbert Linden of the Interior Ministry and an SS officer, Viktor Brack. Brandt and Bouhler were authorized to approve applications to kill children in similar circumstances.<sup>[31]</sup>

This precedent was used to establish a program of killing children with severe disabilities from which the 'guardian' consent element soon disappeared. From August, the Interior Ministry required doctors and midwives to report all cases of newborns with severe disabilities. Those to be killed were "all children under three years of age in whom any of the following 'serious hereditary diseases' were 'suspected': idiocy and Down syndrome (especially when associated with blindness and deafness); microcephaly; hydrocephaly; malformations of all kinds, especially of limbs, head, and spinal column; and paralysis, including spastic conditions".<sup>[32]</sup> The reports were assessed by a panel of medical experts, of whom three were required to give their approval before a child could be killed.<sup>[33]</sup>



Figure 77 Schloss Hartheim where over 8,000 people were killed.



Schloss Hartheim where over 8,000 people were killed.

Various methods of deception were used to gain consent – particularly in Catholic areas, where parents were generally uncooperative. Parents were told that their children were being sent to "Special Sections" for

children where they would receive improved care.<sup>[34]</sup> The children sent to these centres were kept for "assessment" for a few weeks and then killed by lethal injection, their deaths recorded as "pneumonia". Autopsies were usually performed, and brain samples were taken to be used for medical research. This apparently helped to ease the consciences of many of those involved, since it gave them the feeling that the children had not died in vain, and that the whole programme had a genuine medical purpose.<sup>[35]</sup>

Once war broke out in September 1939, the program became less rigorous in its process of assessment and approval. It expanded to include older children and adolescents. The conditions covered also expanded and came to include "various borderline or limited impairments in children of different ages, culminating in the killing of those designated as juvenile delinquents. Jewish children could be placed in the net primarily because they were Jewish; and at one of the institutions, a special department was set up for 'minor Jewish-Aryan half-breeds'".<sup>[36]</sup> At the same time, increased pressure was placed on parents to agree to their children being sent away. Many parents suspected what was really happening, especially when it became apparent that institutions for children with disabilities were being systematically cleared out, and refused consent. They were threatened that they would lose custody of all their children, and if that did not suffice, the parents themselves could be threatened with call-up for "labour duty".<sup>[37]</sup> By 1941, over 5,000 children had been killed.<sup>[38]</sup>

#### **Killing of adults**



Figure 78 Nazi propagama picture of a mental patient, March 1944.



Nazi propaganda picture of a mental patient, March 1934

Brandt and Bouhler soon developed plans to expand the program to adults. In July 1939, they had held a meeting attended by Dr. Leonardo Conti, Reich Health Leader and state secretary for health in the Interior Ministry, and Professor Werner Heyde, head of the SS medical department. This meeting had made preliminary arrangements for a national register of all institutionalised people with mental illnesses or physical disabilities.

The first adults with disabilities to be killed by the Nazi regime, however, were not Germans, but Poles, as the SS men of Einsatzkommando 16 cleared the hospitals and mental asylums of the Wartheland, a region of western Poland which was earmarked for incorporation into Germany and resettlement by ethnic Germans following the German conquest of Poland. In the Danzig (now Gdańsk) area, some 7,000 Polish inmates of various institutions were shot, while 10,000 were killed in the Gdynia area. Similar measures were taken in other areas of Poland destined for incorporation into Germany.<sup>[39]</sup> At Posen (occupied Poznań), hundreds of patients were killed by means of carbon monoxide gas in an improvised gas chamber developed by Dr Albert

Widmann, chief chemist of the German Criminal Police (Kripo). In December 1939, the SS head, Heinrich Himmler, witnessed one of these gassings, ensuring that this invention would later be put to much wider uses.<sup>[40]</sup>

The idea of killing "useless" mental patients soon spread from occupied Poland to adjoining areas of Germany itself, probably because Nazi Party and SS officers in these areas were most familiar with what was happening in Poland. These were also the areas where Germans wounded from the Polish campaign were expected to be accommodated, creating a demand for hospital space. The Gauleiter of Pomerania, Franz Schwede-Coburg, dispatched 1,400 patients from five Pomeranian hospitals to Poland, where they were shot. The Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch, likewise had 1,600 patients killed. In all, more than 8,000 Germans were killed in this initial wave of killings. These were carried out on the initiative of local officials, although Himmler certainly knew and approved of them.<sup>[41]</sup>

The program for killing adults with mental or physical disabilities began with a letter from Hitler issued in October 1939. The letter charged Bouhler and Brandt with "enlarging the authority of certain physicians, to be designated by name, in such a manner that persons who, according to human judgement, are incurable, can, upon a most careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be accorded a mercy death."<sup>[42]</sup> The letter was backdated to 1 September to provide legality to the killings already carried out,<sup>[43]</sup> and to link the program more definitely to the war, giving it a rationale of wartime necessity.<sup>[23]</sup> This letter, which provided the sole legal basis for the program, was not a formal "Führer decree", which in Nazi Germany had the force of law. For this reason Hitler deliberately bypassed Health Minister Conti and his department, who were held to be not sufficiently imbued with National Socialist ruthlessness and who might have raised awkward questions about the legality of the program, and entrusted it to his personal agents Bouhler and Brandt.<sup>[44]</sup>

The program was administered by Brack's staff from Tiergartenstraße 4, under the guise of the *Charitable Foundation for Cure and Institutional Care*, supervised by Bouhler and Brandt. Others closely involved included Dr Herbert Linden, who had been heavily involved in the children's program, Dr Ernst-Robert Grawitz, chief physician of the SS, and August Becker, an SS chemist. These officials chose the doctors who were to carry out the operational part of the program. They were chosen for their political reliability, professional reputation, and known sympathy for radical eugenics. They included several who had proved their worth in the child-killing program, such as Unger, Heinze, and Hermann Pfannmüller. The new recruits were mostly psychiatrists, notably Professor Carl Schneider of Heidelberg, Professor Max de Crinis of Berlin and Professor Paul Nitsche from the Sonnenstein state institution. Heyde became the operational leader of the program, succeeded later by Nitsche.<sup>[45]</sup>

In early October all hospitals, nursing homes, old-age homes, sanatoria were required to report all patients who had been institutionalised for five years or more, who had been committed as "criminally insane", who were of "non-Aryan race", or who had been diagnosed with any of a list of specified conditions. These included schizophrenia, epilepsy, Huntington's chorea, advanced syphilis, senile dementia, paralysis, encephalitis and "terminal neurological conditions generally". Many doctors and administrators assumed that the purpose of the reports was to identify inmates who were capable of being drafted for "labour service". They therefore tended to overstate the degree of incapacity of their patients, to protect them from labour conscription — with fatal consequences.<sup>[46]</sup> When some institutions, mainly in Catholic areas<sup>[citation needed]</sup>, refused to co-operate, teams of T4 doctors (or in some cases Nazi medical students) visited them and compiled their own lists, sometimes in a very haphazard and ideologically motivated way.<sup>[47]</sup> At the same time, all Jewish patients were removed from institutions and were killed during 1940.<sup>[48]</sup>

As with the child inmates, the adults had their cases assessed by a panel of experts, working at the Tiergartenstraße offices. The experts were required to make their judgments solely on the basis of the reports, rather than on detailed medical histories, let alone examinations. Sometimes they dealt with hundreds of reports at a time. On each they marked a + (meaning death), a - (meaning life), or occasionally a ? meaning that they were unable to decide. Three "death" verdicts condemned the person concerned. As with the children, over time these processes became less rigorous, the range of conditions considered unsustainable grew broader, and zealous Nazis further down the chain of command increasingly made decisions on their own initiative.<sup>[47]</sup>



Figure 79 Grafeneck Castle



Grafeneck Castle



Figure 80 Sonnenstein Castle, location of the Sonnenstein Euthanasia Clinic



Sonnenstein Castle, the location of the Sonnenstein Euthanasia Clinic



Figure 81 Bernburg in 1650



Bernburg in 1650



Figure 82 Hadamar Castle about 1900.



View of Hadamar Clinic about 1900

### Gassing



Figure 83 Nazi gas van used to murder people at Chelmno extermination camp.



Nazi gas van used to murder people at Chelmno extermination camp.

At first patients were killed by lethal injection, the method established for killing children, but the slowness and inefficiency of this method for killing adults, who needed larger doses of increasingly scarce and expensive drugs and who were more likely to need restraint, was soon apparent. Hitler himself recommended to Brandt that carbon monoxide gas be used.<sup>[49]</sup> At his trial, Brandt described this as a "major advance in medical history".<sup>[50]</sup> The first gassings took place at Brandenburg Euthanasia Centre in January 1940, under the supervision of Widmann, Becker, and Christian Wirth, a Kripo (criminal police) officer who was later to play a prominent role in the "final solution" extermination of the Jews. Once the efficacy of this method was established, it became standardised and was instituted at a number of centres across Germany. As well as Brandenburg, these included Grafeneck Castle in Baden-Württemberg {10,824 dead}, Schloss Hartheim near Linz in Austria {over 8,000 dead}, Sonnenstein Euthanasia Clinic in Saxony {15,000 dead}, Bernburg in Saxony-Anhalt and Hadamar Clinic in Hesse {14,494 dead}. As well as killing patients from mental homes, nursing homes and sanatoria, these centres were also used to kill prisoners transferred from concentration camps in Germany and Austria.

Patients were transferred from their institutions to the killing centres in buses operated by teams of SS men wearing white coats to give an air of medical authenticity. To prevent the families and the doctors of the patients tracing them, they were often sent to transit centres in major hospitals where they were supposedly assessed before being moved again to "special treatment" (*Sonderbehandlung*) centres. (The expression was later widely employed as a euphemism for killing during the extermination of the Jews.) Families were sent letters explaining that owing to wartime regulations it would not be possible to visit relatives in these centres. In fact most of these patients were killed within 24 hours of arriving at the centres, and their bodies cremated.<sup>[49]</sup> For every person killed, a death certificate was prepared, giving a false but plausible cause of death, and sent to the family along with an urn of ashes (random ashes, since the victims were cremated *en masse*). The preparation of thousands of falsified death certificates in fact took up most of the working day of the doctors who operated the centres.<sup>[51]</sup>

During 1940, the centres at Brandenburg, Grafeneck and Hartheim killed nearly 10,000 people each, while another 6,000 were killed at Sonnenstein. In all about 35,000 people were killed in T4 operations that year. Operations at Brandenburg and Grafeneck were wound up at the end of the year, partly because the areas they served had been cleared and partly because of public opposition. In 1941, however, the centres at Bernberg and Sonnenstein increased their operations, while Hartheim (where Wirth and Franz Stangl were successively commandants) continued as before. As a result, another 35,000 people were killed before August 1941, when the T4 program was shut down. Even after that date, however, the centres continued to be used to kill concentration camp inmates: eventually some 20,000 people in this category were killed.<sup>[52]</sup>

In 1971 the Austrian-born journalist Gitta Sereny conducted a series of interviews with Franz Stangl, who was in prison in Düsseldorf after having been convicted of co-responsibility for killing 900,000 people as commandant of the Sobibor and Treblinka extermination camps in Poland. Stangl gave Sereny a detailed

account of the operations of the T4 program based on his time as commandant of the killing facility at the Hartheim institute.<sup>[53]</sup> He described how the inmates of various asylums were removed and transported by bus to Hartheim. Some were in no mental state to know what was happening to them, but many were perfectly sane and for them various forms of deception were used. They were told they were at a special clinic where they would receive improved treatment, and were given a brief medical examination on arrival. They were then induced to enter what appeared to be a shower block, where they were gassed with carbon monoxide (this ruse was later used on a much larger scale at the extermination camps).

### **Opposition**

Hitler and his helpers were aware from the start that a program of killing large numbers of Germans with disabilities would be unpopular with the German public. Although Hitler had a fixed policy of not issuing written instructions for policies relating to what would later be classed as crimes against humanity, he made an exception when he provided Bouhler and Brack with written authority for the T4 program in his confidential October 1939 letter. This was apparently to overcome opposition within the German state bureaucracy – the Justice Minister, Franz Gürtner, needed to be shown Hitler's letter in August 1940 to gain his cooperation.<sup>[43]</sup>

Hitler told Bouhler at the outset that "the Führer's Chancellery must under no circumstances be seen to be active in this matter."<sup>[42]</sup> There was a particular need for caution in Catholic areas, which after the annexations of Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938 included nearly half the population of Greater Germany, and where public opinion could be expected to be hostile. In March 1940 a confidential report from the SD in Austria warned that the killing program must be implemented with stealth "in order to avoid a probable backlash of public opinion during the war".<sup>[54]</sup>

Opposition persisted within the bureaucracy. A district judge and member of the Confessing Church, Lothar Kreyssig, wrote to Gürtner protesting (correctly) that the T4 program was illegal (since no law or formal decree from Hitler had authorised it); Gürtner replied, "If you cannot recognise the will of the Führer as a source of law, then you cannot remain a judge." and had Kreyssig dismissed.<sup>[26]</sup>

The Catholic Church had agreed to withdraw from all political activity in the Concordat of 1933 between Germany and the Holy See, but the prospect of state-sanctioned mass killing of German citizens had not occurred to the Church in 1933, and such a challenge to fundamental Christian belief in the sanctity of human life posed a serious dilemma for German Catholics. In 1935 the Church had protested in a private memorandum against proposals to pass a law legalising euthanasia (in the true sense of the word): this was one reason the law was not enacted.<sup>[citation needed]</sup>

In January 1939, however, Brack commissioned a paper from Dr Joseph Mayer, Professor of Moral Theology at the University of Paderborn, on the likely reactions of the churches in the event of a state euthanasia program being instituted. Mayer – a longstanding euthanasia advocate – reported that the churches would not oppose such a program if it was seen to be in the national interest. Brack showed this paper to Hitler in July, and it may have increased his confidence that the "euthanasia" program would be acceptable to German public opinion.<sup>[55]</sup> (When Gitta Sereny interviewed Mayer shortly before his death in 1967, he denied that he had approved of killing people with disabilities, but since no copies of this paper are known to survive, this cannot be determined.)<sup>[56]</sup> This turned out not to be the case. In fact the T4 program was the sole example of an action by the Nazi regime which provoked large-scale public protests.

It was impossible to keep the T4 program secret, given that thousands of doctors, nurses (including Catholic nuns<sup>[57]</sup>) and administrators were involved in it, and given that the majority of those killed had families who were actively concerned about their welfare. Despite the strictest orders to maintain secrecy, some of the staff at the killing centres talked about what was going on there. In some cases families could tell that the causes of death notified were false, e.g. when a patient was claimed to have died of appendicitis, even though his appendix had been surgically removed some years earlier. In other cases several families in the same town would receive death certificates on the same day. In the towns where the killing centres were located, many people saw the inmates arrive in buses, saw the smoke from the crematoria chimneys, noticed that no bus-loads of inmates ever left the killing centres, and drew the correct conclusion. In Hadamar ashes containing human hair rained down on the town.<sup>[58]</sup> In May 1941 the Frankfurt County Court wrote to Gürtner

describing scenes in Hadamar where children shouted in the streets that people were being taken away in buses to be gassed.<sup>[59]</sup>

During 1940 rumours of what was taking place spread, and many Germans withdrew their relatives from asylums and sanatoria to care for them at home – often with great expense and difficulty. In some places doctors and psychiatrists co-operated with families to have patients discharged, or, if the families could afford it, had them transferred to private clinics where the reach of T4 did not extend. Other doctors agreed to "re-diagnose" some patients so that they no longer met the T4 criteria, although this ran the risk of exposure when the Nazi zealots from Berlin conducted inspections. In Kiel, Professor Hans Gerhard Creutzfeldt managed to save nearly all of his patients.<sup>[60]</sup> For the most part, however, doctors co-operated with the program, either out of ignorance as to its true nature or out of agreement with Nazi eugenicist policies.<sup>[61]</sup>

During 1940 protest letters began to arrive at the Reich Chancellery and the Ministry of Justice, some of them from Nazi Party members. The first open protest against the removal of people from asylums took place at Absberg in Franconia in February 1941, and others followed. The SD report on the incident at Absberg noted that "the removal of residents from the Ottilien Home has caused a great deal of unpleasantness", and described large crowds of Catholic townspeople, among them Party members, protesting against the action.<sup>[62]</sup> Opposition to the T4 policy sharpened after the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, because the war in the east produced for the first time large-scale German casualties, and the hospitals and asylums began to fill up with maimed and disabled young German soldiers. Rumours began to circulate that these men would also be subject to "euthanasia", although in fact no such plans existed.

During 1940 and 1941 some Protestant churchmen protested privately against T4, but none made any public comment. Bishop Theophil Wurm, presiding the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Württemberg, wrote a strong letter to Interior Minister Frick in March 1940. On December 4, 1940 Reinhold Sautter, Supreme Church Councillor of Württemberg's State Church, reproached the Nazi Ministerial Councillor Eugen Stähle for the murders in Grafeneck Castle, the latter then confronted him with the Nazi government opinion, that "The fifth commandment: Thou shalt not kill, is no commandment of God but a Jewish invention" and cannot claim any validity any more.<sup>[63]</sup>

Others who privately protested were the Lutheran theologian Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, who was director of the Bethel Institution for epileptics at Bielefeld, and Pastor Paul-Gerhard Braune, director of the Hoffnungstal Institution near Berlin. Both used their connections with the regime to negotiate exemptions for their institutions: Bodelschwingh negotiated directly with Brandt and indirectly with Hermann Göring, whose cousin was a prominent psychiatrist. Braune had meetings with Justice Minister Gürtner, who was always dubious about the legality of the program, and later wrote a strongly worded letter to Hitler protesting against it: Hitler did not read it, but was told about it by Lammers.<sup>[64]</sup> In general, however, the Protestant church was more enmeshed with the Nazi regime than was the case for the Catholics and was unwilling to criticise its actions.<sup>[65]</sup>



Wikisource has original text related to this article:

***Letter of Bishop Hilfrich to Reich Justice Minister***

The Catholic Church, which since 1933 had pursued a policy of avoiding confrontation with the Nazi regime in the hope of preserving its core institutions intact, became increasingly unable to keep silent in the face of mounting evidence about the killing of inmates of hospitals and asylums. Leading Catholic churchmen, led by Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber of Munich, wrote privately to the government protesting against the policy. In July 1941 the Church broke its silence when a pastoral letter from the bishops was read out in all churches, declaring that it was wrong to kill (except in self-defence or in a morally justified war).<sup>[66]</sup> This emboldened Catholics to make more outspoken protests.

A few weeks after the pastoral letter was read out, the Catholic Bishop of Münster in Westphalia, Clemens August Graf von Galen, publicly denounced the T4 program in a sermon, and telegraphed his text to Hitler, calling on "the Führer to defend the people against the Gestapo". "It is a terrible, unjust and catastrophic thing when man opposes his will to the will of God", Galen said. "We are talking about men and women, our compatriots, our brothers and sisters. Poor unproductive people if you wish, but does this mean that they

have lost their right to live?"<sup>[67]</sup> Robert Lifton says of this sermon: "This powerful, populist sermon was immediately reproduced and distributed throughout Germany — indeed, it was dropped among German troops by British Royal Air Force pilots. Galen's sermon probably had a greater impact than any other statement in consolidating anti-'euthanasia' sentiment."<sup>[68]</sup> Another Bishop, Franz Bornewasser of Trier, also sent protests to Hitler, though not in public. In August Galen was even more outspoken, broadening his attack to include the Nazi persecution of religious orders and the closing of Catholic institutions. He attributed the heavy allied bombing of Westphalian towns to the wrath of God against Germany for breaking His laws. Galen's sermons were not reported in the German press, but were widely circulated in the form of illegally printed leaflets.<sup>[69]</sup> Local Nazis asked for Galen to be arrested, but Goebbels told Hitler that if this happened there would be an open revolt in Westphalia.<sup>[69]</sup>

By August the protests had spread to Bavaria. According to Gitta Sereny, Hitler himself was jeered by an angry crowd at Hof — the only time he was opposed in public during his 12 years of rule.<sup>[70]</sup> Despite his private fury, Hitler knew that he could not afford a confrontation with the Church at a time when Germany was engaged in a life-and-death war, a belief which was reinforced by the advice of Goebbels, Martin Bormann, head of the Party Chancellery, and Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS. Robert Lifton writes: "Nazi leaders faced the prospect of either having to imprison prominent, highly admired clergymen and other protesters — a course with consequences in terms of adverse public reaction they greatly feared — or else end the program." Himmler said: "If operation T4 had been entrusted to the SS, things would have happened differently", because "when the Führer entrusts us with a job, we know how to deal with it correctly, without causing useless uproar among the people."<sup>[71]</sup>

On 24 August 1941 Hitler ordered the cancellation of the T4 program, and also issued strict instructions to the Gauleiters that there were to be no further provocations of the churches for the duration of the war. The invasion of the Soviet Union in June had opened up new opportunities for the T4 personnel, who were soon transferred to the east to begin work on a vastly greater program of killing: the "final solution of the Jewish question". But the winding up of the T4 program did not bring the killing of people with disabilities to an end, although from the end of 1941 the killing became less systematic. Lifton documents that the killing of both adults and children continued to the end of the war, on the local initiative of institute directors and party leaders. The methods reverted to those employed before the gas chambers were employed: lethal injection, or simple starvation.<sup>[72]</sup> Kershaw estimates that by the end of 1941 75,000 to 100,000 people had been killed as a result of the program, but that further tens of thousands of concentration camp inmates, and people judged incapable of work, were killed in Germany between 1942 and 1945 (this figure does not include the Jews who were deported to their deaths in 1942 and 1943). Hartheim, for example, continued to kill people sent to it from all over Germany until 1945.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action\\_T4#Killing\\_of\\_children](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_T4#Killing_of_children)

## Dortmund Prosecutors Charge World War II Camp Guard With Murder of Jews

Q

By Karin Matussek - Jul 29, 2010 6:40 AM ET Thu Jul 29 10:40:20 GMT 2010

- 
- 
- [inShare0](#)
- 
- [More](#)

- [Business Exchange](#)
- [Buzz up!](#)
- [Digg](#)
- [Print](#)
- [Email](#)

An alleged Nazi camp guard questioned during the investigation of [John Demjanjuk](#) was charged by German prosecutors with the murder of Jews during World War II.

Samuel Kunz, 88, was charged by prosecutors in Dortmund, Germany, with shooting 10 Jews and aiding in the gassing of Jews at the Belzec camp in German-occupied Poland, the Bonn Regional Court said in an e-mailed statement today. Kunz served as a camp guard in Belzec from January 1942 to July 1943, prosecutors said.

“According to the indictment, more than 430,000 Jews were killed in the gas chambers there until July 1943,” the court said. “The accused is said to have participated as a guard.”

A lawyer for Demjanjuk, who is on trial on charges that he assisted in the murder of 27,900 Jews at the Sobibor extermination camp, cited Kunz’s case as an example of German authorities arbitrarily targeting Demjanjuk while other alleged guards were allowed to live freely in Germany for decades.

Uwe Krechel, Kunz’s attorney, didn’t immediately return a call seeking comment. Demjanjuk has denied the allegations against him.

Both Demjanjuk and Kunz served in the Russian Army, were captured by the Germans and then trained as guards at the Trawniki camp, according to prosecutors. Kunz, an ethnic German, moved to Germany after the war and gained citizenship.

The probe against Kunz was opened in June 2009 after a journalist gave Germany’s central **Nazi crime investigation unit a tip**, [Kurt Schrimm](#), **head of that unit, said. Kunz was** questioned as a witness in the Demjanjuk investigation, Schrimm said.

To contact the reporter on this story: [Karin Matussek](#) in Berlin at [kmatussek@bloomberg.net](mailto:kmatussek@bloomberg.net);

## Where did Hitler get such ideas?

### Nazi eugenics

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: [navigation](#), [search](#)

**Nazi eugenics** were [Nazi Germany](#)'s [racially-based](#) social policies that placed the improvement of the [Aryan race](#) through [eugenics](#) at the center of their concerns. Those humans were targeted that they identified as "[life unworthy of life](#)" ([German](#): *Lebensunwertes Leben*), including but not limited to the criminal, [degenerate](#), [dissident](#), feeble-minded, [homosexual](#), idle, insane and the weak, for elimination from the chain of [heredity](#). More than 400,000 people were [sterilized against their will](#), while 70,000 were killed under [Action T4](#), a "[euthanasia](#)" program. <sup>[1][2]</sup>



"We do not stand alone": Nazi poster from 1936 introducing [compulsory sterilization](#) legislation.

## Contents

[\[hide\]](#)

- [1 Hitler's views on eugenics](#)
- [2 Nazi eugenics program](#)
  - [2.1 Nazi eugenics institutions](#)
  - [2.2 Identification](#)
  - [2.3 Nazi eugenics policies regarding marriage](#)
- [3 See also](#)
- [4 Further reading](#)
  - [4.1 Books](#)
  - [4.2 Academic articles](#)
- [5 Videos](#)
- [6 References](#)
- [7 External links](#)
  - [7.1 General reference](#)
  - [7.2 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum](#)

### [\[edit\]](#) [Hitler's views on eugenics](#)

[Adolf Hitler](#) read [racial hygiene](#) tracts during his imprisonment in [Landsberg Prison](#).<sup>[3]</sup> He thought that Germany could only become strong again if the state applied to German society the principles of racial hygiene and [eugenics](#).

Hitler believed the nation had become weak, corrupted by [the infusion of degenerate elements into its bloodstream](#).<sup>[4]</sup> These had to be removed quickly. He also believed that the strong and the racially pure had to be encouraged to have more children, and the weak and the racially impure had to be neutralized by one means or another.

The racialism and idea of competition, termed [social Darwinism](#) in 1944, were discussed by European scientists and also in the Vienna press during the 1920s. Where Hitler picked up the ideas is uncertain. The theory of evolution had been generally accepted in Germany at the time but this sort of extremism was rare.<sup>[5]</sup> In 1876, [Ernst Haeckel](#) had discussed the selective [infanticide](#) policy of the Greek city of ancient [Sparta](#).<sup>[6]</sup>

In his [Second Book](#), which was unpublished during the Nazi era, Hitler praised Sparta, adding that he considered Sparta to be the first "[Völkisch](#) State". He endorsed what he perceived to be an early [eugenics](#) treatment of deformed children:

Sparta must be regarded as the first Völkisch State. The exposure of the sick, weak, deformed children, in short, their destruction, was more decent and in truth a thousand times more humane than the wretched insanity of our day which preserves the most pathological subject, and indeed at any price, and yet takes the life of a hundred thousand healthy children in consequence of [birth control](#) or through [abortions](#), in order subsequently to breed a race of degenerates burdened with illnesses.<sup>[7][8]</sup>

## [\[edit\]](#) Nazi eugenics program



Propaganda for Nazi Germany's [T-4 Euthanasia Program](#): "This person suffering from hereditary defects costs the community 60,000 Reichsmark during his lifetime. Fellow German, that is your money, too." from the [Office of Racial Policy](#)'s [Neues Volk](#).

In organizing their eugenics program the Nazis were inspired by the United States' programs of forced [sterilization](#), especially on the eugenics laws that had been enacted in [California](#).<sup>[9]</sup> The [Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring](#), proclaimed on July 14, 1933, required [physicians](#) to register every case of hereditary illness known to them, except in women over 45 years of age.<sup>[10]</sup> Physicians could be fined for failing to comply. In 1934, the first year of the Law's operation, nearly 4,000 people appealed against the decisions of sterilization authorities. 3,559 of the appeals failed. By the end of the Nazi regime, over 200 [Hereditary Health Courts](#) (*Erbgesundheitsgerichte*) were created, and under their rulings over 400,000 people were sterilized against their will.<sup>[11]</sup>

## [\[edit\]](#) Nazi eugenics institutions

The [Hadamard Clinic](#) was a [mental hospital](#) in the German town of [Hadamard](#), which was used by the Nazi-controlled German government as the site of [Action T4](#). The [Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics](#) was founded in 1927.

In its early years, and during the Nazi era, it was strongly associated with theories of eugenics and racial hygiene advocated by its leading theorists [Fritz Lenz](#) and [Eugen Fischer](#), and by its director [Otmar von Verschuer](#). Under Fischer, the sterilization of so-called [Rhineland Bastards](#) was undertaken. [Grafeneck Castle](#) was one of Nazi Germany's killing centers, and today it is a memorial place dedicated to the victims of the Action T4.

### [\[edit\]](#) Identification

The [Law for Simplification of the Health System](#) of July 1934 created Information Centers for Genetic and Racial Hygiene, as well as Health Offices. The law also described procedures for 'denunciation' and 'evaluation' of people, who were then sent to a [Genetic Health Court](#) where sterilization was decided.<sup>[12]</sup>

Information to determine who was considered 'genetically sick' was gathered from routine information supplied by people to doctor's offices and welfare departments. Standardized questionnaires had been designed by Nazi officials with the help of [Dehomag](#) (a subsidiary of [IBM](#) in the 1930s), so that the information could be encoded easily onto [Hollerith](#) punch cards for fast sorting and counting.<sup>[13]</sup>

In Hamburg, doctors gave information into a Central Health Passport Archive (circa 1934), under something called the 'Health-Related Total Observation of Life'. This file was to contain reports from doctors, but also courts, insurance companies, sports clubs, the Hitler Youth, the military, the labor service, colleges, etc. Any institution that gave information would get information back in return. In 1940, the Reich Interior Ministry tried to impose a Hamburg-style system on the whole Reich.<sup>[14]</sup>

### [\[edit\]](#) Nazi eugenics policies regarding marriage

Nazi Germany had strict marriage laws in which [marriage](#) partners had to be tested for any [hereditary diseases](#). Everyone was encouraged to carefully evaluate their prospective marriage partners eugenically during [courtship](#). Members of the [SS](#) were cautioned to carefully interview prospective marriage partners to make sure they had no family history of hereditary disease or [insanity](#), but to do this carefully so as not to hurt the feelings of the prospective [fiancé](#) and, if it became necessary to reject her for eugenic reasons, to do it tactfully and not cause her any offense.<sup>[15]</sup>

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi\\_eugenics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi_eugenics)

**Olin Tipton** was in the Battle of the Bulge as with Len.

**Ervin Earnest Hall** – Killed on Luzon in the Philippines. Buried in the American Manila Cemetery.



Figure 84 Ervin Earnest Hall

Ervin Earnest Hall (1924 - 1945)

**is your uncle**

[Euell L Hall \(1891 - 1925\)](#)

father of Ervin Earnest Hall

[Edgar Leonard Hall \(1914 - 1973\)](#)

son of Euell L Hall

[Ernest Lenard Hall](#)



Figure 85 Ervin Earnest Hall who was killed on Luzon




Figure 86 World War II Honor Roll Ervin E. Hall

U.S. World War II Army Enlistment Records, 1938-1946 about Ervin E Hall	
Name:	Ervin E Hall
Birth Year:	1924
Race:	White, citizen (White)
Nativity State or Country:	Missouri
State of Residence:	Michigan
County or City:	Kalamazoo
Enlistment Date:	24 Feb 1943
Enlistment State:	Michigan
Enlistment City:	Kalamazoo
Branch:	Branch Immaterial - Warrant Officers, USA
Branch Code:	Branch Immaterial - Warrant Officers, USA
Grade:	Private
Grade Code:	Private
Term of Enlistment:	Enlistment for the duration of the War or other emergency, plus six months, subject to the discretion of the President or otherwise according to law
Component:	Selectees (Enlisted Men)
Source:	Civil Life
Education:	Grammar school
Civil Occupation:	Semiskilled occupations in manufacture of paper and pulp
Marital Status:	Single, without dependents

Height:	70
Weight:	188



Figure 87 Purple Heart

The 32<sup>D</sup> 'Red Arrow' Veteran Association



The 32<sup>D</sup> Infantry Division  
in World War II  
"The Red Arrow"

Figure 88 The 32 Infantry Division in  
World War II "Red Arrow".

---

---

Index:

-  Mobilization, Training and Deployment to Australia “UPDATED” 30 June ‘11
-  Papuan Campaign - Strategic Situation & Overview
-  Papuan Campaign - The Advance to Buna
-  Papuan Campaign - The Battle of Buna
-  Papuan Campaign - The Battle of Sanananda
-  Back to Australia - Rehabilitation and Training
-  New Guinea Campaign - Saidor



New Guinea Campaign – Aitape “UPDATED” 30 June ‘11

New Guinea Campaign - Biak

New Guinea Campaign - Morotai


Leyte Campaign

Luzon Campaign - The Villa Verde Trail

Luzon Campaign - Mopping Up “UPDATED” 30 June ‘11


Occupation of Japan “UPDATED” 30 June ‘11





Mr. Howard Kelley, a 32<sup>D</sup> Infantry Division Veteran, has written a book describing his service during World War II. In *Born in the U.S.A. - Raised in New Guinea*, he shares some of his most personal experiences as a member of the 'Red Arrow's' 3<sup>D</sup> Battalion, 127<sup>TH</sup> Infantry. This book offers a rare, first-hand glimpse of the 32<sup>D</sup> Infantry Division in World War II, as seen through the eyes of an enlisted GI. Click on the book cover to the left, it will take you to Mr. Kelley's web site, where you will find information about how to purchase this book.

Figure 1 Born in the U.S.A.- Raised in New



Guinea

---

---

\*\*\*\*\*

### Mobilization, Training and Deployment to Australia

In August of 1940, Congress passed the legislation necessary to order National Guard units into active Federal Service during peacetime. The National Guard troops could not be required to serve for more than 12 months or outside of the Western Hemisphere.

All 18 existing National Guard divisions, plus countless, smaller, non-divisional units, would be called up in the months that followed; the 32<sup>D</sup> 'Red Arrow' Infantry Division was among the first. The National Guard of the United States was activated in 20 increments between 16 Sept. 1940 and 23 June 1941. The 32<sup>D</sup> Division was part of the second increment.

On **15 October 1940**, the 32<sup>D</sup> Division (consisting of National Guard units from Michigan and Wisconsin) was called to Active Duty.



Figure 90 Major General Irving J. Fish

The Division was commanded by Major General Irving J. Fish and had a strength of approximately 11,600 soldiers. Like almost all units in the National Guard, and even the Regular Army, at this time, the 32<sup>D</sup> Division was not at full strength and did not have all of the equipment it was authorized.



Figure 91 "See You In a Year"

"See You In a Year"

copyrighted image

*"Honoring Those Who Have Served through Art".*

*A.M. Stencel*

*Stencel Military Fine Art*

When the Division was called up, it was basically the same “square” division that it was during World War I. It was centered around the 125<sup>TH</sup> and 126<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiments of the 63<sup>D</sup> Infantry Brigade from Michigan and the 127<sup>TH</sup> and 128<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiments of the 64<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Brigade from Wisconsin. The 32<sup>D</sup> Division's 57<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Brigade was comprised of the 120<sup>TH</sup>, the 121<sup>ST</sup> and the 126<sup>TH</sup> Artillery Regiments of the Wisconsin National Guard.

The 119<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Regiment of the Michigan National Guard had recently been detached from the 32<sup>D</sup> Division and assigned to the 72<sup>D</sup> Field Artillery Brigade, headquartered in Michigan. The 72<sup>ND</sup> Field Artillery Brigade included the 182<sup>D</sup> Field Artillery, 177<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery, and 119<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery, all Michigan National Guard. The 126<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery, which took the place of the 119<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery in the 57<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Brigade, had recently been converted from the 105<sup>TH</sup> Cavalry Regiment of the Wisconsin National Guard.

**Some of the major unit commanders at this time included:**

63<sup>D</sup> Infantry Brigade - Brigadier General Thomas Colladay

125<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiment - Colonel Matthias A. Weisenhoefer

126<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiment - Colonel William Haze

64<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Brigade - Brigadier General Paul B. Clemens

127<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiment - Colonel Forrest H. Himes

128<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiment - Colonel William A. Holden

57<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Brigade - Brigadier General William S. Wood

120<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Regiment - Colonel Jim Dan Hill

121<sup>ST</sup> Field Artillery Regiment - Colonel Waldemar F. Breidster

126<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Regiment - Colonel Frederick C. T. John

On **20 October** LTC J. Tracy Hale Jr. succeeded COL Himes as commander 127<sup>TH</sup> Infantry

In **October 1940**, the Division went to Camp Beauregard, Louisiana.

The living conditions for the soldiers at Camp Beauregard were not the best, so some soldiers unaffectionately nicknamed it 'Camp Disregard.' The poor living conditions were partly the result of the fact that the camp was designed to accommodate one regiment, but the entire 32<sup>D</sup> Division was sent there anyway.

**“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11**



**Figure 92** Infantry Soldiers of the 32<sup>D</sup> Division stand at attention in a company street at Camp Beauregard, LA.

Infantry Soldiers of the 32<sup>D</sup> Division stand at attention in a company street at Camp Beauregard, LA.

**“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11**



**Figure 93** Artillery Soldiers of the 32<sup>D</sup> Division stand at attention in a battery street at Camp Beauregard, LA.

Artillery Soldiers of the 32<sup>D</sup> Division stand at attention in a battery street at Camp Beauregard, LA.

On **16 November 1940**, the 32<sup>D</sup> Division Tank Company of Janesville, Wisconsin (informally known as the Janesville Tank Company), which had been detached from the 32<sup>D</sup> Division, entered Federal service with a strength of 114 officers and men. The unit's name would be changed to Company A, 192<sup>D</sup> Tank Battalion, 1<sup>ST</sup> Armored Division.

On **27 November**, Company A, 192<sup>D</sup> Tank Battalion left Janesville in a convoy of trucks bound for Fort Knox, Kentucky. At Fort Knox, new M-3 light tanks were issued along with other vehicles and equipment.

In **February of 1941**, the 32<sup>D</sup> Division moved to Camp Livingston, Louisiana.

**“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11**



**Figure 94A** company street at Camp Livingston, LA.

A company street at Camp Livingston, LA.

**“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11**



**Figure 95** Co. D & HQ Detachment, 1<sup>ST</sup> Battalion, 128<sup>TH</sup> Infantry pass in review at Camp Livingston, LA, on 29 May 1941.

Co. D & HQ Detachment, 1<sup>ST</sup> Battalion, 128<sup>TH</sup> Infantry pass in review at Camp Livingston, LA, on 29 May 1941.

**“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11**



**Figure 96** BG Wood & Staff of the 57<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Brigade pass in review at Camp Livingston, LA, on 29 May 1941.

BG Wood & Staff of the 57<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Brigade pass in review at Camp Livingston, LA, on 29 May 1941.

On **12 August 1941**, congress narrowly passed legislation that would allow the Federal service of the National Guard to be extended from 12 to 18 months, and would permit the National Guard to serve outside the Western Hemisphere.

In **August and September of 1941**, the 32<sup>D</sup> Division was participating, in the words of then COL Jim D. Hill, CO of the 120<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Regiment, *"in a series of the most grandiose field exercises and full maneuvers ever staged any time, anywhere, before or since, by American troops. (430)"* These exercises were collectively referred to as the Louisiana Maneuvers. They started out pitting division against division, then built up to corps against corps, and culminated in the grand finale of Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Third Army taking the offensive against Lieutenant General Ben Lear's Second Army.

***"The Great Maneuvers"***

***"Lear's Second Army (Red) Order of Battle included 3 'square' Infantry Divisions (Guard), 2 'triangular' Infantry Divisions, two Armored and one Cavalry [horse] division. Krueger's Third Army (Blue) consisted of 8 'square' Infantry Divisions (Guard), two 'triangular' Infantry Divisions, one Tank Group of only 60 light tanks, 3 Anti-Tank Battalions, one Cavalry [horse] Division and one Cavalry [horse] Brigade. Each Army Commander had 300 Air Corps planes at his disposal. A company of paratroopers was present and operational for the first time in American history. Note that Lear was comparatively light and nimble with a tremendous preponderance in armor and enjoyed all the advantages inherent in being on the defense in most difficult terrain. The opposing Third Army was heavy with 330,000 officers and men, weak on proportional motor vehicles and short on Armor and modernity of Divisional organization and equipment.***

***"Initial deployment for Krueger's Blues, with Headquarters at Lake Charles, was from Beaumont, Texas to Bayou Teche, Louisiana. Lear's Red Second Army initially was deployed North and East of the Red River from Alexandria Northwesterly to Shreveport and Caddo Lake on the Texas border. The river line and its terrain were unfavorable to tank tactics, hence Lear with some logic crossed the river on a wide front for a strong thrust forward to seize the comparatively open Peason Ridge country where the preponderance of Red Armor would be most advantageous. Red Cavalry swept wide from the Northwest flank to help foreclose the mortgage on Peason Ridge country and threaten Blue's flank from the line of the Sabine River. But the Red Cavalry did not sweep wide enough and started its flanking movement too soon. Krueger's Third Army Blue Cavalry successfully screened its own Army's open flank but also used its weight and mobility to sweep still more widely and cut deep***

*into Red's rear North and East of Mansfield, Louisiana. While the horse cavalry war was proceeding along a line that would have met with the warm approval of both Phil Sheridan and Jeb Stuart, Blue Army's eight 'square' Guard Divisions were proving to be far less cumbersome and awkward than their obsolete organization and shortage of equipment had appeared to dictate. By temporarily 'grounding' a part of each division while all vehicles did fast shuttle movements, Blue Infantry from the Guard Divisions appeared amazingly soon in areas where time and space factors had suggested impossibility.*

*"Fast shuttle motor movements reconcentrated the 'square' Divisions for coordinated attacks upon specified objectives on their fronts. Thus each Division fought its own little war within its zone of action. Lear's Red Armor was denied the ownership of Peason Ridge with its potential for a quick defensive victory through offensive tactics.*

*"The Red Air Force was either less lucky or not so well handled. Moreover, it had been beefed up with some Navy fliers who knew not the terrain and who had no opportunity to become integrated into an instinctively reacting membership of their entire team. The 300 Blue planes were credited with more successful missions. A Blue paratroop drop of 127 officers and men, as rear area raiders and saboteurs, wrecked General Lear's Red communications. They stank up Lear's own headquarters with smoke bombs simulating complete destruction, which could have claimed Lear as a casualty. "A re-e-edicu-u-lous performance!" General Lear sputtered in the lobby of the Camp Polk movie theater shortly prior to the grand critique.*

*"The Umpires must have partially thought likewise. The squad that pulled the stunt was ruled out because its only hostile identification was a short, thin strand of blue baby ribbon. This notwithstanding, the tide of battle forced Lear to displace his Headquarters to the rear. But it was the Cavalry that ended the long, hot, dusty campaign. With the Guard Cavalry Brigade screening and thus containing the entire Red Cavalry Division, the Blue Division of horse Cavalry swept far to westward and came in behind the Red forward positions to capture and destroy supplies. These included the Red gasoline depot. There could be but one Umpire ruling. The Red tanks and other mobile vehicles were declared immobile as their fuel tanks became empty.*

*"The maneuver war was over except for the equally grandiose critique. In it there was almost as much yapping about improperly policed, vacated bivouac areas as there was about tactics and strategy. This fell alike upon all units, Regulars and Reservists in the 'triangular' Divisions and Guardsmen in the 'square' Divisions. This situation was indeed bad throughout the maneuvers for the simple reason that the thrifty Louisiana farmers broke out their shovels and opened all the marked and dated kitchen refuse pits as fast as the sites were vacated so that their hogs could get at the garbage. Maneuver Headquarters . . . must have been aware of this, for one of the Guard Regimental Executive Officers sought a measure of remedial action by switching the markings upon otherwise properly-covered kitchen pits and the latrine trenches. There appears to have been a civilian complaint. In any event, the Guard officer received a written rebuke for having displayed an unsanitary sense of humor. (Hill 431-33) "*

“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11



Figure 97 Soldiers of Co. D, 128TH Infantry, during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941

Soldiers of Co. D, 128<sup>TH</sup> Infantry, during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11



Figure 98 A bivouac area during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

A bivouac area during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11



Figure 99 Soldiers conducting daily exercise in a bivouac area during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

Soldiers conducting daily exercise in a bivouac area during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11



Figure 100 A field kitchen during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

A field kitchen during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11



Figure 101 A truck from the 120TH Field Artillery Regiment stuck in mud during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

A truck from the 120<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Regiment stuck in mud during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

“NEW” photo added 30 Jun. 11



Figure 102 Engineers constructing a pontoon bridge during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

Engineers constructing a pontoon bridge during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.

About **October of 1941**, the Division organized a regimental combat team for the Carolina maneuvers (held later in **November**). It was called the 128<sup>TH</sup> Regimental Combat Team but it consisted of units from the 126<sup>TH</sup>, 127<sup>TH</sup> and 128<sup>TH</sup> Infantry, 120<sup>TH</sup> Artillery, 107<sup>TH</sup> Engineers, 107<sup>TH</sup> Medical Regiment and other personnel from the Division.

Around **October**, General Wood was succeeded by Brigadier General Ellerbe W. Carter as Commander of the 57<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth L. Hallenbeck became the commander of the 125<sup>TH</sup> Infantry, taking the place of Colonel Wiesenhoefer.

In **mid-October 1941** the 192<sup>D</sup> Tank Battalion, including the former 32<sup>D</sup> Division Tank Company (now Co. A of the 192<sup>D</sup>), was moved by rail to San Francisco, California. The 192<sup>D</sup> was sent to the Philippines, where with the 194<sup>TH</sup> Tank Battalion became the Provisional Tank Group on Luzon. This Tank Group included the tank companies from the National Guard Divisions from California (40<sup>TH</sup>), Kentucky (38<sup>TH</sup>), Illinois (33<sup>D</sup>), Minnesota (34<sup>TH</sup>), Ohio (37<sup>TH</sup>) and Wisconsin (32<sup>D</sup>).

Prior to the creation of the 1<sup>ST</sup> and 2<sup>D</sup> Armored Divisions on 15 July 1940, the only armored force the US Regular Army had was an experimental Mechanized Cavalry Brigade at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Just prior to the induction of the National Guard divisions, their organic tank companies were declared non-divisional GHQ (General Headquarters) Troops. As a result, each division was stripped of its tank company and those companies now came under the direct control of the new and growing Armored Force, with then BG Adna R. Chaffee as its first Chief. When it was recognized that US forces in the Philippines needed some tanks for a more balanced force against the rising threat from Japan, BG Chaffee selected the 6 National Guard tank companies mentioned above. The tank companies of the 18 National Guard Divisions represented the oldest, most-experienced, and best-equipped armored units in being in the US. These National Guard tank companies had been training with World War I French tanks (FT-17) up until about 1940 and only now were being equipped with the M-3 light tank.

On **3 December 1941** the 632<sup>D</sup> Tank Destroyer Battalion was formed at Camp Livingston, Louisiana from personnel of the 32<sup>D</sup> Infantry Division.

When the 'square' National Guard divisions were 'triangularized', each was required to create one tank destroyer battalion from surplus units (for some reason, the 41<sup>ST</sup> Division was not faced with this requirement). These battalions were numbered in the 600-series with the last 2 digits indicating the division it came from. There were 7 additional tank destroyer battalions created from the 7 brigades of National Guard corps artillery. They were numbered in the 700-series with the last 2 digits indicating the brigade it was created from. These battalions were non-divisional units, they were GHQ Troops under the control of the Armored Force (so technically they were not organic to the parent unit). However, some of these tank destroyer battalions went overseas as an attachment to the parent unit and were, for the most part, considered organic to them. Most were separated, some were redesignated to become part of an armored division, others were inactivated with their personnel absorbed into some other Armored Force unit.

The 632<sup>D</sup> Tank Destroyer Battalion was, essentially, treated as an organic unit of the 32<sup>D</sup> Division. It went to Australia with the 32<sup>D</sup> Division. It fought with the 32<sup>D</sup> at Aitape and Saidor. It went into the battle for Leyte with the 1<sup>ST</sup> Cavalry Division, but later joined the 32<sup>D</sup> on Leyte. On Luzon it was initially attached to the 13<sup>TH</sup> Armored Group but subsequently served with 37<sup>TH</sup>, 44<sup>TH</sup> and 32<sup>D</sup> Divisions on Luzon.

On **7 December 1941**, in conjunction with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese began bombing the Philippines in preparation for an amphibious assault a few days later. Company A, 192<sup>D</sup> Tank Battalion (formerly the 32<sup>D</sup> Div. Tank Co.) fought against the Imperial Japanese Forces in many engagements and rear guard actions, and rendered assistance in covering the eventual retreat of our forces into Bataan.

In **January and February 1942**, the 32<sup>D</sup> Division was reorganized into a “triangular” division, centered around three infantry regiments. As a result, the 125<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiment was detached from the Division; and the three existing artillery regiments (120<sup>TH</sup>, 121<sup>ST</sup> and 126<sup>TH</sup>) were converted into four battalions (120<sup>TH</sup>, 121<sup>ST</sup>, 126<sup>TH</sup> and 129<sup>TH</sup>); three battalions of 105 mm howitzers and one battalion of 155 mm howitzers).

The 1<sup>ST</sup> Battalion of the 120<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Regiment became the 120<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Battalion. The 2<sup>D</sup> Battalion of the 120<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Regiment became the 129<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Battalion. The 1<sup>ST</sup> Battalion of the 121<sup>ST</sup> Field Artillery Regiment became the 121<sup>ST</sup> Field Artillery Battalion. The 1<sup>ST</sup> Battalion of the 126<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Regiment became the 126<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Battalion. The 2<sup>D</sup> Battalions of the 121<sup>ST</sup> and 126<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Regiments combined to become the 173<sup>D</sup> Field Artillery Regiment, later redesignated the 173<sup>D</sup> Field Artillery Group. The group was composed of the 173<sup>D</sup> Field Artillery Battalion and the 985<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Battalion (formerly 2<sup>D</sup> Battalion, 126<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Regiment and 2<sup>D</sup> Battalion, 121<sup>ST</sup> Field Artillery Regiment, not positive which was which). The 173<sup>D</sup> Field Artillery Group served in the European Theater and it appears that one battalion fought in Italy (Naples-Foggia, Rome-Arno, North Appenines, and Po Valley Campaigns) while the other battalion fought in northern Europe (Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes-Alsace, and Central Europe Campaigns).

The engineer, medical and quartermaster regiments were also converted into battalions as part of the reorganization to a 'triangular' division. When the reorganization was complete, the 32<sup>D</sup> Infantry Division consisted of the following units:

Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Military Police Company

126<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiment

127<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiment

128<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiment

Division Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

120<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Battalion (LTC Harold A. Morgan)

121<sup>ST</sup> Field Artillery Battalion (LTC Melvin L. McCreary)

126<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Battalion (LTC Ross J. Quatsoe)

129<sup>TH</sup> Field Artillery Battalion (LTC Kenneth J. Hough)

107<sup>TH</sup> Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Colonel Ralph A. Loveland)

107<sup>TH</sup> Medical Battalion (LTC Carl Hanna)

107<sup>TH</sup> Quartermaster Battalion (MAJ Donald M. Farris)

32<sup>D</sup> Signal Company

32<sup>D</sup> Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop

632<sup>D</sup> Tank Destroyer Battalion (not officially organic to the Division)

In **January of 1942**, General Fish was reassigned to other duties when he became over-age for combat command. General Fish had been associated with the 32<sup>D</sup> Division and the Wisconsin National Guard for many years; he served on the Mexican Border with the Wisconsin National Guard in 1916 and served with the 32<sup>D</sup> Division in World War I.

In truth, the creation and enforcement of this 'over-age' policy was little more than a thinly veiled excuse to get rid of senior National Guard officers and give their desirable commands to Regular Army officers. To make a long, complicated story short, the Regular Army in 1940 was bloated with officers, especially colonels but other officer ranks as well. This excess in officers was partly caused by the fact that the strength of the Regular Army was drastically reduced after World War I; they got rid of many enlisted soldiers but kept many

officers. Also, the promotion system for officers between the wars was very ineffective. Sometimes the Regular Army officers that replaced these so-called 'over-age' National Guard officers were themselves over-age or later became over-age but were not replaced when they did. Another tactic used to replace National Guard officers with Regular Army officers was to give the National Guard officers extremely rigorous physical examinations, much more thorough than those given to enlisted soldiers, junior officers or Regular Army officers. In this way they could create more vacancies for Regular Army officers by claiming that some of these National Guard officers suffered from often unnamed or nonexistent ailments. This information is not being included here to imply that these Regular Army officers were in any way undeserving or unqualified for these positions. It is only being included to point out that some National Guard officers were treated in an unjust and unprofessional manner by some in the Regular Army.



**Figure 103** On 9 February 1942, Brigadier General Edwin F. Harding took command of the Division.

On **9 February 1942**, Brigadier General Edwin F. Harding took command of the Division. He was promoted to Major General on 13 February.

MG Harding came to the 32<sup>D</sup> Division from the 9<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Division, where he had been assistant division commander. Before that he had been commander of the 27<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Regiment (at that time the 27<sup>TH</sup> Infantry was assigned to the Hawaiian Division). He had graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1909. He was a native of Franklin, Ohio.

Brigadier General Albert W. Waldron was assigned to the Division around this time as commanding general, 32<sup>D</sup> Division Artillery.

Shortly after General Harding assumed command, the Division moved to Fort Devens, Massachusetts and began preparing to be shipped to Northern Ireland.

On **25 March 1942**, the Division was notified that it was being sent to Australia to help halt the Japanese advances in the Southwest Pacific and attempt to put the Japanese on the defensive. The Division boarded troop trains and headed for San Francisco. The 107<sup>TH</sup> Engineers had already sailed for Europe so the 114<sup>TH</sup> Engineer Combat Battalion from New England hastily took their place in the 32<sup>D</sup> Division.

The 32<sup>D</sup> Division, along with the 41<sup>ST</sup> Division, would become part of I Corps in Australia. Major General Robert L. Eichelberger, a classmate of General Harding's at West Point, was the I Corps commander. I Corps had been scheduled to participate in Operation Torch in North Africa later in the year, until a last minute change sent it, too, to Australia. General Eichelberger had seen sudden changes of mission before (and he would see more in the future), during World War I, when scheduled to go to France, a last minute change found him as assistant chief of staff of our American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, Russia.

On **9 April 1942**, Bataan fell to the Japanese. All surviving members of Company A, 192<sup>D</sup> Tank Battalion became prisoners and, along with the other American and Philippine forces who surrendered to the Japanese, participated in the infamous "Death March." Three years later, after the defeat of Japan, the 35 remaining men of the Janesville Tank Company were released from POW camps and returned home. The Company had 114 officers and men when it entered Federal service on 16 Nov. 1940.

On **22 April**, the 32<sup>D</sup> Division sailed from San Francisco bound for Australia. Just before they left, the Division picked up some 3,000 replacements, most of these had just finished basic training (the Division was still short around 1,800 men).

It is interesting to note that the date **7 May 1942** never existed for the men of the 32<sup>D</sup> Division. When their convoy crossed the International Date Line, they went from 6 May to 8 May.

On **14 May 1942** the 32<sup>D</sup> Division reached Adelaide, South Australia. It was sent to Camp Woodside (east of Adelaide) and Camp Sandy Creek (north of Adelaide).

In **July of 1942** the Division relocated to Camp Tamborine, near Brisbane on Australia's east coast. The 900-mile move from Adelaide to Brisbane was rather difficult. Much of the Division's equipment and personnel were shipped by railroad (some also went by sea). Each Territory in Australia had its own (different) rail gauge (gauge refers to the distance between the two rails). The trains had to stop at the border of each territory; the train was then unloaded and all the equipment and soldiers had to be loaded onto a different train that was compatible with the rail gauge in the next territory. The 32<sup>ND</sup> Division crossed the borders of four Australian Territories before it reached Brisbane.



**Figure 104** On 30 August, Camp Tamborine was renamed Camp Cable, in honor of CPL Gerald O. Cable, a Soldier from Michigan assigned to Service Company, 126<sup>TH</sup> Infantry. CPL Cable was making the trip to Brisbane aboard a ship that was transporting some of the Division'

On **30 August**, Camp Tamborine was renamed Camp Cable, in honor of CPL Gerald O. Cable, a Soldier from Michigan assigned to Service Company, 126<sup>TH</sup> Infantry. CPL Cable was making the trip to Brisbane aboard a ship that was transporting some of the Division's equipment. He was killed when the ship was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine; giving him the distinction of being the first Soldier of the 32<sup>D</sup> Division to be KIA in World War II.

In **August 1942** the 107<sup>TH</sup> Engineer Battalion (Michigan National Guard and formerly part of the 32<sup>D</sup> Division) and the 112<sup>TH</sup> Engineer Battalion (Ohio) were combined to form the 112<sup>TH</sup> Engineer Regiment in Ireland.

#### **Next Section - Papuan Campaign - Strategic Situation And Overview**

---

#### **Bibliography:**

- Blakeley, H. W., Major General, Retired. The 32<sup>D</sup> Infantry Division in World War II. The Thirty-second Infantry Division History Commission, State of Wisconsin, n.d.
- Cannon, M. Hamlin. Leyte: The Return to the Philippines. U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1954.
- Drea, Edward J. New Guinea - The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II. U. S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.
- Hill, Jim Dan, Major General, Retired. The Minute Man in Peace and War. Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1964.
- Jungwirth, Clarence J. Diary of a National Guardsman in World War II. Oshkosh, WI: Poeschl Printing Company, 1991.
- Milner, Samuel. Victory in Papua. U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1957.
- Papuan Campaign - The Buna-Sanananda Operation. Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, War Department, 1945.
- The Red Arrow - 1955 - The 32<sup>D</sup> Division, Wisconsin National Guard. n.p., 1955.
- Smith, Herbert M., Lieutenant Colonel, Retired. Hannibal Had Elephants II. Eau Claire, WI: Rev. William A. Heins, 1995.

Smith, Robert Ross. The Approach to the Philippines. U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1953.

Smith, Robert Ross. Triumph in the Philippines. U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1963.

---

---

Back to 32<sup>D</sup> Division in World War II

Contact the 32<sup>D</sup> 'Red Arrow' Veteran Association Webmaster.

revised 30 June 2011

since 15 March 1999



Figure 105 New Guinea

---

## Introduction

World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in the history of mankind. However, the half century that now separates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowledge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social, and military implications of a war that, more than any other, united us as a people with a common purpose.

Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not only about the profession of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will participate in the nation's 50th anniversary commemoration of World War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various materials to help educate Americans about that war. The works produced will provide great opportunities to learn about and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been called "the mighty endeavor."

World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over several diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The following essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting those struggles

that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army's significant military feats from that war.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History by Edward J. Drea. I hope this absorbing account of that period will enhance your appreciation of American achievements during World War II.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

---

## **New Guinea**

### **24 January 1943-31 December 1944**

The campaign on New Guinea is all but forgotten except by those who served there. Battles with names like Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo Jima overshadow it. Yet Allied operations in New Guinea were essential to the U.S. Navy's drive across the Central Pacific and to the U.S. Army's liberation of the Philippine Islands from Japanese occupation. The remorseless Allied advance along the northern New Guinea coastline toward the Philippines forced the Japanese to divert precious ships, planes, and men who might otherwise have reinforced their crumbling Central Pacific front.

New Guinea is the second largest island in the world. Its north coastline extends nearly 1,600 miles from twelve degrees south latitude to just south of the equator. A major mountain range cuts across the island's center from the eastern end of New Guinea to Geelvink Bay on the west and makes passage overland through the jungled mountains by large units nearly impossible. The lee of the mountainous spine, around the Port Moresby area, is wet from January to April but otherwise dry. On the windward side, scene of most of the ground fighting during 1942-1945, rainfall runs as high as 300 inches per year. As one veteran recalled, "It rains daily for nine months and then the monsoon starts."

Disease thrived on New Guinea. Malaria was the greatest debilitator, but dengue fever, dysentery, scrub typhus, and a host of other tropical sicknesses awaited unwary soldiers in the jungle. Scattered, tiny coastal settlements dotted the flat malarial north coastline, but inland the lush tropical jungle swallowed men and equipment.

The terrain was a commander's nightmare because it fragmented the deployment of large formations. On the north shore a tangled morass of large mangrove swamps slowed overland movement. Monsoon rains of eight or ten inches a day turned torpid streams into impassable rivers. There were no roads or railways, and supply lines were often native tracks, usually a dirt trail a yard or so wide tramped out over the centuries through the jungle growth. Downpours quickly dissolved such footpaths into calf-deep mud that reduced soldiers to exhausted automatons stumbling over the glue-like ground. Fed by the frequent downpours, the lush rain-forest jungle afforded excellent concealment to stubborn defenders and made coordinated overland envelopments nearly [3] impossible. Infantrymen carrying sixty pounds of weapons, equipment, and pack staggered along in temperatures reaching the mid-90s with humidity levels to match. Thus the U.S. Army faced a determined Japanese foe on a battleground riddled with disease and whose terrain made a mockery of orthodox military deployments.

#### ***Strategic Setting***

In January 1943 the Allied and the Japanese forces facing each other on New Guinea were like two battered heavyweights. Round one had gone to the Americans and Australians who had ejected the Japanese from Papua, New Guinea. After three months of unimaginative frontal attacks had overcome a well-entrenched foe, General Douglas MacArthur, the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) commander, had his airstrip and staging base at Buna on the north coast. It was expensive real estate. About 13,000 Japanese troops perished during the terrible fighting, but Allied casualties were also heavy; 8,500 men fell in battle (5,698 of them Australians) and 27,000 cases of malaria were reported, mainly because of shortages of medical supplies. Besides ruining the Australian 7th and U.S. 32d Infantry Divisions, the campaign had severely taxed the

Australian 5th and U.S. 41st Infantry Divisions. The exhausted Americans needed six months to reconstitute before their next operation. Australian ground forces, despite heavier losses, became the front line of defense against the Japanese who, though bloodied, were ready for round two.

To block the Allied counteroffensives on New Guinea and in the Solomons, Tokyo dispatched thousands of reinforcements to its great bastion at Rabaul, New Britain. On 9 November 1942, *Eighth Area Army*, commanded by Lt. Gen. Hitoshi Imamura, opened on Rabaul. *Eighteenth Army*, commanded by Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi, was organized the same day and subordinated to *Eighth Area Army*. Adachi took charge of operations on New Guinea. Despite their defeat at Buna and the heavy losses in the continuing struggle for Guadalcanal, in January 1943 Japan still held the preponderant air, naval, and ground strength in the Southwest Pacific and retained the strategic initiative in New Guinea. With these advantages, they planned to strike again for Port Moresby.

Japanese construction battalions had transformed the prewar airfield and harbor at Lae, North East New Guinea, into a major air base and anchorage on the Huon Gulf. Japanese infantrymen could land at the stronghold and then sortie under air cover to seize a forward air [4] base at Wau, located in the malarious Bulolo Valley about 150 miles west-northwest of Buna. With Wau in hand, the Japanese could lunge forward again toward Moresby protected by an aerial umbrella. Isolated and weakly defended, the Australian airstrip at Wau seemed ripe for *Eighteenth Army's* picking.

In January 1943 *Eighth Area Army* ordered reinforcements to Lae. Forewarned of the impending convoy by decrypted Japanese naval messages, MacArthur's air chief, Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, commander of Allied Air Forces and U.S. Fifth Air Force, sent repeated air attacks against the enemy ships. Allied pilots sank two troop transports, damaged another, and killed 600 Japanese soldiers. Only one-third of the intended Japanese reinforcements reached Lae, and these survivors salvaged only half of their equipment. Without reinforcements, the desperate attack on Wau failed. The defeated Japanese remnants fell back into the jungle, slowly giving ground toward Lae.

Repulsed at Wau and pressed by the Australians, Japanese forces on New Guinea urgently needed reinforcements. On 19 February 1943, U.S. Navy cryptanalysts handed MacArthur solid intelligence that the enemy was planning another major transport to Lae in early March. Kenney threw every available aircraft into a three-day struggle from 2 to 5 March, known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Eight transports and four destroyers were lost in all. Of the *51st Division's* 6,912 troops, about 3,900 survived, but only 1,000 soaked, oil-stained, and dispirited officers and men reached Lae. Kenney's destruction of the *51st Division* condemned the Japanese to the strategic defensive on New Guinea.

From February to June 1943 the battleground in eastern New Guinea lapsed into a stalemate as the opponents reinforced and replaced earlier losses. Shipping shortages created logistics and transportation bottlenecks for both sides. The *Imperial Navy* could not make good its heavy losses in naval planes and pilots so the *Japanese Army Air Force* was gradually taking control of air bases and operations in New Guinea. For the Allies, Europe also had first priority, for long-range heavy bombers and fighters were needed in North Africa. Kenney found himself trying to justify additional scarce warplanes from Washington for New Guinea. Carrier-based aircraft in the Pacific remained firmly under U.S. Navy control, as did the greater part of the Pacific Fleet. MacArthur was limited to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. He lacked transports, cargo vessels, and landing craft as well as the specialized crews to man them. Neither side had the resources in early 1943 to force a decisive victory, and the campaign seemed likely to continue as a war of attrition.

[5]




Figure 106 New Guinea map.

### *Operations*

At SWPA General Headquarters MacArthur's staff was planning the timetable for his triumphant return to the Philippines. Code-named RENO, it became the basis for operations against Japan from February 1943 through August 1944. During that time, RENO underwent five modifications to keep pace with changing operational and strategic requirements. RENO I envisioned leapfrogging past Japanese strongholds in New Guinea and using paratroopers to seize key bases en route to Mindanao in the southern Philippines. The Japanese roadblock to MacArthur's scheme was the so-called Bismarck Barrier, that is, New Britain and its naval and air bases at Rabaul in combination with the series of Japanese air enclaves dispersed along the northern New Guinea coastline.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of 28 March 1943 described Southwest Pacific objectives as a line running across the straits between Finschhafen, New Guinea, and New Britain. They ordered MacArthur to establish air bases on Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands; to seize the Huon Peninsula and Madang; and to occupy western New Britain. Meantime, under Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander in Chief, South Pacific Area, the U.S. Navy with Army and Marine troops would clear the Solomons to southern Bougainville. These operations were seen as preparatory for the ultimate seizure of Rabaul.

From these decisions grew the CARTWHEEL operation, a joint Southwest and South Pacific undertaking that originally envisioned thirteen amphibious operations, over six months, culminating in the capture of Rabaul. It began the night of 29-30 June when Halsey invaded New Georgia, Solomon Islands, and MacArthur struck at Nassau Bay. The following day two U.S. Army separate regiments, the 112th Cavalry and the 158th Infantry, made unopposed landings at Woodlark and Kiriwina respectively.

For CARTWHEEL MacArthur created ALAMO Force, an independent operational command that was in reality almost identical to Southwest Pacific's newly created U.S. Sixth Army. By placing ALAMO Force directly under General Headquarters, MacArthur removed American troops engaged in tactical operations from the control of Allied Land Forces commanded by the Australian General Sir Thomas Blamey. MacArthur personally selected Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger to command Sixth Army. Another American, Vice Adm. Arthur S. Carpender, commanded Allied Naval Forces which included the U.S. Seventh

[8]

Fleet. His aggressive assistant was Rear Adm. Daniel E. Barbey, who commanded VII Amphibious Force, the ships that would carry the ground forces, their equipment, and supplies forward into battle against the Japanese during CARTWHEEL.

The limited sixty-mile range of the boats of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, selected to transport the troops and equipment, dictated that the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, land in Nassau Bay. On 30 June a makeshift fleet of 3 PT boats; 29 landing craft vehicles, personnel (LCVP), and 1 landing craft, mechanized (LCV); and 2 captured Japanese barges carried the battalion to its objective. Although the troops landed without enemy opposition, SWPA had much to learn about amphibious operations. Pounding surf had beached or wrecked eighteen of the precious landing craft. Small bands of enemy soldiers appeared the following day, but after confused nighttime skirmishes in a tropical downpour the outnumbered Japanese fled into the concealment of the thick jungle. They left behind some 50 of their dead comrades as well as 18 dead and 27 wounded Americans.

About forty miles from Lae, Nassau Bay became a staging base that threatened Japanese defenders at Salamaua, a village midway between the two points that guarded the overland approach to Lae. As the 162d Regiment, 41st Division, pushed slowly north along the coast from Nassau Bay, Adachi had to siphon troops from Lae to protect Salamaua. This left his already understrength Lae garrison vulnerable to a flanking attack by sea and air.

An Allied pincer was slowly closing on Lae. While the Americans pushed along the coast, Australian troops advanced on a western axis from Wau through the Markham Valley. The mainstay of the Japanese defense was a lone infantry regiment. In such rugged jungled terrain, however, a few determined men could slow down a division. Numerous streams cut the coastline into a swampy, muddy bog that impeded the American push. The few jungle trails capable of bearing basic logistic support made the direction of the Australian overland thrust predictable. Japanese infantrymen dug in along key terrain dominating the obvious approaches. A grueling 75-day ordeal followed in the jungle wilds under appalling conditions. Patrol-size probes lurching through overgrown and tangled vegetation became the principal maneuver elements. Ambush and sudden death awaited the careless or unlucky because it was often impossible to see more than a few feet into the undergrowth. In the Southwest Pacific, small arms claimed 32 percent of Americans killed in action during the war and artillery 17 percent—a marked contrast to the overall rates in the European theater of 19.7 and 57.5 percent respectively. In part the aberration stemmed from the relative paucity of

[9]

Japanese artillery compared to their Axis allies; in part it reflects the face-to-face combat characteristic of jungle fighting.

American losses from the end of June until 12 September, when Salamaua fell, were 81 killed and 396 wounded while the Australian 15th Brigade suffered 112 killed, 346 wounded, and 12 missing. Japanese losses surpassed 1,000 men. The battle casualties tell only part of the struggle fought out against nature in the jungle wilds. Men on both sides collapsed, exhausted from the debilitating tropical heat and humidity; soldiers shook violently from malarial chills or from a drenching in tropical downpours. Others simply went mad. The neuropsychiatric rate for American soldiers was the highest in the Southwest Pacific theater (43.94 per 1,000 men). The same monotonous field ration—bully beef and biscuits for the Australians, C-rations for the Americans—left soldiers undernourished and susceptible to the uncountable tropical diseases that flourished in the warm, moist jungle.

Japanese losses in their prolonged defense of Salamaua had left Lae exposed to an Allied envelopment. For his part, General Adachi expected the newly organized *Fourth Air Army* at Wewak to protect Lae's flanks against possible Allied airborne or seaborne assaults. As for MacArthur, the continuing shortage of ships and aircraft in SWPA meant that an envelopment of Lae required a total effort and all available resources. He could not, however, take that risk without local air superiority.

Faced with Japanese air power on two fronts—Rabaul and now Wewak—Kenney concentrated all his might against the latter. Wewak, however, lay beyond the effective range of Allied fighters, and ordering unescorted heavy bombers to make the attack risked unacceptable losses. Instead Kenney built an advance secret air base sixty miles southeast of Lae from where his fighters could reach Wewak. He planned the raid on the basis of compromised *Japanese Army Air Force* air-ground codes which revealed that the enemy had concentrated ten

flying regiments at Wewak. On 17 August 1943, Kenney's airmen struck Wewak and left 100 parked airplanes destroyed on taxiways or damaged in their earthen revetments. A follow-up strike the next morning wrecked 28 more Japanese planes. In just two days *Fourth Air Army* lost three-quarters of its aircraft. Temporarily crippled, it was unable to oppose the first coordinated airborne and amphibious assault in the Pacific that occurred two weeks later.

More than forty ships manned by 3,200 sailors of Barbey's VII Amphibious Force, with the 2d Engineer Special Brigade attached, carried the Australian 9th Division to landing areas eighteen miles east of Lae. A two-echelon landing spread over 4 to 6 September placed  
[10]



**Figure 107 Airdrop at Nadzab, Morning of 5 September 1943.**

*Airdrop at Nadzab, Morning of 5 September 1943.*

(U.S. Air Force photograph)

some 7,800 Australian troops in the rear of the Japanese defenses. Meanwhile, unchallenged by Japanese air power, on 5 September 96 C-47 transports, escorted by another 200 fighters and bombers, ferried the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment to Nadzab, about twenty miles west of Lae. In a spectacular display, hundreds of American paratroopers emptied the C-47s within five minutes. They met no opposition on the ground and quickly secured the landing zone. Within two days C-47s were flying troops from the Australian 7th Division into the airhead. The sea-air envelopment threatened to cut off the 51st Division at Lae from the rest of *Eighteenth Army*. Adachi ordered the division to withdraw to Finschhafen fifty miles east of Lae. The luckless Japanese had to detour around the Australians blocking the coastal road and into rugged, 12,000-foot-high mountains to reach the north coast. About 8,000 officers and men trekked into the foreboding mountains. More than 2,000 Japanese never came out, most victims of starvation.

Coupled with the loss of the Central Solomons and the Aleutians, this latest reversal convinced Tokyo that its forces were dangerously overextended. *Imperial Headquarters* therefore established a revised main perimeter line from western New Guinea through the Carolines to the Marianas. Although Rabaul and eastern New Guinea were now expendable, Japanese forces there were ordered to delay MacArthur's advance as long as possible.

[11]



Figure 108 New Guiana map 2

Meanwhile Allied strategy also underwent a major shift. At the QUADRANT Conference held during August 1943 in Quebec, Canada, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the Joint Chiefs' recommendation to bypass rather than to capture Rabaul. Now MacArthur's task became the neutralization of the Japanese on New Guinea as far west as Wewak. QUADRANT'S decisions gave priority to the U.S. Navy's drive across the Central Pacific and naturally disappointed MacArthur, who had argued for the seizure of Rabaul. The SWPA commander received official notification of the Combined Chiefs' decisions just five days before his attack on Finschhafen.

Finschhafen was the strongpoint that guarded the western side of the sixty-mile-wide straits separating New Guinea and New Britain. About 3,000 Japanese construction and engineer troops defended from fortified Sattelberg Ridge. This high ground overlooked the entire coastline about Finschhafen and blocked any further ground push northward toward Sio. The Japanese perched on the jungle-covered ridgeline waiting for the inevitable Allied landing.

Australian troops arrived at Finschhafen on 22 September. They quickly cleared the narrow coastal enclave encompassing the port and then started up the Sattelberg ridgeline. The fighting deteriorated into a series of deadly small unit combats against a well-entrenched and fanatically stubborn opponent. By the end of September 2,400 more men from the *20th Division* had reinforced the battle-depleted engineers.

Two weeks later the Japanese launched a combined ground and amphibious counterattack. Australian infantrymen beat back the ground attack, but in the early morning darkness of 17 October one barge full of Japanese troops got ashore on the Allied beachhead. Pvt. Nathan Van Noy, Jr., of the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, although seriously wounded by enemy grenades, sprayed the advancing Japanese with .50-caliber machine-gun fire. Van Noy's body was later found with his finger still on the trigger, his last round of ammunition fired, and thirty slain Japanese sprawled in front of his position. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

The Japanese counterattack was broken, but they fought on for two more months. Australians of the 9th Division attacked the ridgeline again and again, isolating and destroying pockets of Japanese resistance one at a time. At least 5,500 Japanese perished, but they held their ground until late November. MacArthur found himself bogged down at Finschhafen, where he had expected a walkover.

While the Australians were bearing the majority of the fighting from Nassau Bay to Finschhafen, General Krueger was training his growing number of American divisions to fight as amphibious task

[14]

forces. Admiral Barbey had responsibility for the amphibious portion of the training designed to take full advantage of Southwest Pacific's domination of the air and sea by moving infantrymen over water to strike at their objectives. The seizure of undefended Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands in the southern Solomon Sea about 180 miles east of Buna during June 1943 had served as dress rehearsals for American GHQ planners as well as for lower echelon commanders of combat and service support units.

Southwest Pacific Area had expanded dramatically. From two infantry divisions, the 32d and 41st, in December 1942, the American contingent numbered five divisions (1st Cavalry, 6th, 24th, 32d, and 41st) by 31 January 1944. MacArthur also had three regimental combat teams (formed by attaching a field artillery battalion to the 503d Parachute Infantry, 112th Cavalry, and 158th Infantry Regiments), three engineer special brigades, and five Australian infantry divisions. Three more U.S. infantry divisions-the 31st, 33d, and 43d-were on the way. A combination of organized mosquito control, scientific treatment, and improved malaria discipline drummed into the GIs during training decreased outbreaks of the epidemic sixfold and thus improved combat effectiveness. Kenney had about 1,000 combat aircraft at his command. The new Seventh Fleet commander, Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, had about the same number of warships as his predecessor, but Barbey's amphibious fleet had grown with transports, cargo vessels, and landing craft. Together with Admiral Halsey's South Pacific force, the Allied commands enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority in air and naval strength. They also held the strategic and tactical initiative and could select the times and places for forthcoming operations that were most advantageous to the Allied cause.

The Japanese, in contrast, could not replace their losses in aircraft, shipping, and skilled manpower. Japan's air losses on the New Guinea and Solomons fronts perhaps surpassed 3,000 aircraft. On the ground, *Eighteenth Army* had suffered around 35,000 casualties. Of the three divisions in eastern New Guinea-the *20th*, *41st*, and *51st*-only the *41st* was near full strength. Airfield, shipping, engineer construction, and assorted service units brought Japanese strength in the eastern half of the island to around 60,000 troops. A dangerous 350-mile gap separated maneuver elements of the *41st Division* at Wewak from those of the *36th Division* at Sarmi, Netherlands New Guinea. The *36th* was part of a frenetic Japanese effort to strengthen the western half of the island through the construction of a web of interlocking airdromes. Until the buildup in the west was completed, Imamura and Adachi were locked in a desper-

[15]

ate battle of attrition against a foe with a crushing superiority in resources.

Paradoxically, the jungle that had claimed so many Japanese lives now sheltered them from a concentrated Allied ground offensive. The jungle rendered large unit maneuver impossible so the Allies could not bring their overwhelming firepower, manpower, and material resources to bear en masse against a selected Japanese stronghold. To sustain an infantry regiment in combat devoured the resources of two division equivalents. Every Allied operation depended on an extensive logistics infrastructure, painstakingly scratched out of the wilds, that stretched from engineers developing a coastal enclave and port back through the ships that were the umbilical cord between the advance base and the staging areas. Few soldiers actually fought the Japanese. The majority, perhaps seven of every eight, served in support roles- unloading ships, building roads, hauling supplies, preventing malaria, constructing airfields and bases, and so forth.

How best to use the favorable military balance was a question whose answer depended on where MacArthur decided to go next. CARTWHEEL had scheduled landings by U.S. Marine and U.S. Army units at Cape Gloucester and Gasmata on the New Britain coasts as part of the reconquest of Rabaul. The Quebec decisions, however, meant that MacArthur's staff had to modify the original plan.

MacArthur's intermediate objective was Madang, about halfway between Finschhafen and Wewak. To strike Madang, any Allied amphibious force had to cross the straits separating New Guinea from New Britain. To protect the Allies' flank during the Madang and Cape Gloucester operations, Southwest Pacific headquarters also ordered the seizure of an air and PT base on New Britain. Thus, on 15 December 1943, MacArthur's forces crossed the straits and invaded Arawe on the western tip of New Britain. The 112th Cavalry Regiment tried to surprise the enemy at Arawe by a predawn attack in rubber rafts. Although Japanese gunners shot the flimsy boats to pieces and repulsed this diversionary assault, the 112th's main force did get ashore by more conventional means. After suffering through numerous Japanese air raids, the 112th repulsed a Japanese

counterattack at the end of the month and eventually pushed the enemy away from its perimeter. Thereafter the cavalymen, despite the swampy ground and thick mud fed by almost continuous tropical rains, successfully performed every task that the limited nature of their mission allowed. At Cape Gloucester on the north side of New Britain, the 1st Marine Division found itself in similar circumstances, but on a larger scale. Mud, unbroken swamp, and dense jungle made an overland

[16]

advance toward Rabaul impossible. Indeed the increasing tempo of MacArthur's advance rendered it unnecessary.

On New Guinea Australian troops of the 7th Division were ahead of schedule, advancing rapidly through the Ramu Valley on the south side of the Finisterre Range. On the Huon Peninsula the commonwealth's 9th Division had secured Finschhafen in early December and was moving along the coastline north of the range. To exploit the success at Finschhafen, Sixth Army received orders on 17 December to capture Saidor, thereby severing the Japanese line of retreat.

Barbey's VII Amphibious Fleet carried the 126th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 32d Division, from Finschhafen through the Dampier Straits 175 miles to Saidor. In contrast to the confusion at Nassau Bay just six months earlier, the unopposed landing at Saidor on 2 January 1944 was a model of precision. Troops and cargo were unloaded in record time, and, at the cost of 6 battle casualties, more than 6,700 troops and their supplies were ashore by evening. MacArthur now had an intermediate staging base for his Madang operation, control of both sides of the straits, and an enemy division trapped at Sio between the Australian 9th Division's steady advance and the 126th RCT's blocking position at Saidor.

Once again the Japanese found themselves forced to flee into the rugged mountains in order to escape encirclement. As they sidestepped inland around Saidor, the retreating Japanese left a trail of abandoned equipment. On 15 January 1944, an Australian patrol pushing through Sio after the fleeing enemy discovered a half-buried trunk in a stream bed. It held the complete cipher library of the *Imperial Japanese Army's 20th Division*. The find was immediately returned to Central Bureau, MacArthur's Allied cryptanalytic agency in Brisbane, Australia. Central Bureau used the captured code books to solve the *Japanese Army's* main cipher system. This intelligence windfall arrived exactly when MacArthur was most prepared to take advantage of it.

In January 1944 MacArthur and his staff were searching for ways to accelerate the final phases of the campaign against Madang and complete the isolation of Rabaul. Around this time, Fifth Air Force pilots consistently reported the absence of any signs of Japanese activity on Los Negros, largest of the Admiralty group which lay about 360 miles west of Rabaul. Kenney insisted that air power had driven the Japanese from the island and recommended to MacArthur that ground troops immediately seize the supposedly undefended island with its valuable airstrips. Despite intelligence from decrypted enemy communications which revealed that more than 4,000 Japanese were defending the Admiralties, MacArthur approved Kenney's scheme. On five days'

[17]



Figure 109 First Wave at Los Negros, Admiralty Islands. (DA photograph).

*First Wave at Los Negros, Admiralty Islands.* (DA photograph)

notice, Sixth Army was ordered to land in the Admiralties. If the troops encountered too much opposition, they would withdraw the same day.

On 29 February 1944, a reconnaissance-in-force of about 1,000 officers and men from the reinforced 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, landed on Los Negros. The initial landings caught the Japanese off guard, facing the opposite direction. But the Japanese fought back with a fury; vicious night fighting typified the next five days. Krueger threw sufficient reinforcements into the battle to tip the balance in the cavalymen's favor. After three days of piecemeal attacks, the Japanese struck hard on the night of 3-4 March and nearly succeeded in breaking the cavalymen's lines. During this action Sgt. Troy A. McGill and his eight-man squad withstood repeated attacks. When all but McGill and another man had been killed or wounded, McGill ordered the survivor to the rear, fired his rifle at the advancing Japanese until it jammed, then fought them in front of the position, using the rifle as a club until he was killed. His actions earned him a posthumous Medal of Honor. MacArthur's luck and daring, plus the courage of a handful of cavalymen like Sergeant McGill, had won an impressive victory.

Capture of the Admiralties isolated Rabaul and gave MacArthur a forward air base that extended his fighter range past Wewak.

Seizing

[18]



**Figure 110 Unloading LST's, Red Beach 2 (Hollandia). (U.S. Navy photograph)**

*Unloading LST's, Red Beach 2 (Hollandia).* (U.S. Navy photograph)

the Admiralties two months ahead of schedule also led the Joint Chiefs to reevaluate Pacific strategy. MacArthur sent his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, to Washington to brief an operation remarkable in scope, daring in execution, and promising to cut months off the Southwest Pacific advance. This was the revised RENO IV plan to jump an unprecedented 400 miles up the New Guinea coastline to capture the major Japanese air and supply base at Hollandia. Code-named RECKLESS, the Hollandia operation was a masterpiece of sound planning that took full advantage of extremely accurate intelligence obtained from reading Japanese codes. For MacArthur it proved the decisive operation on New Guinea and was the turning point in his war against the Japanese.

When Allied codebreakers lifted the veil shrouding Japanese defenses, it became evident that MacArthur's next landing, scheduled for 26 April in Hansa Bay, midway between Madang and Wewak, could expect strong ground opposition. Moreover Japanese aerial reinforcements were filling up the major air base complex at Hollandia from where they would support the land defense of Madang. Conversely, Hollandia's land defenses were almost nonexistent. The soft Japanese center remained vulnerable to an Allied landing.

JCS approval of RECKLESS did not automatically ensure success of

[19]




Figure 111 New Guiana map 3



Figure 112 The Assault on Wakde Island. (DA photograph).

*The Assault on Wakde Island.* (DA photograph)

execution. MacArthur, for instance, needed carrier air support because Hollandia was far beyond the range of his land-based fighter aircraft. The U.S. Navy, busily preparing for its assault of the Marianas, could provide three days of carrier support and no more. General Headquarters planners then decided to seize Aitape, about 140 miles east of Hollandia. Aitape's airstrips could provide land-based fighter support to the ground troops at Hollandia after the carriers departed. The operation now evolved into a herculean effort by 217 ships to transport safely 80,000 men, their equipment, and supplies 1,000 miles to conduct three separate amphibious landings deep in the enemy rear area. The Japanese fleet was no longer a threat, having withdrawn from Rabaul to the safety of the Philippines. Control of the skies along the invasion route, however, was the prerequisite to success.

By late March, Kenney knew from deciphered Japanese communications that about 350 enemy warplanes were concentrated near Hollandia where they believed themselves safely beyond the range of Allied air strikes. Employing new model P-38s whose extended range [22]

made them ideal as escorts, Kenney sent sixty B-24 heavy bombers against Hollandia on 30 March. Follow-up raids demolished nearly all the operational Japanese aircraft at Hollandia on the ground. Never again would the enemy contest air superiority over New Guinea.

For MacArthur to bag all of *Eighteenth Army*, it was imperative that Adachi continue to believe that MacArthur's next blow was aimed at the Madang-Hansa area. A well-designed deception effort fed General Adachi and his staff a steady diet of false information about an Allied landing in Hansa Bay that the Japanese were predisposed to believe. The deception was so successful that on 22 April the 24th and 41st Divisions, led by Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of I Corps and the RECKLESS Task Force, landed unopposed twenty-five miles apart at Hollandia. The 163d Regimental Combat Team simultaneously waded ashore against no opposition at Aitape. In one swoop MacArthur had split the Japanese defenses on New Guinea in half, isolating *Eighteenth Army* in eastern New Guinea.

Once ashore, the 24th and 41st Divisions, moving east and west respectively, conducted a pincer movement to encircle Hollandia's three airfields. The maze of jungle trails, rain-swollen streams, marshy lowlands, and numerous hills and defiles proved a harsher opponent than the Japanese. Although there were 7,600 enemy near Hollandia, most were assigned to service, airfield, and communications units. Only one in ten carried a rifle. Surprised, badly outnumbered, demoralized, and ill equipped for battle, the Japanese fled into the jungle in hopes of reaching Sarmi, about 150 miles to the northwest. On 26 April the pincers closed on the airdromes where GIs discovered an aircraft graveyard of 340 wrecked planes that provided silent testimony to the deadliness of Kenney's earlier air raids.

With the enemy disorganized and confused, MacArthur's strategy was to capture additional forward airfields from which to cover his further advance into Geelvink Bay and thence the Vogelkop Peninsula. While his Sixth Army advanced rapidly westward to exploit his Hollandia advantage by not allowing Japanese defenders any respite, General Krueger simultaneously had to prevent Adachi's *Eighteenth Army* from breaking through the Hollandia encirclement. Just five days after the Hollandia/Aitape landings, MacArthur ordered the 41st Division to leapfrog to Wakde Island and the airstrips at Sarmi on the adjacent New Guinea coast by mid-May.

The 163d RCT landed unopposed in Maffin Bay near Sarmi on 17 May and prepared to take Wakde. The following day four rifle companies of the 163d assaulted the tiny island. Wakde proved a tough nut to crack. It took two days of nasty squad-size fighting to pry almost 800 [23]

Japanese defenders from their spider holes, coconut log bunkers, and coral caves. In sum, 40 American soldiers were killed and 107 wounded to take Wakde. They counted 759 Japanese corpses and brought back 4 prisoners of war.

By 22 May Krueger had achieved his objectives near Sarmi. He then enlarged the mission. To secure the high ground overlooking Maffin Bay, Krueger ordered an overland advance toward Sarmi village about eighteen miles west of the beachhead. The American push by the 158th RCT ignited a sharp battle for a coral lump overgrown with rain forest, forever after known as Lone Tree Hill. Following several days of close-in fighting, correctly believing itself outnumbered and overextended, the 158th pulled back toward its beachhead.

Three separate Japanese forces threatened the Americans. Units of the *223d* and *224th Infantry Regiments* had checked the 158th RCT at Lone Tree Hill. Simultaneously a second Japanese task force composed of the main force of the *223d Infantry* had infiltrated through the jungle and worked its way behind the strung-out American advance. Yet a third enemy force, a battalion of the *224th Infantry*, was returning from the direction of Hollandia, which placed it on the exposed eastern flank of the American beachhead. Fortunately for the GIs, the Japanese could not coordinate their offensive, but their piecemeal attacks alerted Sixth Army to the potential danger of the situation.

Operations farther west required the 158th RCT and the 163d Infantry. To replace them, and to strengthen Army forces, Krueger ordered the entire 6th Infantry Division to the Sarmi region. On 14 June the 6th Division relieved the 158th and took up the fight for Lone Tree Hill. After ten days of tough, close infantry fighting, the now veteran 6th Division held Lone Tree Hill. Division members counted nearly 1,000 Japanese bodies and sealed other enemy soldiers forever in fortified caves. The division itself suffered about 700 battle and 500 nonbattle casualties. With the high ground in American possession, Maffin Bay became a major staging base for all or parts of five different task forces-Biak, Noemfoor, Sansapor, and Leyte, plus Luzon in the Philippines.

The 6th Division was slated to spearhead the Sansapor landing, so Sixth Army headquarters ordered the 31st Infantry Division to Maffin Bay to replace it. From mid-July until the end of August, the 31st conducted aggressive patrolling to keep the Japanese at bay. It suffered about 240 battle casualties while killing nearly 300 Japanese and capturing 14 others before it departed in early September to invade Morotai. The 123d Regimental Combat Team, 33d Division, arrived on 1 September to garrison the area. It remained until January 1945

[24]



Figure 113 Infantrymen Moving Up, Biak. (DA photograph).

*Infantrymen Moving Up, Biak.* (DA photograph)

when a battalion combat team of the 93d Infantry Division replaced it. Altogether the fighting near Sarmi cost U.S. Army units approximately 2,100 battle casualties. Five times that number of Japanese perished. Although the area later supported five invasions, the push toward Sarmi was a significant distraction at a time when Krueger had his hands full juggling four other major operations-Aitape, Noemfoor, Sansapor, and Biak. Biak Island dominates strategic Geelvink Bay. Its coral airstrips, suitable for heavy bombers, were a powerful lure to MacArthur and Kenney. On 27 May the 41st Division (minus) arrived at Biak which lies only sixty miles south of the equator. The first wave landed exactly as planned, but strong currents carried subsequent units well west of their designated landing beaches. There was, fortunately, only nominal enemy resistance because the invasion caught the Japanese garrison flat-footed. Still, the steaming equatorial heat, thick, twelve-foot-high scrub growth, rugged terrain, and small parties of Japanese entrenched in caves cut into the face of a 200-foot-high cliff combined to slow the American advance along the coastal track toward the vital airstrips. Nevertheless, by the following morning, patrols of the 162d Infantry Regiment were within 200 yards of the island's airfields. Then a violent Japanese counterattack drove them back.

American troops now found themselves under attack from the west and the targets of well-aimed fire from the East Caves which dominated the coastal road. In constant danger of being cut off, the 162d fought an unseen enemy until ordered to withdraw in late afternoon. The next morning opened with another counterattack by the *222d Infantry Regiment* supported by half a dozen light tanks. Sherman M4 tanks dispatched the inferior Japanese models while the 162d broke the infantry attack. The Japanese, however, regrouped for

[25]

another attack. More importantly, the Americans finally recognized the importance of clearing the high ground of Japanese.

In these circumstances, the 41st Division commander, Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller, requested reinforcements. Krueger dispatched the 163d RCT, which had accomplished its mission at Wakde and was an organic

regiment of the division. It arrived on 1 June along with an admonition from Krueger to the division commander to push the offensive vigorously. Meanwhile the 186th Infantry Regiment had occupied the plateau overlooking the landing beaches and was pushing westward. With the 162d along the coastal road pinning the Japanese defenders, the 186th threatened the East Caves from the rear. MacArthur, however, wanted the airfields immediately to support planned landings farther west. His unrelenting pressure on Krueger translated, in turn, to Krueger's demands that the 41st Division quickly take the airfields. Thus the 186th Infantry was ordered from the high ground down to the airfield on the coast. By moving into this basin, the regiment placed itself under Japanese guns and suffered a continual pounding. Because the enemy dominated the airdrome by fire, it remained unusable by Allied warplanes.

MacArthur then dispatched General Eichelberger to the island with orders to get the troops moving on the airfield. Despite a shakeup of commanders, the fighting continued unabated on Biak through June, and the island was not completely secured until mid-July. The doomed garrison fought tenaciously, but to a foregone conclusion that left more than 4,800 Japanese dead at the cost of nearly 2,800 American casualties. Because Biak's airfields were not taken as scheduled, MacArthur ordered the capture of the strips on tiny, 15-mile-long by 12-mile-wide, Noemfoor Island situated 60 miles west of Biak.

Preceded by an intense naval bombardment, more than 13,500 troops of the 158th Regimental Combat Team (Reinforced) stormed ashore on Noemfoor on 2 July against desultory resistance. One dazed Japanese prisoner announced that recently arrived reinforcements had raised the garrison's strength to nearly 4,500 men. The surprised task force commander immediately requested reinforcements from Sixth Army. In truth no Japanese reinforcements had landed on Noemfoor, but the reserve of 1,500 officers and men of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment jumped onto the island using its runway as their drop zone. High winds carried the parachutists to bone-cracking landings in supply dumps, vehicle parks, and amidst wrecked Japanese aircraft. No paratroopers fell to hostile fire, but 128 were injured in the jump, including 59 serious fracture cases.

To the paratroopers also fell the nasty job of mopping up the

[26]

enemy on Noemfoor. "Mopping up" meant searching for an elusive enemy and hoping you found him before he found you. When the Japanese did surprise a platoon from the 503d, Sgt. Ray E. Eubanks led his squad to their relief. Enemy fire wounded Eubanks and smashed his rifle, yet he continued to lead his men forward and, using his rifle as a club, killed four Japanese before he was again hit and killed. His heroism earned a Medal of Honor. For the entire Noemfoor campaign, the task force incurred a total of 411 battle casualties while killing 1,759 Japanese and capturing another 889, mostly laborers. While GIs secured Biak and Noemfoor, 500 miles to the east *Eighteenth Army* was approaching Aitape.

After scant opposition following the 22 April landing at Aitape, Allied engineers had quickly converted the existing Japanese airdromes into a major fighter base. By early June the 32d Division had established an outer defensive perimeter along the western banks of the Driniumor River, about fifteen miles east of the airstrips. Extensive intelligence reports warned the American commanders of the coming offensive.

Privy to the unfolding enemy plan thanks to codebreaking, Krueger asked MacArthur for, and received, additional infantry, artillery, and air reinforcements for Aitape, bringing the total forces, either present or en route, to two and two-thirds divisions. Eventually the 32d and 43d Infantry Divisions, plus the 124th Infantry, 31st Division, and the 112th RCT as well as a corps artillery section and tank destroyer battalion stiffened the defense. On 28 June Krueger created XI Corps to oversee the growing Allied force and appointed Maj. Gen. Charles P. Hall its commander. Hall enclosed the vital airstrips with a semicircular, ten-mile, defensive belt whose flanks rested on the sea. Along this line were more than 1,500 mutually protective log bunkers. Barbed wire obstacles and entanglements girded the line. Within that perimeter stood the equivalent of two divisions, including nine infantry battalions. Fifteen miles east, however, only three infantry battalions and two understrength cavalry squadrons defended the Driniumor River line. They had little barbed wire, few bunkers, poor fields of fire, and miserable jungle tracks for communication.

The Driniumor's twenty-foot-wide stream was easily fordable, calf-deep water. Dense jungle and towering trees on both sides of the wider riverbed effectively masked movement on the opposite banks. American riflemen and machine gunners in foxholes, pits, and a few bunkers along the river nervously awaited a

Japanese attack. Japanese prisoners of war told of a forthcoming assault. American patrols had encountered stiffening Japanese resistance, and numerous decrypted [27]

messages pointed to an imminent offensive. Rather than wait for the Japanese attack, Hall ordered a textbook maneuver, a reconnaissance-in-force along both enemy flanks, to commence on 10 July.

That morning an infantry battalion on the north and a cavalry squadron on the south crossed the Driniumor and probed cautiously eastward. The reconnaissance-in-force passed north and south of *Eighteenth Army's* main assembly areas which were from two to four miles inland from the coast. Only two infantry battalions and a cavalry squadron remained to defend the Driniumor line.

That night ten thousand howling Japanese troops burst across the shallow Driniumor and charged through the center of the badly outnumbered and undermanned covering force. GIs fired their machine guns and automatic rifles until the barrels turned red hot, but the Japanese, eerily visible under the light of flares, surged forward. American artillery fell in clusters on the Japanese infantrymen, killing and maiming hundreds or crushing others beneath the tall trees that snapped apart in the unceasing explosions. Japanese numbers proved irresistible. Their breakthrough precipitated a month-long battle of attrition in the New Guinea wilds. GIs moved behind heavy artillery support to close off pockets of Japanese resistance. The jungle restricted movement so the hardest fighting fell to rifle squads or platoons. Infantrymen fought a disconnected series of vicious actions that appeared coherent only on headquarters' situation maps. Adachi's men asked no quarter and received none. During July and August 1944, nearly 10,000 Japanese perished. Almost 3,000 Americans fell along the Driniumor, 440 of them killed. In terms of American casualties, it was MacArthur's most costly campaign since Buna.

One measure of the severity of the fighting was the award of four Medals of Honor, all posthumously, for the campaign. Three soldiers received the decoration for self-sacrifice. Pvt. Donald R. Lobaugh of the 127th Infantry, 32d Division, launched a single-handed attack on a Japanese machine gun nest that saved his squad but cost him his life. S. Sgt. Gerald L. Endl, 128th Infantry, 32d Division, also single-handedly engaged the enemy at close range to save seven wounded Americans. As Endl was carrying the last wounded man to safety, a burst of Japanese machine gun fire killed him. Second Lt. George W. G. Boyce, Jr., of Troop A, 112th RCT, threw himself on a hand grenade to save his men. Second Lt. Dale Eldon Christensen, also of Troop A, won the medal for his series of heroic actions and outstanding leadership during the 112th's mid-July counterattack. Christensen was later killed "mopping up" after a Japanese attack. Their valor and [28]

the anonymous heroism of their comrades broke the back of *Eighteenth Army*.

Hall's victory allowed Sixth Army's other ongoing operations to proceed on or ahead of schedule and validated MacArthur's concept of bypassing the enemy. Adachi's terrible defeat left *Eighteenth Army* trapped between the Americans in the west and the Australians in the east. In mid-December 1944 Australian forces began a slow, determined drive from the east toward Wewak, which finally fell on 10 May 1945. Australian losses were 451 killed, 1,163 wounded, and 3 missing. Some 7,200 Japanese fell. Adachithen kept his approximately 13,000 survivors together in the hills and surrendered only in September 1945. Adachi himself was tried at Rabaul for war crimes, but beat the hangman by committing suicide in September 1947.

With the fighting along the Driniumor flickering out, MacArthur's final assault landing on New Guinea took place at Sansapor, a weak point between two known Japanese strongholds on the Vogelkop Peninsula. There were about 15,000 Japanese troops of the *35th Division* at Manokwari, 120 miles east of Sansapor. Sixty miles to Sansapor's west were 12,500 enemy soldiers at the major air base complex of Sorong. Rather than fight on the enemy's terms, MacArthur employed SWPA's well-tested amphibious capability to leapfrog to Sansapor where, on 30 July, 7,300 men of the 6th Division conducted an unopposed landing. Sixth Army had once again split the Japanese forces in order to seize a coastal enclave that combat engineers quickly transformed from jungle overgrowth into two airfields that provided valuable support during MacArthur's invasion of Morotai in the Molucca chain. Japan's *35th Division* found itself isolated in western New Guinea. For historical purposes, Sixth Army closed the Vogelkop operation on 31 August 1944, although the 6th Division remained

there until it left for Luzon, Philippines, in January 1945. Units of the 93d Infantry Division then took over the defense of the airfields.

**Analysis**

The New Guinea Campaign is really the story of two Allied armies fighting two kinds of war—one of grinding attrition and one of classic maneuver. During the attrition period, from January 1943 until January 1944, Australian infantrymen carried the bulk of ground combat while the Americans reconstituted, reinforced, and readied themselves for the maneuver phase of the campaign. During attrition warfare characteristic of eastern New Guinea ground operations through the seizure of the Saidor in January 1944, the Allies suffered more [29]



Figure 114 Jungle Fighters, Arawe, Pacific, by David

*Jungle Fighters, Arawe, Pacific, by David Fredenthal.* (Army Art Collection)

than 24,000 battle casualties; about 70 percent (17,107) were Australians. All this to advance the front line 300 miles in 20 months. But following the decisive Hollandia, Netherlands New Guinea, envelopment in April 1944, losses were 9,500 battle casualties, mainly American, to leap 1,300 miles in just 100 days and complete the reconquest of the great island.

The series of breathtaking landings, often within a few weeks of one another, were the fruits of the Australians' gallant effort in eastern New Guinea. They fought the Japanese to a standstill at Wau and then pushed a fanatical foe back to the Huon Peninsula. This gave Sixth Army the time to train and to prepare American forces for the amphibious assaults that MacArthur envisioned. It also bought the time to bring the industrial capacity of America to bear in the Southwest Pacific. Aircraft, ships, landing craft, ammunition, medicine, equipment—in short, the sinews of war—gradually found their way to MacArthur's fighting men. Still, without flexible senior commanders who adapted their plans to wring full advantage of Japanese weakness, the campaign could have degenerated into a meatgrinder

[30]

along the coast which is what the enemy wanted.

Instead the speed of MacArthur's seaborne envelopments consistently surprised the Japanese. At the strongpoints where they expected to fight a delaying action, MacArthur bypassed them. Where they were weak, he overwhelmed them. Between Wau and Sansapor 110,000 of the emperor's soldiers and sailors died from enemy action, disease, or starvation in the pestilent jungles, the cold mountains, or in the empty seas. Another 30,000 were isolated in New Guinea and neutralized. Add to this the more than 57,000 imperial soldiers and 39,000 sailors marooned on New Britain and the totality of Allied victory in the New Guinea Campaign comes into sharp relief.

Victory on the ground depended on local air superiority which enabled the Navy to carry the ground forces safely forward to the next objective. The infantry held the ground and allowed the engineers to construct a forward air base, and the cycle began again. Against this sophisticated employment of combined arms warfare, modern technology, and industrial might, Tokyo asked its hardened veterans to do the impossible. Japanese infantry operations, brave, determined, but futile, were swept aside by Allied joint operations relying on the combined air, naval, and ground firepower essential for the conduct of modern war. MacArthur bypassed the jungle and left it to devour the Japanese soldiers isolated in its interior.

But above all New Guinea was the story of the courage of the GI who could always be counted on to move forward against a determined foe. It was the ordinary American soldier who endured the worst deprivations that the debilitating New Guinea climate and terrain could offer. It was the lowly GI who was the brains, the muscle, the blood, and the heart and soul of the great army that came of age in the Southwest Pacific Area in 1943 and 1944. In one tough fight after another, he never lost a battle to the Japanese. Those accomplishments and sacrifices are forever his and deserve to be remembered by all.

[31]



Figure 115 New Guinea 1943-1944

#### Further Readings

Two volumes of the U.S. Army in World War II series, John Miller, Jr., *CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul* (1959) and Robert Ross Smith, *The Approach to the Philippines* (1953) remain the best accounts of the New Guinea Campaign. Similarly David Dexter, *Australia in the War of 1939-45: The Army: The New Guinea Offensives* (1961) is an excellent recounting of Australia's ground war on New Guinea. Several top American commanders like Robert L. Eichelberger and Milton MacKaye, *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo* (1950); Walter Krueger, *From Down Under to Nippon* (1953); and George C. Kenney, *General Kenney Reports* (1949) discuss New Guinea operations in general terms. More critical, though still general, accounts appear in Eichelberger's letters published in Jay Luvaas, ed., *Dear Miss Em* (1972) and D. Clayton James' excellent biography *The Years of MacArthur*, vol. 2, 1941-1945. Edward J. Drea's "Defending the Driniumor," *Leavenworth Paper No. 9* (1984) details tactical operations at Aitape while his *MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945* (1992) analyzes MacArthur's use of intelligence during the New Guinea fighting.

CMH Pub 72-9

Cover: *Troops of the 32d Division near Saidor.* (DA photograph)

	<b>Return to CMH Online</b>
<a href="#">SEARCH CMH ONLINE</a>	
<b>Figure 116</b> <b>Troops of the</b> <b>32d Division</b> <b>near Saidor. (DA</b> <b>photograph).</b>	<i>Last updated 3 October 2003</i>

# LUZON 1944–1945

Figure 117 Luzon 1944-1945.



Figure 118 Luzon.

## Introduction

World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in the history of mankind. However, the half century that now separates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowledge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social, and military implications of a war that, more than any other, united us as a people with a common purpose.

Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not only about the profession of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will participate in the nation's 50th anniversary commemoration of World War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various materials to help educate Americans about that war. The works produced will provide great opportunities to learn about and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been called "the mighty endeavor."

World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over several diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The following essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting those struggles that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army's significant military feats from that war.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History by Dale Andrade. I hope this absorbing account of that period will enhance your appreciation of American achievements during World War II.

GORDON  
General,  
Chief of Staff

United States

R. SULLIVAN  
Army

---

## LUZON

### 15 December 1944-4 July 1945

"The Philippine theater of operations is the locus of victory or defeat," argued General Douglas MacArthur, as Japanese planes strafed and bombed key installations around Manila on 8 December 1941. Although overwhelming Japanese strength ultimately forced the United States to relinquish the Philippines, MacArthur

began planning his return almost immediately from bases in Australia. Throughout the long campaign to push the Japanese out of their Pacific bastions, these islands remained his crucial objective. "The President of the United States ordered me to break through the Japanese lines...for the purpose, as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan, a primary object of which is the relief of the Philippines," MacArthur said when he took over as Allied commander in the Southwest Pacific. "I came through and I shall return." As the Pacific campaign dragged on, MacArthur never strayed far from that goal, and every move he made was aimed ultimately at recapturing the lost archipelago.

### ***Strategic Setting***

In March 1942 a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive established two U.S. military commands in the Pacific: the Southwest Pacific Area, headed by General MacArthur, and the Pacific Ocean Areas, under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The decision clearly violated the principle of unity of command. However, with naval officers objecting to MacArthur, the senior officer in the region, as overall Pacific commander and with MacArthur unlikely to subordinate himself to another, the ensuing division of authority seemed a workable compromise. Given the size of the theater and the different national contingents involved, it may even have been a blessing. But it left no single authority in the Pacific to decide between conflicting plans or to coordinate between the two. Even MacArthur later wrote that "of all the faulty decisions of the war, perhaps the most unexplainable one was the failure to unify the command in the Pacific, [which]...resulted in divided effort; the waste, diffusion, and duplication of force; and the consequent extension of the war with added casualties and cost."

From a strategic perspective, this divided command had a direct impact on decisions leading up to the invasion of the Philippines.

### **3**

During the spring of 1944, the Joint Chiefs debated the merits of seizing Luzon or the Chinese island of Formosa as an initial point for direct operations against Japan. Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations, had long objected to landings in the Philippines, and by May 1944 he was joined by Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall and Army Air Force Chief of Staff General Henry H. Arnold. Marshall felt that MacArthur's Luzon plan would be "the slow way" and that it made more sense to "cut across" from the Mariana Islands to Formosa. MacArthur, on the other hand, argued that the Formosa route was militarily "unsound" and that the Philippine Islands provided a more sensible staging area for the final assault against the Japanese home islands. As commander of the Philippine defenses in 1941, MacArthur felt a strong moral responsibility to free the entire archipelago of the brutal Japanese occupation. Making the Philippines a major Pacific objective gave his Southwest Pacific command a key mission.

By July 1944 most planners agreed that an invasion of Formosa was not logistically feasible in the near future. In September the Joint Chiefs thus approved a December starting date for MacArthur's invasion of Leyte Island in the central Philippines. The invasion would be followed by an assault on either Luzon, the large, northernmost Philippine island, on 20 February or Formosa on 1 March. But it was not until October that Admiral King finally agreed that Luzon was the better choice.

From the Japanese perspective, control of the islands was vital. Loss of the Philippines would threaten Japan's overseas access to foodstuffs and critical raw materials, especially oil, from the East Indies and Southeast Asia. Thus, Tokyo's naval and army leaders vowed to make the defense of the Philippines their major war effort for 1943-44. For these purposes the commander of Japanese land forces in the Philippines, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the former conqueror of British Malaya and Singapore, had some 430,000 troops stationed all across the islands, while Japanese naval leaders were prepared to commit the entire battle fleet. If the Americans could be stopped here, then perhaps the entire tide of the war could be changed or, at least, Japan's position greatly strengthened.

MacArthur's return to the Philippines began on the island of Leyte in October 1944. Prior to the amphibious assault, the Japanese carrier force had been decimated in the battle of the Philippine Sea on 19-20 June of the same year. Moreover, the battle of Leyte Gulf in October saw most of the Japanese surface fleet destroyed with little to show for its sacrifice. Japan's once formidable air force was also decimated, leaving

### **4**

the skies over the Philippines open to American air power. Yet the primary objective of assaulting Leyte was to provide a staging area for a much larger effort, the assault against the island of Luzon where most of the Japanese land defenses lay. The operations on Leyte in December gave the Americans little more than a foothold in the Philippines.

### ***Operations***

Before Luzon could be attacked, MacArthur needed a base of operations closer to his objective than Leyte. He picked Mindoro, an island with minimal Japanese defenses just south of Luzon. About half the size of New Jersey, Mindoro is blanketed by mountains, with a few narrow plains along the coast. The high peaks trap clouds moving up from the south, causing almost daily rains and high humidity and making the island a breeding ground for malaria and other tropical diseases.

From MacArthur's point of view Mindoro was important only for its potential airfields, could supplement the unsatisfactory ones recently constructed on Leyte. Landing areas in the northeastern part of the island were best, but constant inclement weather and the airfields' proximity to what was left of Japanese air power on Luzon ruled them out. Instead, planners chose to secure beachhead and airfield sites near San Jose, in the southwest corner of the island. Although not ideal, the region lay near Mangarin Bay, Mindoro's best anchorage. This location would provide a base for the amphibious invasion fleet and allow land-based American aircraft to intensify their attacks against the Japanese on Luzon.

MacArthur assigned the seizure of Mindoro to Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger's Sixth Army. Krueger, in turn, gave the task to Maj. Gen. Roscoe B. Woodruff, commander of the 24th Infantry Division, who was to employ one organic regiment, the 19th Infantry, and the separate 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team. Although the airborne unit was originally scheduled to jump into the battle area, the limited capacity of the Leyte airfields dictated that they arrive by sea, alongside the infantry. In any case, naval support for the small landing was substantial, with 6 escort carriers, 3 battleships, 6 cruisers, and many small warships providing direct support.

For the amphibious assault vessels and supporting warships, the main threat came from Japanese land-based *kamikaze* suicide planes. The Japanese had begun the practice as a desperate measure during the final stages of the Leyte Campaign, perfecting it during December. On the 13th, two days before the scheduled assault on Mindoro, the light

5



Figure 119 U.S. troops land and prepare for attack. (National Archives).

*U.S. troops land and prepare for attack.* (National Archives)

cruiser *Nashville* was hit by a *kamikaze*, killing over 130 men and wounding another 190. Among the injured was Brig. Gen. William C. Dunkel, commander of the landing force. Later *kamikaze* attacks damaged two landing ships, tank (LSTs) and disabled several other ships. U.S. Army and Navy aviation did what they could

during the first weeks of December. The Army claimed to have destroyed about 450 Japanese planes in the air and on the ground throughout the Philippines and the Navy 270 more.

The invasion of Mindoro began on 15 December. Clear weather allowed full use of U.S. air and naval power against virtually no Japanese resistance. The ensuing landings were also unopposed. With only about 1,000 Japanese troops on the large island, plus some 200 survivors from ships sunk off Mindoro while on their way to Leyte, the defenders could do little. By the end of the first day, Army engineers were hard at work preparing airfields for the invasion of Luzon. The first was completed in five days; a second was ready in thirteen. Together the airfields allowed American aircraft to provide more direct

6

support for the planned Luzon beachhead, striking kamikaze airfields before aircraft could take off and harrying Japanese shipping between Luzon, Formosa, and southern Japan.

From his headquarters in Manila, General Yamashita realized that he could expect little outside support. The Japanese naval and air arms had done their best in the preceding months but to no avail, and they had been largely destroyed in the process. Moreover, Yamashita's forces on Luzon, some 260,000 strong, were weak in artillery, transport, armor, and other modern equipment. They would be unable to face the well-equipped American Army units in open warfare. Thus Yamashita decided to fight a delaying action, keeping his army in the field as long as possible. During his 1941-42 defense of the Philippines, MacArthur had considered Manila, the central Luzon plains, and the Bataan Peninsula critical, with their harbors and airfields. The Japanese commander, however, had no intention of defending these sites. Instead, Yamashita planned to withdraw the bulk of his forces into three widely separated mountain strongholds and settle down for a long battle of attrition.

Long before the American invasion began, General Yamashita divided his Luzon forces into three groups, each centered around a remote geographical region. The largest of these groups and under the direct command of Yamashita was *Shobu Group*, located in northern Luzon with about 152,000 troops. A much smaller force, *Kembu Group*, with approximately 30,000 troops, occupied the Clark Air Field complex as well as the Bataan Peninsula and Corridor. The third major force, *Shimbu Group*, consisted of some 80,000 soldiers occupying the southern sections of Luzon, an area that included the island's long Bicol Peninsula as well as the mountains immediately east of Manila. Most *Shimbu* units were in the latter area and controlled the vital reservoirs that provided most of the capital area's water supply.

On the American side, General MacArthur intended to strike first at Lingayen Gulf, an area of sheltered beaches on the northwestern coast of Luzon. A landing there would place his troops close to the best roads and railways on the island, all of which ran through the central plains south to Manila, his main objective. Also, by landing that far north of the capital, MacArthur allowed himself maneuvering room for the large force he intended to use on Luzon. But once the beachhead was secure, his initial effort would focus on a southern drive to the Filipino capital. Possession of this central core, as well as Manila Bay, would allow his forces to dominate the island and make a further coordinated defense by the Japanese exceedingly difficult. Ultimately ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments would see action on Luzon, making it the largest

7

Map: The Enemy on Luzon

8

campaign of the Pacific war and involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France.

The weather on 9 January (called S-day) was ideal. A light overcast dappled the predawn sky, and gentle waves promised a smooth ride onto the beach. At 0700 the preassault bombardment began and was followed an hour later by the landings. With little initial Japanese opposition, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed almost 175,000 men along a twenty-mile beachhead within a few days. While the I Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Innis P. Swift, protected the beachhead's flanks, Lt. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold's XIV Corps prepared to drive south, first to Clark Field and then to Manila. Only after the Manila area had been secured was Swift's I Corps to push north and east to seize the vital road junctions leading from the coast into the mountains of northern Luzon.

Almost from the beginning there was friction between MacArthur and some of his subordinates. Krueger wanted the I Corps to secure the roads leading east into the mountains before the XIV Corps advanced south. Already, he pointed out, I Corps had encountered opposition on the beachhead's northern, or left, flank, while the XIV Corps had found little resistance to the south. Cautious, Krueger hesitated before committing his army to a narrow thrust directly toward Manila with his eastern flank open to a possible Japanese attack.

MacArthur disagreed. He thought it unlikely that the Japanese were capable of mounting an attack in Sixth Army's rear or flank and directed Krueger to follow his prearranged plans, seizing Clark Air Field and the port facilities at Manila as soon as possible. So on 18 January Griswold's XIV Corps moved south with the 37th and 40th Infantry Divisions, leaving Sixth Army's eastern flank undefended as it proceeded from the beachhead area. But with Yamashita's *Shobu Group* relatively inactive, Krueger's concerns proved unwarranted. As at the beachhead, the Japanese put up little opposition to the drive south, having evacuated the central plains earlier. Only when Griswold's troops reached the outskirts of Clark Field on 23 January did they run up against determined resistance, and it came from the relatively weak *Kembu Group*. For more than a week the Japanese fought a stubborn battle against the advancing Americans, and it was not until the end of January that the airfield was in American hands. Leaving the 40th Division behind to occupy the area, Krueger regrouped the XIV Corps and on 2 February continued south toward the capital.

From the beginning, MacArthur remained unhappy with the pace of the advance. He personally drove up and down the advancing line,

9

Map: Sixth Army Landings

10

inspecting units and making suggestions. On 30 January, after visiting the 37th Division as it advanced south from San Fernando toward Calumpit, MacArthur sent off a message to Krueger criticizing "the noticeable lack of drive and aggressive initiative." Later, while visiting the 1st Cavalry Division, which had just arrived in Luzon to reinforce the XIV Corps, he told the division commander, Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge, to "Go to Manila, go around the Nips, bounce off the Nips, but go to Manila." In response, Mudge formed a mechanized task force under the 1st Cavalry Brigade commander, Brig. Gen. William C. Chase, commanding two motorized cavalry squadrons reinforced with armor and motorized artillery and support units. This "flying column" rushed toward Manila while the rest of the division followed and mopped up.

At the same time MacArthur added additional forces to the drive on the capital. On 15 January he launched Operation MIKE VI, a second amphibious assault some forty-five miles southwest of Manila. On 31 January, X-ray Day, two regiments of the 11th Airborne Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, landed unopposed. The paratroopers seized a nearby bridge before the surprised Japanese defenders had a chance to demolish it, and then the paratroopers turned toward Manila. The division's third regiment, the 511th Parachute, dropped in by air to join the advance, which by the following day was speeding north along the paved highway toward the capital to the cheers of throngs of grateful Filipino civilians along the way.

Originally the 11th Airborne Division, one of Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger's Eighth Army units, had been slated to contain Japanese troops throughout southwestern Luzon. But acting on MacArthur's orders, Eichelberger pushed the division north. On 3 February one battalion of the 511th encountered determined Japanese resistance near the town of Imus, five miles south of Manila, where some fifty defenders clung to an old stone building despite a fierce bombardment by the battalion's 75-mm. howitzers. Observing that the artillery had had little effect, T. Sgt. Robert C. Steel climbed onto the building's roof, knocked a hole through it, poured in gasoline, and then threw in a phosphorous grenade. As the Japanese dashed out, Steel's men shot them down.

Another three miles up the road lay the Las Pinas River bridge. It was set for demolition and guarded by a small detachment of Japanese who were dug in along the north bank. Despite the fierce firelight less than an hour before at Imus, the Japanese were surprised by the appearance of the Americans. The paratroopers secured the span before it could be blown. With one battalion guarding the bridge, another passed over on trucks toward Manila, hoping to enter the city from the south.

11

It was not to be. By dawn on 4 February the paratroopers ran into increasingly heavy and harassing fire from Japanese riflemen and machine gunners. At the Paranaque River, just south of the Manila city limits, the battalion halted at a badly damaged bridge only to be battered by Japanese artillery fire from Nichols Field. The 11th Airborne Division had reached the main Japanese defenses south of the capital and could go no further.

The "race" for Manila was now between the 37th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, with the cavalry in the lead. Since the operation had begun in late January, its units had been fortunate enough to find bridges and fordable crossings almost everywhere they went. On 2 February Chase's flying column was dashing toward Manila, sometimes at speeds of fifty miles per hour, with individual units competing for the honor of reaching the city first. The 37th Division, on the other hand, was slowed down by difficult crossings which forced it to either ferry its artillery and tanks across or wait for the engineers to build bridges.

On 3 February elements of the 1st Cavalry Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila, with only the steep-sided Tulaohan River separating them from the city proper. A squadron of the 8th Cavalry reached the bridge just moments after Japanese soldiers had finished preparing it for demolition. As the two sides opened fire on one another, the Japanese lit the fuse leading to the carefully placed explosives. Without hesitation, Lt. James P. Sutton, a Navy demolitions expert attached to the division, dashed through the enemy fire and cut the burning fuse. The way to Manila was clear.

That evening, the 8th Cavalry passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself. The troopers had won the race to Manila. As the sun set over the ocean behind the advancing Americans, a single tank named "Battling Basic" crashed through the walls surrounding Santo Tomas University, the site of a camp holding almost 4,000 civilian prisoners. The Japanese guards put up little resistance, and soon the inmates, many of whom had been incarcerated for nearly two years, were liberated.

Despite the initial American euphoria, much fighting remained. Although the approach to the city had been relatively easy, wresting the capital from the Japanese proved far more difficult. Manila, a city of 800,000, was one of the largest in Southeast Asia. While much of it consisted of ramshackle huts, the downtown section boasted massive reinforced concrete buildings built to withstand earthquakes and old Spanish stone fortresses of equal size and strength. Most were located south of the Pasig River which bisects the capital, requiring that the Americans cross over before closing

12



Figure 120 Sniper fire keeps infantrymen low as medium tanks advance. (National Archives).

*Sniper fire keeps infantrymen low as medium tanks advance.* (National Archives)

with the enemy. Even a half-hearted defense was bound to make Manila's recapture difficult.

Regarding Manila as indefensible, General Yamashita had originally ordered the commander of *Shimbu Group*, General Yokoyama Shizuo, to destroy all bridges and other vital installations and evacuate the city as soon as strong American forces made their appearance. However, Rear Adm. Iwabachi Sanji, the naval commander for the Manila area, vowed to resist the Americans and countermanded the order. Determined to support the admiral as best he could, Yokoyama contributed three Army battalions to Iwabachi's 16,000man *Manila Naval Defense Force* and prepared for battle. The sailors knew little about infantry tactics or street fighting, but they were well armed and entrenched throughout the capital. Iwabachi resolved to fight to the last man.

On 4 February 1945, General MacArthur announced the imminent recapture of the capital while his staff planned a victory parade. But the battle for Manila had barely begun. Almost at once the 1st Cavalry Division in the north and the 11th Airborne Division in the south reported stiffening Japanese resistance to further advances into the city. As one airborne company commander remarked in mock seriousness, "Tell Halsey to stop looking for the Jap Fleet; it's dying on Nichols Field." All thoughts of a parade had to be put aside.

Following the initial American breakthrough on the fourth, fighting raged throughout the city for almost a month. The battle quickly came down to a series of bitter street-to-street and house-to-house struggles. In an attempt to protect the city and its civilians, MacArthur placed stringent restrictions on U.S. artillery and air support. But massive devastation to the urban area could not be avoided. In the north, General Griswold continued to push elements of the XIV Corps south from Santo Tomas University toward the Pasig River.

Late on the afternoon of 4 February he ordered the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, to seize Quezon Bridge, the only crossing over the Pasig that the Japanese had not destroyed. As the squadron approached the bridge, enemy heavy machine guns opened up from a formidable roadblock thrown up across Quezon Boulevard. The Japanese had pounded steel stakes into the pavement, sown the area with mines, and lined up old truck bodies across the road. Unable to advance farther, the cavalry withdrew after nightfall. As the Americans pulled back, the Japanese blew up the bridge.

The next day, 5 February, went more smoothly. Once the 37th Division began to move into Manila, Griswold divided the northern section of the city into two sectors, with the 37th responsible for the

#### 14

Map: The Capture of Manila

western half and the 1st Cavalry responsible for the eastern part. By the afternoon of the 8th, 37th Division units had cleared most Japanese from their sector, although the damage done to the residential districts was extensive. The Japanese added to the destruction by demolishing buildings and military installations as they withdrew. But the division's costliest fighting occurred on Provisor Island, a small industrial center on the Pasig River. The Japanese garrison, probably less than a battalion, held off elements of the division until 11 February.

The 1st Cavalry Division had an easier time, encountering little opposition in the suburbs east of Manila. Although the 7th and 8th Cavalry fought pitched battles near two water supply installations north of the city, by 10 February the cavalry had extended its control south of the river. That night, the XIV Corps established for the first time separate bridgeheads on both banks of the Pasig River.

The final attack on the outer Japanese defenses came from the 11th Airborne Division, under the XIV Corps control since 10 February. The division had been halted at Nichols Field on the fourth and since then had been battling firmly entrenched Japanese naval

#### 15

*General MacArthur and members of his staff at a ceremony of the American flag being raised once again on the island of Corregidor. (National Archives)*

troops, backed up by heavy fire from concealed artillery. Only on 11 February did the airfield finally fall to the paratroopers, but the acquisition allowed the 11th Airborne Division to complete the American encirclement of Manila on the night of the twelfth.

For the rest of the month the Americans and their Filipino allies mopped up enemy resistance throughout the city. Due to the state of Japanese communications, Yamashita did not learn of the efforts of his subordinates in defending Manila until about 17 February, after it was too late to countermand the order. The final weeks of fighting were thus bloody, but the results were inevitable. On 4 March, with the capture of the giant Finance Building in the city center, Griswold reported that enemy resistance had ceased. Manila was officially liberated. But it was a city no more. Some observers commented that the destruction was more complete than in Cologne, Hamburg, or even London. Amidst the devastation, Manila's residents tried to resume their lives.

Just before the last fighting ended, MacArthur summoned a provisional assembly of prominent Filipinos to Malacanan Palace and in their presence declared the Commonwealth of the Philippines to be permanently reestablished. "My country kept the faith," he told the gathered assembly. "Your capital city, cruelly punished though it be, has regained its rightful place-citadel of democracy in the East."

#### ***Bataan and Corregidor***

Securing Manila was significant for both military and psychological reasons, but from a logistical point of view the seizure of Manila Bay was especially crucial. The supply lines at Lingayen Bay, which had so ably supported the American advance south on the capital, were strained almost to the breaking point. Yet, despite the fact that Manila's world-class harbor was in American hands, it could not be used unless the Bataan Peninsula, which encompassed the bay's western shore, was secure.

Even as XIV Corps forces drove on Manila, MacArthur had thus ordered Krueger's Sixth Army to seize Bataan, including Corregidor, the small island fortress at its southern tip. Since Griswold's troops were fully occupied, MacArthur supplemented Sixth Army with the XI Corps from Leyte, commanded by Maj. Gen. Charles P. Hall. With the 38th Infantry Division and the 24th Division's 34th Infantry, the XI Corps was to

land on the Zambales coast some twenty-five miles northwest of Bataan and drive rapidly east across the base of the peninsula, and then sweep south, clearing the entire peninsula including its eastern coast.

**18**

Prior to the assault, American intelligence had badly overestimated enemy strength, predicting that the Japanese had nearly 13,000 soldiers on Bataan. However, having decided that the defense of Manila Bay was also beyond the capabilities of his forces, General Yamashita had the *Kembu Group* commander, Maj. Gen. Rikichi Tsukada, place fewer than 4,000 of his troops on the peninsula. The main defensive force was *Nagayoshi Detachment*, a regiment from the *10th Division* under Col. Nagayoshi Sanenobu.

On the morning of 29 January, nearly 35,000 U.S. troops landed just northwest of the peninsula. Elements of the 38th Division immediately dashed inland to take the San Marcelino airstrip, but found that Filipino guerrillas under the command of Capt. Ramon Magsaysay, later president of the Republic of the Philippines, had secured the field three days earlier. Elsewhere, surprise was complete. In fact, the only casualty on that first day was an American enlisted man, who was gored by an ornery bull. The next day Subic Bay and Olongapo were occupied.

The Japanese chose to make a stand in the rugged Zambales mountains at the northern base of the peninsula, which Americans dubbed the "ZigZag Pass." Colonel Nagayoshi had plenty of supplies and ammunition for a long battle, but his main defensive line was a mere 2,000 yards long, leaving his position open to flanking maneuvers. On 31 January Hall's forces advanced east, seeking out both Japanese flanks. But unfavorable terrain and determined resistance by the Japanese made it difficult. During the next two weeks, elements of the 38th Division struggled to open the ZigZag Pass, and by 8 February they had overrun the main Japanese positions, killing more than 2,400 defenders. Colonel Nagayoshi and 300 of his men escaped farther south and joined other defenders who held out until the middle of February. But before then the vital shoreline of Manila Bay had been secured.

Although Corregidor lacked the importance to the Japanese defense that it had held for the Americans in 1942, it merited a separate attack. MacArthur's plan involved a combined amphibious and airborne assault, the most difficult of all modern military maneuvers. The airborne attack was obviously risky. At just over five square miles, Corregidor made a small target for a parachute drop. To make matters more difficult, the paratroopers were required to land on a hill known as Topside, the dominant terrain feature on the island. On the other hand there was little choice. From Topside the Japanese could dominate all possible amphibious landing sites. In addition, the Japanese would certainly not expect an airborne landing on such an unlikely target.

**19**

The planners were correct in their assumptions. On the morning of 16 February the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team floated down on the surprised defenders while a battalion of the 34th Infantry stormed ashore. During fierce fighting, the Japanese tried to regroup, and at one point, on the morning of 16 February, they threatened to drive a salient into the paratroopers' tenuous foothold on Topside. Pvt. Lloyd G. McCarter charged a key enemy position and destroyed a machine gun nest with hand grenades. For his bravery, McCarter was awarded the Medal of Honor. His actions and those of many other paratroopers and infantrymen during the nine days that followed helped defeat the Japanese on Corregidor. The island fell on 26 February, and, six days later, MacArthur returned to the fortress he had been forced to leave in disgrace three years before.

***Shimbu Group***

The battles for Manila, Bataan, and Corregidor were only the beginning of the Luzon Campaign. Both *Shobu Group*, securing northern Luzon, and the bulk of *Shimbu Group*, defending the south, remained intact. With about 50,000 men at his disposal, the *Shimbu Group* commander, General Yokoyama, had deployed some 30,000 of them immediately east and south of Manila, with the remainder arrayed along the narrow Bicol Peninsula to the southwest. The main Japanese defenses near the capital were built around the *8th* and *105th Divisions*, with the rest of the manpower drawn from a jumble of other units and provisional organizations. East of Manila, their positions were organized in considerable depth but lacked good lines of supply and reinforcement. *Shimbu Group's* eastern defenses obviously presented the most immediate threat to American control of the Manila area and would have to be dealt with first.

By mid-February Krueger's Sixth Army staff had begun planning operations against those *Shimbu Group* forces closest to Manila. Although still concerned about *Shobu Group* troop concentrations in northern Luzon, both Krueger and MacArthur agreed that the Manila area, the potential logistical base for all American activities on Luzon, still had first priority. Nevertheless, MacArthur made Krueger's task more difficult in the coming weeks by continually detaching troop units from Sixth Army control and sending them to the southern and central Philippines, which had been bypassed earlier. These diversions greatly impaired Krueger's ability to deal with both *Shobu* and *Shimbu Groups* at the same time.

20



Figure 121 Men of the 122d Field Artillery Battalion, 33d Division, fire a 105-mm. howitzer against a Japanese pocket in the hills of Luzon. (National Archives).

*Men of the 122d Field Artillery Battalion, 33d Division, fire a 105-mm. howitzer against a Japanese pocket in the hills of Luzon.* (National Archives)

By 20 February Krueger had positioned the 6th and 43d Infantry Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team for an offensive in the rolling hills east of Manila. In addition, as soon as Manila was secured, he wanted the 11th Airborne Division to clear the area south of the capital, assisted by the indepen-

21

dent 158th Infantry. He hoped that the first effort could begin immediately and that the second would start by the first week in March.

The main objective of XIV Corps' attack against *Shimbu Group* was to gain control of the Manila water supply, most of which came from dams along the Angat and Marikina Rivers some twenty miles northeast of the city. Here the coastal plains gave way to rolling mountains and plunging valleys carved by rivers flowing toward the sea. But two crucial errors affected the operation before it even began. First, the Americans did not realize that the Wawa Dam, thought to be one of Manila's sources of water, had been abandoned in 1938 in favor of the larger Ipo Dam in the Marikina Valley. The Wawa Dam could have been bypassed, but Krueger did not realize his error for almost two months. Second, intelligence badly underestimated *Shimbu Group's* strength, reckoning that there were fewer than 20,000 Japanese troops east of Manila when, in reality, there were about

30,000. Enemy defensive positions were strung out along a thin line about thirty miles long running from Ipo Dam in the north to the town of Antipolo in the south. The Japanese positions alone were of little strategic value, but together they commanded all the high ground east of Manila.

On the afternoon of 20 February the XIV Corps launched its attack. Griswold assigned the 6th Division the task of capturing the dams in the north and ordered the 2d Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, to attack the southern half of the Japanese defenses and secure the town of Antipolo. Both units traversed the broad Marikina Valley unmolested but encountered fierce resistance as they moved into the hills and mountains forming the valley's eastern wall. There the Japanese had honeycombed the area with subterranean strongholds and machine gun positions covering all avenues of approach. Despite massive Allied air support, the cavalry advanced slowly, on some days measuring progress in mere yards: Not until 4 March did the troops reach Antipolo. But success was bittersweet. The brigade had lost nearly 60 men killed and 315 wounded, among them the 1st Cavalry Division commander, General Mudge.

To the north the 6th Infantry Division fared only slightly better. Its initial objectives were Mount Pacawagan and Mount Mataba, two strategic high points crucial to capturing the Wawa Dam. Both mountains were defended by extensive Japanese artillery and infantry positions. By 4 March the infantry's southernmost elements had gained a precarious foothold on the crest of Mount Pacawagan, but they could go no farther. Just to the north the Japanese continued to deny the Americans any gains in the Mount Mataba area. Not until 8 March did

## 22

the infantry regain its momentum, gouging the Japanese defenders from their positions as they advanced.

From his vantage point in the mountains, General Yokoyama was concerned by these advances that threatened to envelop both his flanks. Unwilling to abandon his excellent defensive positions on Mataba and Pacawagan, he decided instead to launch a counterattack aimed at the advancing 6th Division. His plans and their subsequent execution typified major Japanese tactical weaknesses throughout the war. Yokoyama scheduled a series of complicated maneuvers that required meticulous coordination in difficult terrain, necessitating sophisticated communications that *Shimbu Group* lacked. In addition, the Japanese artillery was neither strong enough nor suitably deployed to provide proper support. Still, the counterattack began on 12 March with three reserve battalions assaulting three widely dispersed positions along the American line. How Yokoyama expected these scattered attacks to succeed is unclear, but to make matters worse, they ran straight into another major offensive of the 6th Division. In fact, the counterattacks were so weak that the Americans had no idea they were even under attack. The entire effort demonstrated only that *Shimbu Group* was incapable of effective offensive action and that the original defensive strategy was the best course. But the Japanese were irretrievably weakened by the failed counterattack, and to Yokoyama the ultimate fate of *Shimbu Group* was a foregone conclusion. All he could do now was trade lives for terrain and time.

For the next two days, 13-14 March, the Americans battered through Japanese positions, bolstered in the south by a regiment of the 43d Division sent in as reserve for the 1st Cavalry Division. The 6th Division successfully cleaned out the extreme northern Japanese positions, securing a strong foothold on Mount Mataba. The cost, however, continued to be high. On the morning of 14 March a burst from a hidden Japanese machine gun position caught a group of officers bunched together at a regimental forward command post, mortally wounding the division commander, Maj. Gen. Edwin D. Patrick, and one of the regimental commanders. Still, the dual offensives had begun to cave in the Japanese defensive line at both the northern and southern flanks, killing an estimated 3,350 enemy troops. On the American side, the XIV Corps lost almost 300 dead and over 1,000 wounded in less than a month of fighting.

On 14 March General Hall's XI Corps took over responsibility for operations against *Shimbu Group*. With the 38th and 43d Infantry Divisions, Hall decided to continue XIV Corps' strategy, although he intended to concentrate more heavily on destroying the Japanese left,

## 23

Map: The Seizure of Wawa Dam

or southern, flank. On 15 March American forces resumed the attack, and by the twenty-second, to avoid complete encirclement, the Japanese had begun withdrawing to the northeast. But the Americans followed up quickly, and by 27 March they had penetrated the hasty Japanese defenses, completely destroying *Shimbu*

*Group's* left flank. On 17 May the 43d Division, aided by guerrilla forces and air strikes that delivered the heaviest concentration of napalm ever used in the Southwest Pacific, captured the Ipo Dam intact and restored Manila's water supply. Wawa Dam was captured, also undamaged, on 28 May against comparatively light resistance. Continued pressure forced the Japanese to withdraw deep into the Sierra Madre mountains in eastern Luzon where starvation, disease, and guerrilla attacks gradually decimated their ranks during the remainder of the war.

*Shimbu Group's* southern positions along the Bicol Peninsula fared no better. After the XI Corps had relieved the XIV Corps in mid-March, the latter concentrated on rooting the Japanese out of southern Luzon. On 15 March the 6th Division, with the 112th Regimental Combat Team attached, passed to the control of the XI Corps, and the 37th Division was placed in the Sixth Army reserve and given the mission of patrolling Manila. The XIV Corps now included the 1st Cavalry Division and the 11th Airborne Division with the 158th Regimental Combat Team attached. The corps held a line stretching from Laguna de Bay, a huge lake at the northern edge of the Bicol Peninsula, to Batangas Bay on the southern coast. Between the bays lay Lake Taal, a smaller body of water, and a crucial road junction at the town of Santo Tomas. On 19 March the 1st Cavalry Division on the northern edge of the line and the 11th Airborne Division on the south edge began a double enveloping drive around Japanese positions near Lake Taal. The purpose of the drive was to open the highway between Santo Tomas and Batangas, a move that was successfully completed by month's end. On 24 March the 158th Regimental Combat Team was taken from the 11th Airborne Division and ordered to prepare for an amphibious landing at Legaspi on the southeast coast of the Bicol Peninsula.

By 19 April, the Americans had completed their encirclement and driven all the way to Luzon's east coast. The 11th Airborne Division cut all routes leading to the Bicol Peninsula, while the 1st Cavalry Division turned north into the Santa Maria Valley in a move intended to turn *Shimbu Group's* southeast flank and prevent the Japanese from using any of the small coastal towns as concentration or evacuation points. By 25 May, the cavalry, with substantial support from guerrilla units, had seized Infanta, the largest town along the coast.

## 25

The XIV Corps was now free to proceed with the liberation of the Bicol Peninsula. The campaign had actually begun on 1 April when the 158th Regimental Combat Team carried out its amphibious assault at Legaspi on the southeastern tip of Luzon. Resistance was light because the Japanese had transferred most of their troops to the northern *Shimbu Group* positions during January. Although the 158th Regimental Combat Team encountered many prepared defenses, the opposition consisted mainly of support troops and naval service troops, together with a few remnants that had escaped from Leyte. The Americans had little trouble handling this hodgepodge of Japanese defenders, and on 2 May they linked up with the 1st Cavalry Division, which had been advancing into the peninsula from the northwest. By 31 May, all of southern Luzon was cleared of major enemy units, and on 15 June the XIV Corps was relieved of tactical responsibility in southern Luzon and transferred north.

### ***Shobu Group***

Despite the hard fighting in Manila, the Bataan Peninsula, and throughout southern Luzon, the main Japanese force was in the northern part of the island. It was there that General Yamashita's *Shobu Group* occupied a large region resembling an inverted triangle, with northern Luzon's rugged geography as a shield. In the east rose the Sierra Madre mountain range, to the west the impressive hills of the Cordillera Central, and at the northern edge of the triangle, the Babuyan channel. In the center lay the Cagayan Valley, Luzon's rice bowl and a key supply area for the Japanese units. Yamashita had pieced together a defensive force made up of the *19th Division*, the *23d Division*, and elements of three others: the *103d* and *10th Divisions* and the *2d Tank Division*. Its main purpose was to harass the Americans rather than to defeat them. Yamashita expected the main attack to come from the Manila area where American forces were consolidating their gains, particularly along the handful of roads winding north through Bambang and Baguio and into the Cagayan Valley. And there was always the possibility of amphibious landings along the northern coastline.

In February, as American troops gradually pushed the enemy out of Manila, General Krueger alerted the I Corps for an offensive into northern Luzon against *Shobu Group*. Originally, Krueger had planned to use a total of six divisions to gradually push north through Bambang, but MacArthur's emphasis on securing the

entire Manila area first made this impossible. Nevertheless, by the end of February, General Swift, the I Corps commander, had begun probing the area

26

Map: Troop Dispositions



Figure 122 "Trading Rations for Souvenirs" by Sidney Simon. Lingayen, Philippines, 1945. (Army Art Collection).

"Trading Rations for Souvenirs" by Sidney Simon. Lingayen, Philippines, 1945. (Army Art Collection)

north of the original beachhead with the 33d Division, which had replaced the battle-weary 43d Division and the 158th Regimental Combat Team on 13 February. Although Swift's forces were outnumbered two-to-one by the Japanese, the relative passivity of their foes encouraged the more aggressive Americans.

In early March Swift ordered the 33d Division to push northeast along Route 11, the easiest road into the mountains, toward the town of Bambang. But the attackers quickly discovered that this avenue was heavily defended and made little progress. Meanwhile, other elements of the division operating along the coast directly north from the Lingayen Gulf landing beaches found little resistance. After taking some small towns farther up the coast and turning inland Maj. Gen. Percy W. Clarkson, the division commander, decided to dash along Route 9 and attack Baguio—the prewar summer capital of the Philippines and currently Yamashita's headquarters—from the northeast. To assist, Krueger added the 37th Infantry Division to the attack and with the aid of air strikes and guerrilla harassment, wore down the defenders until they were on the verge of starvation. A small garrison made a last stand at

28

Irisan Gorge, where the road crossed the Irisan River some three miles west of Baguio, but on 27 April the town fell to American troops.

*Shobu Group* had lost one of the three legs of its defensive triangle, but the battle on northern Luzon was far from over. Until the end of the war, Sixth Army forces continued to push Yamashita's men farther into the mountains, taking heavy casualties in the process. The 32d Division, which had also seen heavy fighting on Leyte, was worn down to almost nothing, but the defenders suffered even heavier battle casualties as well as losses to starvation and disease. By the end of the war, the Japanese were still holding out in the rugged Asin Valley of the Sierra Madre in north-central Luzon, enduring the drenching summer monsoons. Nevertheless, General Yamashita and about 50,500 of his men surrendered only after the close of hostilities on 15 August.

On 30 June 1945 Krueger's Sixth Army was relieved by the Eighth Army, whose task was to mop up scattered Japanese positions. By the end of March, however, the Allies controlled all of Luzon that had any strategic or economic significance.

### ***Analysis***

Technically, the battle for Luzon was still not over when Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945. On the northern part of the island *Shobu Group* remained the center of attention for the better part of three U.S. Army divisions. Altogether, almost 115,000 Japanese remained at large on Luzon and on some of the

southern islands. For all practical purposes, however, the battle for control of Luzon had been over since March.

MacArthur can be both lauded and criticized for the Luzon Campaign. On the one hand he had swiftly recaptured Manila and all areas deemed critical for further operations against the Japanese. On the other hand the enemy was not totally subdued and the Japanese troops still posed a serious threat even after several months of fighting. But many other Japanese garrisons had been left behind along the road to the Japanese heartland—just as in the European theater the Allied commanders had virtually ignored many German garrisons remaining along the French Atlantic coast and on the English Channel. After June, only a limited number of forces were needed to keep *Shobu Group* on the defensive. More significantly, *Shobu Group*, representing the largest Japanese troop concentration on the islands, contributed little to the defense of Luzon. In the end they appeared more concerned with their own pointless survival as a force in being than in interfering in any way with American designs. The Japanese decision to fight a

**29**

passive war of attrition set the tone for the entire campaign. Had Yamashita conducted a more active defense, one that did not meekly surrender the initiative to the Americans, the struggle might have been shorter but much sharper. In such a case, MacArthur's single-minded drive on Manila might have been judged a risky venture and the diversion of troops to liberate other minor islands a dangerous practice. And had the Americans suffered even minor reverses on the battlefield in the early days of January and February, the struggle might also have been prolonged until August at an even heavier cost in American lives.

Taken altogether, MacArthur's offensive had contained or taken out of the war over 380,000 Japanese, rendering them unavailable for the defense of the homeland. In the final analysis, the fall of Luzon meant once and for all that the Japanese Empire was doomed. The battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf had left its fleet in tatters, and the ground campaigns that followed turned the once-proud Japanese Army into a shadow of its former self.

Casualties on both sides were staggering. Except for those forces surrendering at the end of the war, the Japanese lost virtually all of the 230,000 military personnel on Luzon, in addition to some 70,000 casualties from the previous battle on Leyte Island. By the summer of 1945, the Americans had thus destroyed nine of Japan's best divisions and made another six combat-ineffective. Losses stemming from the battle so drastically reduced Japanese air power that the use of *kamikaze* operations was necessary throughout the rest of the war.

American casualties were also high. Ground combat losses for the Sixth and Eighth Armies were almost 47,000, some 10,380 killed and 36,550 wounded. Nonbattle casualties were even heavier. From 9 January through 30 June 1945, the Sixth Army on Luzon suffered over 93,400 noncombat casualties, including 260 deaths, most of them from disease. Only a few campaigns had a higher casualty rate.

For the first time during the Pacific war, American troops were deployed in field army strength, making for a sometimes unwieldy command structure. In earlier campaigns throughout the Pacific, the U.S. theater commanders had generally employed one or two divisions at a time to seize small islands or small portions of coastline. In contrast, the Luzon Campaign saw extended operations inland which demanded the deployment of multi-corps forces supported by greatly expanded logistical and communications systems. Fortunately for the Americans, all but one of the participating U.S. divisions had had previous experience in fighting the Japanese, particularly on Leyte only a few months before. In fact, except for the urban fighting in Manila, American units were in the enviable position of applying past lessons to the battlefield. The

**30**

Americans also had the advantage of superior weapons, equipment, and supplies and by January, control of both the local seas and air. Finally, the flat open plains of central Luzon were conducive to the Americans' advantage in maneuverability and firepower. During earlier battles on the Pacific's small jungle islands, the terrain often worked to the Japanese advantage; on Luzon, the reverse was so. But again, due to the scope of the battlefield, it was the American ability to perform effectively at the larger, operational level of war that was tested for the first time in the Pacific during the Luzon Campaign.

Although the reconquest of Luzon was a severe blow to the Japanese and placed the Allies one step closer to total victory, Japan would not admit defeat. An invasion of the Japanese homeland still loomed large in

American planning and expectations. But the battle for Luzon had steeled America's fighting men for the daunting task ahead. Their victory was not merely another stepping stone in MacArthur's island-hopping campaign. It marked the first time that the Japanese were driven from a strategic area that they had captured at the beginning of the war. And if American soldiers needed any other impetus, many of them received it when they saw the horror of Japanese prison camps. To many, it made the difficult battle of Luzon-and the specter of a possible invasion of the Japanese mainland-seem worthwhile.


31

**Further Readings**

The most complete works on the Luzon Campaign are the official volumes produced by the Army and Navy, particularly Robert Ross Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines* (1963), and Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Liberation of the Philippines* (1963). The best account contained in a general work on the Pacific war is Ronald Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun* (1985). Other significant general studies include John Toland's *The Rising Sun* (1970), and James L. Stokesbury, *A Short History of World War II* (1980). Various MacArthur biographies, such as Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: Far Eastern General* (1989), cover MacArthur's personal involvement in the campaign, but with the exception of D. Clayton James' excellent *The Years of MacArthur: Volume II, 1941-1945* (1970), go into few operational details.

CMH Pub 72-28

Cover: *Troops on Hill 604 fire on Japanese positions.* (National Archives)

	<p><b>Return to CMH Online</b></p> <hr/> <p><i>Last updated 3 October 2003</i></p>
--	--




Figure 123 Names from Veterans wall at Branson. Ervin E Hall is listed in the fifth row.




Figure 124 Names from Veterans wall in Branson. Glass names.




Figure 125 Names from Veterans wall at Branson, Glass names.






Figure 128 Names from Veterans wall at Branson. Narngrover names.




Figure 129 Names from Veterans wall at Branson. Tipton names.



Figure 130 Photo from Veterans Museum at Branson.

**U.S. World War II Army Enlistment Records, 1938-1946** about Cecil J Ritchie

Name:	<b>Cecil J Ritchie</b>
Birth Year:	1917
Race:	White, Citizen ( <i>White</i> )
Nativity State or Country:	Oklahoma
State of Residence:	Oklahoma
Enlistment Date:	24 Mar 1942
Branch:	Branch Immaterial - Warrant Officers, USA
Branch Code:	Branch Immaterial - Warrant Officers, USA

Veterans Day – A Tribute to the Military Service of our Ancestors RESEARCH DRAFT 2013

Grade:	Private
Grade Code:	Private
Term of Enlistment:	Enlistment for the duration of the War or other emergency, plus six months, subject to the discretion of the President or otherwise according to law
Component:	Selectees (Enlisted Men)
Source:	Civil Life
Education:	Grammar school
Civil Occupation:	Cooks, except private family
Marital Status:	Married
Height:	68
Weight:	153

Cecil James Ritchie (1916 - 1979)

**is your husband**

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)

**U.S. World War II Draft Registration Cards, 1942** about Willard Elijah Tipton

Name:	Willard Elijah Tipton
Birth Date:	29 Jan 1883
Birth Place:	Rardon, Coles Co, Illinois
Residence:	The Dalles, Oregon
Race:	White
Age:	
Occupation:	
Nearest Relative:	
Height/Build:	
Color of Eyes/Hair:	
Signature:	View image

Willard E Tipton (1883 - 1969)

**is your grand uncle of daughter**

[John Tipton \(1852 - 1910\)](#)

father of Willard E Tipton

[Lucy B Tipton \(1885 - 1910\)](#)

daughter of John Tipton

[Ida Mae Tipton \(1907 - 1984\)](#)

daughter of Lucy B Tipton

[Betty Lavern Hodo \(1935 - \)](#)

daughter of Ida Mae Tipton

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)

**Albert Anson Hall** Career USAF  
Albert Alson Hall (1923 - 2006)

**is your 1st cousin 1x removed**

[Mervin Robert Hall \(1897 - 1929\)](#)

father of Albert Alson Hall

[George Henry Hall \(1866 - 1917\)](#)

father of Mervin Robert Hall

[Euell L Hall \(1891 - 1925\)](#)

son of George Henry Hall

[Edgar Leonard Hall \(1914 - 1973\)](#)

son of Euell L Hall

[Ernest Lenard Hall](#)

**Alice Hall Washburn** ( Family Genealogist) Served at San Francisco Port of Embarkation 1945 during  
surrender of Japan  
Alice Clifton Hall (1927 - 2001)

**is your 1st cousin 1x removed**

[Obie Palmer Hall \(1906 - 1971\)](#)

father of Alice Clifton Hall

[George Henry Hall \(1866 - 1917\)](#)

father of Obie Palmer Hall

[Euell L Hall \(1891 - 1925\)](#)

son of George Henry Hall

[Edgar Leonard Hall \(1914 - 1973\)](#)

son of Euell L Hall

[Ernest Lenard Hall](#)

**Charles Glass** Hawaii 1944

Charles W Glass (1920 - )

**is your father**

[Bettie Glass](#)




Figure 131 Charles Glass in Hawaii during World War II.



Figure 132 Charles Glass at Branson

Charles was accompanied by his daughter Jeannine on the Nov 15, 2011 Honor Flight to the WW II memorials in Washington, DC.

Hello to all,

I thought this would be the best way to let people know how much we enjoyed the trip to Washington, DC. After an early start--we picked Dad up at 4:00 am as we had to be at the airport by 4:30 am. We got checked thru security and boarded the plane around 6:15. When we landed at Dulles, the plane was water cannoned on both sides as we taxied in to our gate. There were quite a lot of people stationed all thru the terminal--students, military personnel, and volunteers in lime shirts and just ordinary people greeting us and shaking all the veterans' hands. The kids had made signs and everyone was very enthusiastic in their welcome! It was almost overwhelming. Then onto our assigned bus--there were three designated red, white & blue. We were on the blue bus (53 people) and were accompanied by a volunteer from the army (a colonel, I think) who was very knowledgeable about most everything having to do with the memorials. He also pointed out all the sights along the way, so it kept our driving time interesting. We visited the WWII memorial first, where the most time was spent. Dad enjoyed just strolling around taking everything in--strangers would come up, shake the veterans' hands and thank them--this happened everywhere we went and seemed to please them all. The Korean memorial was the most artistic interpretation (my favorite) the engravings all over the wall and the

statues of the soldiers arranged in front of it were really well-executed. Dad was too tired to walk to the Vietnam wall and at that time, wouldn't ride in a wheelchair, so missed that particular part of history. We did climb the stairs at the Lincoln monument and I believe that did him in, at least his legs! ha Arlington cemetery was almost the final stop and we saw the 4:00 pm changing of the guard. There are several segments on the ky3.com web site and that is on video. The Air Force memorial was really neat but it was almost dark when we got there so didn't park to view for long. Got to tour the historic parts of Washington and see a ton of places I had seen in movies and read about in books--I guess Ron and I will have to go to the Smithsonian one of these years! ha There was a huge welcoming committee of military, civilian and school kids when we landed at Spfd, along with a band playing. Dad had a couple from the Senior Center come out and greet him, which was really wonderful for him. Of course, Mom and Ron were there, too, and were we ever glad to see them! I think it was a great experience for Dad and all of the veterans. You can call me and get even more detailed information if you want.

Love to you all,

Jeannine



Figure 2 November 2011 Ozark Honors Flight (<http://www.ky3.com/galleries/ky3-november-ozarks-honor-flight-photos-20111115,0,4264593.photogallery>)

This was the last Ozarks Honor Flight of 2011. In the two years since Ozarks Honor Flight started, it's flown 31,000 miles, helped 1,000 veterans of World War II see their monument, and raised \$1 million.

## Japanese offensives, 1941-42

“ I praise the Army for cutting down like weeds large numbers of the enemy... ”

— [Hirohito](#)<sup>[37]</sup>



[HMS Prince of Wales](#) (left, front) and [HMS Repulse](#) (left, rear) under attack by Japanese aircraft. A destroyer is in the foreground.

British, Australian and Dutch forces, already drained of personnel and [matériel](#) by two years of war with Germany, and heavily committed in the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere, were unable to provide much more than token resistance to the battle-hardened Japanese. The Allies suffered many disastrous defeats in the first six months of the war. Two major British warships, [HMS Repulse](#) and [HMS Prince of Wales](#) were [sunk by a Japanese air attack](#) off Malaya on 10 December 1941.

Thailand, with its territory already serving as a springboard for the Malayan campaign, surrendered within 24 hours of the [Japanese invasion](#). The government of Thailand formally allied itself with Japan on 21 December.

[Hong Kong was attacked on 8 December](#)<sup>[38]</sup> and fell on 25 December 1941, with Canadian forces and the Royal Hong Kong Volunteers playing an important part in the defense. U.S. bases on [Guam](#) and [Wake Island](#) were lost at around the same time.

Following the 1 January 1942 [Declaration by United Nations](#) (the first official use of the term United Nations), the Allied governments appointed the British General Sir [Archibald Wavell](#) to the [American-British-Dutch-Australian Command](#) (ABDACOM), a supreme command for Allied forces in [South East Asia](#). This gave Wavell nominal control of a huge force, albeit thinly-spread over an area from Burma to the Philippines to northern Australia. Other areas, including India, Hawaii and the rest of Australia remained under separate local commands. On 15 January Wavell moved to [Bandung](#) in [Java](#) to assume control of ABDA Command (ABDACOM).



Japanese battleships [Yamashiro](#), [Fuso](#) and [Haruna](#) (more distant)

In January, Japan invaded [Burma](#), the [Dutch East Indies](#), [New Guinea](#), the [Solomon Islands](#) and captured [Manila](#), [Kuala Lumpur](#) and [Rabaul](#). After being driven out of Malaya, Allied forces in Singapore attempted to resist the Japanese during the [Battle of Singapore](#) but surrendered to the Japanese on 15 February 1942; about 130,000 Indian, British, Australian and Dutch personnel became prisoners of war.<sup>[39]</sup> The pace of conquest was rapid: [Bali](#)<sup>[40]</sup> and [Timor](#)<sup>[41]</sup> also fell in February. The rapid collapse of Allied resistance had left the "ABDA area" split in two. Wavell resigned from ABDACOM on 25 February, handing control of the ABDA Area to local commanders and returning to the post of [Commander-in-Chief, India](#).



The [Bombing of Darwin](#), Australia, 19 February 1942

Meanwhile, Japanese aircraft had all but eliminated Allied air power in South-East Asia and were making [attacks on northern Australia](#), beginning with a psychologically devastating (but militarily insignificant) [attack on the city of Darwin](#) on 19 February, which killed at least 243 people.

At the [Battle of the Java Sea](#) in late February and early March, the [Japanese Navy](#) inflicted a resounding defeat on the main ABDA naval force, under Admiral [Karel Doorman](#).<sup>[42]</sup> The [Dutch East Indies campaign](#) subsequently ended with the surrender of Allied forces on Java<sup>[43]</sup> and Sumatra.<sup>[44]</sup>

In March and April, a [raid into the Indian Ocean](#) by a powerful Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier force resulted in a wave of major air raids against [Ceylon](#) and the sinking of a British aircraft carrier, [HMS Hermes](#), as well as other Allied ships and driving the British fleet out of the Indian Ocean. This paved the way for a Japanese assault on Burma and India.

The British, under intense pressure, made a fighting retreat from [Rangoon](#) to the Indo-Burmese border. This cut the [Burma Road](#) which was the western Allies' supply line to the Chinese Nationalists. Cooperation between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists had waned from its zenith at the [Battle of Wuhan](#), and the relationship between the two had gone sour as both attempted to expand their area of operations in occupied territories. Most of the Nationalist guerrilla areas were eventually overtaken by the Communists. On the other hand, some Nationalist units were deployed to blockade the Communists and not the Japanese. Furthermore, many of the forces of the Chinese Nationalists were warlords allied to Chiang Kai-Shek, but not directly under his command. "Of the 1,200,000 troops under Chiang's control, only 650,000 were directly controlled by his generals, and another 550,000 controlled by warlords who claimed loyalty to his government; the strongest force was the Szechuan army of 320,000 men. The defeat of this army would do much to end Chiang's power."<sup>[45]</sup> The Japanese exploited this lack of unity to press ahead in their offensives.

Filipino and U.S. forces resisted in the Philippines until 8 May 1942, when more than 80,000 soldiers were ordered to surrender. By this time, General [Douglas MacArthur](#), who had been appointed Supreme Allied Commander South West Pacific, had retreated to the safer confines of Australia. The U.S. Navy, under Admiral [Chester Nimitz](#), had responsibility for the rest of the Pacific Ocean. This divided command had unfortunate consequences for the [commerce war](#),<sup>[46]</sup> and consequently, the war itself.

### [\[edit\]](#) Threat to Australia

In late 1941, as Japan struck at Pearl Harbor, most of Australia's best forces were committed to the fight against Hitler in the [Mediterranean Theatre](#). Australia was ill-prepared for an attack, lacking armaments, modern fighter aircraft, heavy bombers, and aircraft carriers. While still calling for reinforcements from Churchill, the Australian Prime Minister [John Curtin](#) called for American support with an historic announcement on 27 December 1941:<sup>[47]</sup>

“ The Australian Government...regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Without inhibitions of any kind, I make it clear that Australia looks to America, ” free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.”<sup>[48]</sup>



Dutch and Australian [PoWs](#) at Tarsau, in [Thailand](#) in 1943. 22,000 Australians were captured by the Japanese; 8000 died as POWs.



U.S. General [Douglas MacArthur](#), Commander of Allied forces in the Pacific, with Prime Minister [John Curtin](#).

Australia had been shocked by the speedy collapse of British Malaya and [Fall of Singapore](#) in which around 15,000 Australian soldiers became prisoners of war. Curtin predicted that the "[battle for Australia](#)" would now follow. The Japanese established a major base in the Australian [Territory of New Guinea](#) in early 1942.<sup>[49]</sup> On 19 February, [Darwin](#) suffered a devastating [air raid](#), the first time the Australian mainland had been attacked. Over the following 19 months, [Australia was attacked from the air](#) almost 100 times.

Two battle-hardened Australian divisions were steaming from the Mid-East for Singapore. Churchill wanted them diverted to Burma, but Curtin insisted on a return to Australia. In early 1942 elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy [proposed an invasion of Australia](#). The Japanese Army opposed the plan and it was rejected in favour of a policy of isolating Australia from the United States via blockade by advancing through the South Pacific.<sup>[50]</sup> The Japanese decided upon a seaborne invasion of [Port Moresby](#), capital of the Australian [Territory of Papua](#) which would put Northern Australia within bomber range of Japanese aircraft.

U.S. President [Franklin Roosevelt](#) ordered his commander in the Philippines, General [Douglas MacArthur](#), to formulate a Pacific defence plan with Australia in March 1942. Curtin agreed to place Australian forces under the command of MacArthur, who became "Supreme Commander of the South West Pacific". MacArthur moved his headquarters to Melbourne in March 1942 and American troops began massing in Australia. [Axis naval activity in Australian waters](#) reached Sydney in late May 1942, when Japanese [midget submarines](#) launched a daring [raid on Sydney Harbour](#). On 8 June 1942, two Japanese submarines briefly shelled Sydney's eastern suburbs and the city of Newcastle.<sup>[51]</sup>

### [\[edit\]](#) Allies re-group

“ *For every advance that the Japanese have made since they started their frenzied career of conquest, they have had to pay a very heavy toll in warships, in transports, in planes, and in men. They are feeling the effects of those losses.* <sup>[52]</sup> ”

— Franklin D. Roosevelt, 28 April 1942

In early 1942, the governments of smaller powers began to push for an inter-governmental Asia-Pacific war council, based in [Washington, D.C.](#). A council was established in London, with a subsidiary body in Washington. However the smaller powers continued to push for a U.S.-based body. The [Pacific War Council](#) was formed in Washington, on 1 April 1942, with President [Franklin D. Roosevelt](#), his key advisor [Harry Hopkins](#), and [representatives](#) from Britain, China, Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Canada. Representatives from [India](#) and the Philippines were later added. The council never had any direct operational control, and any decisions it made were referred to the U.S.-UK [Combined Chiefs of Staff](#), which was also in Washington.

Allied resistance, at first symbolic, gradually began to stiffen. Australian and Dutch forces led civilians in a prolonged [guerilla campaign in Portuguese Timor](#). The [Doolittle Raid](#) did minimal damage but was a huge morale booster for the Allies, especially the United States, and it caused repercussions throughout the Japanese military because they were sworn to protect the [Japanese emperor](#) and homeland, but did not shoot down a single bomber. The greatest effect of the raid,

however, was that it caused the Japanese to launch the ultimately catastrophic assault on Midway.<sup>[53]</sup>

### [\[edit\]](#) Coral Sea and Midway: the turning point

Main articles: [Battle of the Coral Sea](#) and [Battle of Midway](#)



*Lexington* on fire at the [Coral Sea](#)

By mid-1942, the [Japanese Combined Fleet](#) found itself holding a vast area, even though it lacked the aircraft carriers, aircraft, and aircrew to defend it, and the freighters, tankers, and destroyers necessary to sustain it. Moreover, Fleet doctrine was inadequate to execute the proposed "barrier" defence.<sup>[29][32]</sup> Instead, they decided on additional attacks in both the south and central Pacific. While Yamamoto had used the element of surprise at Pearl Harbor, Allied [codebreakers](#) now turned the tables. They discovered an attack against [Port Moresby](#), New Guinea, was imminent with intent to invade and conquer all of New Guinea. If Port Moresby fell, it would give Japan control of the seas to the immediate north of Australia. Nimitz rushed the carrier [USS Lexington](#), under Admiral [Fletcher](#), to join [USS Yorktown](#) and an American-Australian task force, with orders to contest the Japanese advance. The resulting [Battle of the Coral Sea](#), fought 4–8 May 1942, was the first naval battle in which ships involved never sighted each other and aircraft were solely used to attack opposing forces. Although *Lexington* was sunk and *Yorktown* seriously damaged, the Japanese lost the aircraft carrier [Shōhō](#), suffered extensive damage to [Shōkaku](#) and heavy losses to the air wing of [Zuikaku](#) (both missed the operation against Midway the following month), and saw the Moresby invasion force turn back. Even though Allied losses were heavier than Japanese, the Japanese attack on Port Moresby was thwarted and their invasion forces turned back, yielding a strategic victory for the Allies. Moreover, Japan lacked the capacity to replace losses in ships, planes and trained pilots.




#### Japanese advance until mid-1942

Destruction of U.S. carriers was Yamamoto's main objective, and he planned an operation to lure them to battle. After Coral Sea, he had four fleet carriers operational—[Sōryū](#), [Kaga](#), [Akagi](#) and [Hiryū](#)—and believed Nimitz had a maximum of two—[Enterprise](#) and [Hornet](#). [Saratoga](#) was out of action, undergoing repair after a torpedo attack, while [Yorktown](#) sailed after three days' work to repair her [flight deck](#) and make essential repairs, with civilian work crews still aboard.

A large Japanese force was sent north to [attack the Aleutian Islands](#), off [Alaska](#). The next stage of Yamamoto's plan called for the capture of [Midway Atoll](#), which would give him an opportunity to destroy Nimitz's remaining carriers; afterward, it would be turned into a major airbase, giving Japan control of the central Pacific. In May, Allied [codebreakers](#) discovered his intentions. Nagumo was again in tactical command but was focused on the invasion of Midway; Yamamoto's complex plan had no provision for intervention by Nimitz before the Japanese expected him. Planned surveillance of the U.S. fleet by long range seaplane did not happen ([as a result of an abortive identical operation in March](#)), so U.S. carriers were able to proceed to a [flanking position](#) on the approaching Japanese fleet without being detected. Nagumo had 272 planes operating from his four carriers, the U.S. 348 (of which 115 were land-based).

As anticipated by U.S. commanders, the Japanese fleet arrived off Midway on 4 June and was spotted by [PBY](#) patrol aircraft.<sup>[54]</sup> Nagumo executed a first strike against Midway, while Fletcher launched his aircraft, bound for Nagumo's carriers. At 09:20 the first U.S. carrier aircraft arrived, [TBD Devastator torpedo bombers](#) from [Hornet](#), but their attacks were poorly coordinated and ineffectual;<sup>[55]</sup> they failed to score a single hit, and [Zero](#) fighters shot down all 15. At 09:35, 15 TBDs from [Enterprise](#) skimmed in over the water; 14 were shot down by Zeroes. Fletcher's attacks had been disorganized, yet succeeded in distracting Nagumo's defensive fighters. When U.S. [dive bombers](#) arrived, the Zeroes could not offer any protection. In addition, Nagumo's four carriers had drifted out of formation, reducing the concentration of their anti-aircraft fire. His most-criticized error was twice changing his arming orders: he first held aircraft for shipping attack as a hedge against discovery of U.S. carriers, changed this based on reports an additional strike was needed against Midway, then again after sighting [Yorktown](#), wasting time and leaving his hangar decks crowded with refueling and rearming aircraft, and ordnance stowed outside the

magazines. Yamamoto's dispositions, which left Nagumo with inadequate reconnaissance to detect (and therefore attack) Fletcher before he launched, are often ignored.<sup>[30]</sup>



[Hiryū](#) under attack by [B-17 Flying Fortress](#) heavy bombers

When [SBD Dauntlesses](#) from *Enterprise* and *Yorktown* appeared at an altitude of 10,000 feet (3,000 m), the Zeroes at sea level were unable to respond before the bombers pushed over. They scored a small number of significant hits; *Sōryū*, *Kaga*, and *Akagi* all caught fire. *Hiryū* survived this wave of attacks and launched an attack against the American carriers which caused severe damage to *Yorktown* (which was later finished off by a Japanese submarine). A second attack from the U.S. carriers a few hours later found and destroyed *Hiryū*. Yamamoto had four additional small carriers, assigned to his scattered surface forces, all too slow to keep up with the [Kido Butai](#) and therefore never in action. Yamamoto's enormous superiority in gun power was irrelevant as the U.S. had [air superiority](#) at Midway and could refuse a surface gunfight (which, by remarkable good fortune, Spruance moved to avoid, based on a faulty submarine report<sup>[56]</sup>); Yamamoto's flawed dispositions had made closing to engage after dark on 4 June impossible.<sup>[57]</sup> Midway was a decisive victory for the U.S. Navy and the [high point](#) in Japanese aspirations in the Pacific.

### [\[edit\]](#) [New Guinea and the Solomons](#)

Main articles: [New Guinea campaign](#) and [Solomon Islands campaign](#)

Japanese land forces continued to advance in the [Solomon Islands](#) and [New Guinea](#). From July 1942, a few Australian [reserve battalions](#), many of them very young and untrained, fought a stubborn rearguard action in New Guinea, against a Japanese advance along the [Kokoda Track](#), towards Port Moresby, over the rugged [Owen Stanley Ranges](#). The militia, worn out and severely depleted by casualties, were relieved in late August by regular troops from the [Second Australian Imperial Force](#), returning from action in the [Mediterranean theater](#).



US Marines rest in the field during the Guadalcanal campaign in November 1942

In early September 1942 [Japanese marines](#) attacked a strategic [Royal Australian Air Force](#) base at [Milne Bay](#), near the eastern tip of New Guinea. They were beaten back by the [Australian Army](#), which inflicted the first outright defeat on Japanese land forces since 1939.

[\[edit\]](#) [Guadalcanal](#)

Main article: [Guadalcanal Campaign](#)

At the same time as major battles raged in New Guinea, Allied forces identified a Japanese airfield under construction at Guadalcanal. In August 16,000 Allied infantry—primarily [US Marines](#)—made an amphibious landing to capture the airfield.

Japanese and Allied forces occupied various parts of the island. Over the following six months, both sides fed resources into an escalating battle of attrition on the island, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft in the South Pacific were drafted into the Japanese defence of Guadalcanal, facing [Allied air forces](#) based at [Henderson Field](#). Japanese ground forces launched attacks on US positions around Henderson Field, suffering high casualties. These offensives were resupplied by Japanese convoys known to the Allies as the "[Tokyo Express](#)", which often faced night battles with the Allied navies, and expended [destroyers](#) IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "[Ironbottom Sound](#)", from the severe losses to both sides. However, only the US Navy could quickly replace and repair its losses. The Allies were victorious on Guadalcanal in February 1943.

### [\[edit\]](#) Allied advances in New Guinea and the Solomons



Australian commandos in New Guinea during July 1943

By late 1942, the Japanese were also retreating along the Kokoda Track in the highlands of New Guinea. Australian and U.S. counteroffensives culminated in the capture of the key Japanese beachhead in eastern New Guinea, the [Buna-Gona area](#), in early 1943.

In June 1943, the Allies launched [Operation Cartwheel](#), which defined their offensive strategy in the South Pacific. The operation was aimed at isolating the major Japanese forward base, at [Rabaul](#), and cutting its supply and communication lines. This prepared the way for Nimitz's [island-hopping](#) campaign towards Japan.

### [\[edit\]](#) Stalemate in China and South-East Asia

*Main articles:* [Second Sino-Japanese War](#) and [Burma Campaign 1942–1943](#)



Chinese troops during the [Battle of Changde](#) in November 1943.

In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous [famine in Bengal](#), which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An [offensive in Arakan](#) failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the [Chindits](#) under Brigadier [Orde Wingate](#) suffered heavy losses, but was

publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new [South East Asia Command](#) (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the [British India Command](#), under Wavell. In October 1943 [Winston Churchill](#) appointed Admiral Lord [Louis Mountbatten](#) as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian [Fourteenth Army](#) was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General [William Slim](#), its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General [Joseph Stilwell](#), who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the [China Burma India Theater](#), directed aid to China and prepared to construct the [Ledo Road](#) to link India and China by land.

On 22 November 1943 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and ROC Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, met in [Cairo](#), Egypt, to discuss a strategy to defeat Japan. The meeting was also known as [Cairo Conference](#) and concluded with the [Cairo Declaration](#).

### [\[edit\]](#) Allied offensives, 1943-44



The Allied leaders of the Asian and Pacific Theaters: Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek](#), Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill meeting at the [Cairo Conference](#) in 1943.

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into actual ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate naval resources and [commerce defense](#), fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion.

In November 1943 U.S. Marines sustained high casualties when they overwhelmed the 4,500-strong garrison at [Tarawa](#). This helped the Allies to improve the techniques of amphibious landings, learning from their mistakes and implementing changes such as thorough pre-emptive bombings and bombardment, more careful planning regarding tides and landing craft schedules, and better overall coordination.

The U.S. Navy did not seek out the Japanese fleet for a decisive battle, as [Mahanian](#) doctrine would suggest (and as Japan hoped); the Allied advance could only be stopped by a Japanese naval attack, which oil shortages (induced by submarine attack) made impossible. <sup>[32][46]</sup>

### [\[edit\]](#) Submarine warfare

Main article: [Allied submarines in the Pacific War](#)

US submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at [Cavite](#), in the Philippines (1941–42) [Fremantle](#) and [Brisbane](#) in Australia; Pearl Harbor; [Trincomalee](#), Ceylon; [Midway](#); and later [Guam](#), [played a major role in defeating Japan](#). This was the case even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. <sup>[46][58]</sup> Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many [troop transports](#), and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. By early 1945 the oil tanks were dry. The Japanese military claimed its defenses sank 468 Allied subs. <sup>[59]</sup> Only 42 US submarines were sunk in the Pacific, with 10 others going down in accidents or as the result of [friendly fire](#). <sup>[60][61]</sup>



The torpedoed Japanese destroyer, [Yamakaze](#), as seen through the periscope of an American submarine, [Nautilus](#), in June 1942

US submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; most of the rest were destroyed by mines or aircraft. <sup>[60]</sup> US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. <sup>[62]</sup> Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf (and, coincidentally, at Midway), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers.

The Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt ordered a new doctrine into effect: unrestricted [submarine warfare](#) against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors. <sup>[63]</sup> Allied submarine bases were well-protected by surface fleets and aircraft.

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war US) [doctrine](#) stipulated naval campaigns are won only by fleet battles, not [guerre de course](#) (commerce raiding). So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, and was

vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan's submarines were instead primarily used for long range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked US supply lines. The Japanese [submarine offensive against Australia](#) in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little.<sup>[64]</sup> As the war turned against Japan, IJN submarines were increasingly used to resupply strongholds which had been cut off, such as [Truk](#) and [Rabaul](#). In addition, Japan honored its neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union and ignored US freighters shipping millions of tons of war supplies from San Francisco to [Vladivostok](#)<sup>[65]</sup> much to the consternation of its German ally.



The [Japanese submarine I-400](#). The *Sen Toku I-400* class were the largest non-nuclear submarines ever constructed. Japanese submarines were not used to their full potential during the Pacific War.

The US Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the [Philippines](#), during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while *en route* to patrol areas, inhibiting effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard issue [Mark 14 torpedo](#) and its Mark VI exploder were both defective, problems not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed [US Customs](#) officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "[maru code](#)" in the USN), not knowing the [Office of Naval Intelligence](#) (ONI) had broken it.<sup>[66]</sup> The Japanese government promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again until 1943.

Thus, it was not until 1944 the US Navy began to use its 150 submarines to maximum effect: effective shipboard radar was installed, commanders lacking in aggression were replaced, and faults in torpedoes were fixed. Japanese commerce protection was "shiftless beyond description,"<sup>[67]</sup> and convoys were poorly organised and defended compared to Allied ones, a product of flawed IJN doctrine and training — errors concealed by American faults as much as Japanese overconfidence. The number of U.S. submarine patrols (and sinkings) rose steeply: 350 patrols (180 ships sunk) in 1942, 350 (335) in 1943, and 520 (603) in 1944.<sup>[68]</sup> By 1945, sinkings had decreased because so few targets dared to move on the high seas. In all, Allied submarines destroyed 1,200 merchant ships for about five million tons of shipping. Most were small cargo carriers, but 124 were tankers bringing desperately needed oil from the East Indies. Another 320 were passenger ships and troop transports. At critical stages of the Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Leyte campaigns, thousands of Japanese troops were killed or diverted before they arrived where they were needed. Over 200 warships were sunk, ranging from many auxiliaries and destroyers to one battleship and no fewer than eight carriers. Underwater warfare was especially dangerous; of the 16,000 Americans who went out on patrol, 3,500 (22%) never returned, the highest casualty rate of any American force in World War II.<sup>[69]</sup> The Japanese losses, 130 submarines in all,<sup>[70]</sup> were even higher.

A single German submarine, [U-862](#), operated in the Pacific Ocean during the war, patrolling off the Australian east coast and New Zealand in December 1944 and January 1945. It sank one ship in the Pacific before it was recalled to [Batavia](#).<sup>[71]</sup>

Japanese Naval and Merchant Marine losses 1941-1945 can be found here at.<sup>[72]</sup> US Submarine claims of sunk/damaged ships 1941-1945 can be found at.<sup>[73]</sup> The Joint Army Navy Assessment Committee has assessed US Submarine credits.<sup>[74]</sup>

## [\[edit\]](#) Japanese counteroffensives in China, 1944

*Main article:* [Operation Ichi-Go](#)

In mid-1944, Japan launched a massive invasion across China, under the code name [Operation Ichi-Go](#). These attacks, the biggest in several years, gained much ground for Japan before they were stopped in [Guangxi](#).

 This section requires [expansion](#).

## [\[edit\]](#) Japanese offensive in India 1944

*Main article:* [Burma Campaign 1944](#)



Chinese forces on [M3 Stuart](#) tanks on the Ledo Road

After the Allied setbacks in 1943, the South East Asia command was preparing to launch offensives into Burma on several fronts. In the first months of 1944, the Chinese and American troops of the [Northern Combat Area Command](#), commanded by the American Joseph Stilwell, began extending the [Ledo Road](#) from India into northern Burma, while the [XV Corps](#) began an advance along the coast in the [Arakan](#) province. In February, the Japanese mounted a local counter-attack in the Arakan. After early success, this counter-attack was defeated when the

[Indian](#) divisions of XV Corps stood firm, and relied on aircraft to drop supplies to isolated forward units until they could be relieved by reserve divisions.

The Japanese response to the Allied attacks was to launch an offensive of their own into India, across the mountainous and densely-forested frontier. This attack, codenamed [Operation U-Go](#), was advocated by Lieutenant General [Renya Mutaguchi](#), the recently promoted commander of the [Japanese Fifteenth Army](#), and was permitted to proceed by [Imperial General Headquarters](#), despite misgivings at several intervening headquarters. The offensive was launched in mid-March. Although several units of the British Fourteenth Army were forced to fight their way out of encirclement, by early April they had concentrated around [Imphal](#) in [Manipur](#) state. A Japanese division which had advanced to [Kohima](#) in [Nagaland](#) cut the main road to Imphal, but failed to capture the whole of the defences at Kohima. During April, the Japanese attacks against Imphal failed, while fresh Allied formations drove the Japanese from the positions they had captured at Kohima.

As many Japanese had feared, their supply arrangements were inadequate to maintain their forces. Once Mutaguchi's hopes for an early victory were thwarted, his troops, particularly those at Kohima, starved. During May, while Mutaguchi continued to order attacks, the Allies were advancing southwards from Kohima and northwards from Imphal. The two Allied attacks met on 22 June, breaking the Japanese siege of Imphal. The Japanese finally broke off the operation on 3 July. They had lost over 50,000 troops, mainly to starvation and disease. It was the worst defeat suffered by the Japanese Army to that date.

Although the advance in the Arakan had been halted to release troops and aircraft for the [Battle of Imphal](#), the Americans and Chinese had continued to advance in northern Burma, aided by the Chindits operating against the Japanese lines of communication. By the time campaigning ceased during the [monsoon](#) rains, the Americans had secured a vital airfield at [Myitkyina](#), which eased the problems of the air resupply to China over [The Hump](#).

## [\[edit\]](#) **Beginning of the end in the Pacific, 1944**

### [\[edit\]](#) **Saipan and Philippine Sea**

*Main articles: [Battle of Saipan](#) and [Battle of the Philippine Sea](#)*

On 15 June 1944, 535 ships began landing 128,000 U.S. Army and Marine personnel on the island of [Saipan](#). The Allied objective was the creation of airfields within [B-29](#) range of Tokyo. The ability to plan and execute such a complex operation in the space of 90 days was indicative of Allied logistical superiority.



The Japanese aircraft carrier *Zuikaku* and two destroyers under attack in the Battle of Philippine Sea.

It was imperative for Japanese commanders to hold Saipan. The only way to do this was to destroy the [U.S. Fifth Fleet](#), which had 15 fleet carriers and 956 planes, 7 battleships, 28 submarines, and 69 destroyers, as well as several light and heavy cruisers. Vice Admiral [Jisaburo Ozawa](#) attacked with nine-tenths of Japan's fighting fleet, which included nine carriers with 473 planes, 5 battleships, several cruisers, and 28 destroyers. Ozawa's pilots were outnumbered 2:1 and their aircraft were becoming or were already obsolete. The Japanese had considerable [antiaircraft defenses](#) but lacked [proximity fuzes](#) or good [radar](#). With the odds against him, Ozawa devised an appropriate strategy. His planes had greater range because they were not weighed down with protective armor; they could attack at about 480 km (300 mi)<sup>[citation needed]</sup>, and could search a radius of 900 km<sup>[citation needed]</sup> (560 mi). U.S. Navy [Hellcat](#) fighters could only attack within 200 miles (320 km) and only search within a 325-mile (523 km)<sup>[citation needed]</sup> radius. Ozawa planned to use this advantage by positioning his fleet 300 miles (480 km)<sup>[citation needed]</sup> out. The Japanese planes would hit the U.S. carriers, land at Guam to refuel, then hit the enemy again when returning to their carriers. Ozawa also counted on about 500 land-based planes at Guam and other islands.

Admiral [Raymond A. Spruance](#) was in overall command of Fifth Fleet. The Japanese plan would have failed if the much larger U.S. fleet had closed on Ozawa and attacked aggressively; Ozawa correctly inferred Spruance would not attack. U.S. Admiral [Marc Mitscher](#), in tactical command of Task Force 58, with its 15 carriers, was aggressive but Spruance vetoed Mitscher's plan to hunt down Ozawa because Spruance's orders made protecting the landings on Saipan his first priority.



A soldier of the U.S. 27th Infantry division retrieves a living baby from a cave full of corpses. June 1944, [Saipan](#). Nearly all of the 30,000 Japanese defenders were killed; thousands of Japanese civilians also died, many committing suicide.

The forces converged in the largest sea battle of World War II up to that point. Over the previous month American destroyers had destroyed 17 of 25 submarines out of Ozawa's screening force.<sup>[75][76]</sup> Repeated U.S. raids destroyed the Japanese land-based planes. Ozawa's main attack lacked coordination, with the Japanese planes arriving at their targets in a staggered sequence.


Following a directive from Nimitz, the U.S. carriers all had combat information centers, which interpreted the flow of radar data and radioed interception orders to the Hellcats. The result was later dubbed the *Great Marianas Turkey Shoot*. The few attackers to reach the U.S. fleet encountered massive AA fire with proximity fuzes. Only one American warship was slightly damaged.

On the second day, U.S. reconnaissance planes located Ozawa's fleet, 275 miles (443 km)<sup>[[citation needed](#)]</sup> away, and submarines sank two Japanese carriers. Mitscher launched 230 torpedo planes and dive bombers. He then discovered the enemy was actually another 60 miles (97 km)<sup>[[citation needed](#)]</sup> further off, out of aircraft range (based on a roundtrip flight). Mitscher decided this chance to destroy the Japanese fleet was worth the risk of aircraft losses due to running out of fuel on the return flight. Overall, the U.S. lost 130 planes and 76 aircrew; however, Japan lost 450 planes, three carriers, and 445 aircrew. The Imperial Japanese Navy's carrier force was effectively destroyed.

### [\[edit\]](#) Leyte Gulf 1944

Main article: [Battle of Leyte Gulf](#)

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was arguably the [largest naval battle in history](#). It was a series of four distinct engagements fought off the Philippine island of [Leyte](#) from 23 to 26 October 1944. Leyte Gulf featured the largest [battleships](#) ever built, was the last time in history that battleships engaged each other, and was also notable as the first time that [kamikaze](#) aircraft were used. Allied victory in the Philippine Sea established Allied air and sea superiority in the western Pacific. Nimitz favored blockading the Philippines and landing on Formosa. This would give the Allies control of the sea routes to Japan from southern Asia, cutting off substantial Japanese garrisons. MacArthur favoured an invasion of the Philippines, which also lay across the supply lines to Japan. Roosevelt adjudicated in favor of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Japanese Combined Fleet Chief [Toyoda Soemu](#) prepared four plans to cover all Allied offensive scenarios. On 12 October Nimitz launched a carrier raid against Formosa to make sure that planes based there could not intervene in the landings on Leyte. Soemu put Plan *Sho-2* into effect, launching a series of air attacks against the U.S. carriers. However the Japanese lost 600 planes in three days, leaving them without air cover.



The four engagements in the battle of Leyte Gulf.

*Sho-1* called for [V. Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa](#)'s force to use an apparently vulnerable carrier force to lure the [U.S. 3rd Fleet](#) away from Leyte and remove air cover from the Allied landing forces, which would then be attacked from the west by three Japanese forces: V. Adm. [Takeo Kurita](#)'s force would enter [Leyte Gulf](#) and attack the landing forces; [R. Adm. Shoji Nishimura](#)'s force and V. Adm. [Kiyohide Shima](#)'s force would act as mobile strike forces. The plan was likely to result in the destruction of one or more of the Japanese forces, but Toyoda justified it by saying that there would be no sense in saving the fleet and losing the Philippines.

Kurita's "Center Force" consisted of five battleships, 12 cruisers and 13 destroyers. It included the two largest battleships ever built: [Yamato](#) and [Musashi](#). As they passed [Palawan](#) Island after midnight on 23 October the force was spotted, and U.S. submarines sank two cruisers. On 24 October, as Kurita's force entered the [Sibuyan Sea](#), [USS Intrepid](#) and [USS Cabot](#) launched 260 planes, which scored hits on several ships. A second wave of planes scored many direct hits on [Musashi](#). A third wave, from [USS Enterprise](#) and [USS Franklin](#) hit [Musashi](#) with 11 bombs and eight torpedoes. Kurita retreated but in the evening turned around to head for San Bernardino Strait. [Musashi](#) sank at about 19:30.

Meanwhile, V. Adm. [Onishi Takijiro](#) had directed his [First Air Fleet](#), 80 land-based planes, against U.S. carriers, whose planes were attacking airfields on Luzon. The carrier [USS Princeton](#) was hit by an armour-piercing bomb and suffered a major explosion which killed 108 crew (out of 1,569) and 80 on a cruiser which was fire-fighting alongside. [Princeton](#) sank, and the cruiser was forced to retire.

Nishimura's force consisted of two battleships, one cruiser and four destroyers. Because they were observing radio silence, Nishimura was unable to synchronise with Shima and Kurita. Nishimura and Shima had failed to even coordinate their plans before the attacks — they were

long-time rivals and neither wished to have anything to do with the other. When he entered the narrow [Surigao Strait](#) at about 02:00, Shima was 22 miles (40 km) behind him, and Kurita was still in the Sibuyan Sea, several hours from the beaches at Leyte. As they passed [Panaon Island](#), Nishimura's force ran into a trap set for them by the U.S.-Australian [7th Fleet](#) Support Force. R. Adm. [Jesse Oldendorf](#) had six battleships, four [heavy cruisers](#), four [light cruisers](#), 29 destroyers and 39 [PT boats](#). To pass the strait and reach the landings, Nishimura had to run the gauntlet. At about 03:00 the Japanese battleship [Fuso](#) and three destroyers were hit by torpedoes and *Fuso* broke in two. At 03:50 the U.S. battleships opened fire. Radar fire control meant they could hit targets from a much greater distance than the Japanese. The battleship [Yamashiro](#), a cruiser and a destroyer were crippled by 16-inch (406 mm) shells; *Yamashiro* sank at 04:19. Only one of Nishimura's force of seven ships survived the engagement. At 04:25 Shima's force of two cruisers and eight destroyers reached the battle. Seeing *Fuso* and believing her to be the wrecks of two battleships, Shima ordered a retreat.

Ozawa's "Northern Force" had four aircraft carriers, two obsolete battleships partly converted to carriers, three cruisers and nine destroyers. The carriers had only 108 planes. The force was not spotted by the Allies until 16:40 on 24 October. At 20:00 Soemu ordered all remaining Japanese forces to attack. Halsey saw an opportunity to destroy the remnants of the Japanese carrier force. The U.S. Third Fleet was formidable — nine large carriers, eight light carriers, six battleships, 17 cruisers, 63 destroyers and 1,000 planes — and completely outgunned Ozawa's force. Halsey's ships set out in pursuit of Ozawa just after midnight. U.S. commanders ignored reports that Kurita had turned back towards San Bernardino Strait. They had taken the bait set by Ozawa. On the morning of 25 October Ozawa launched 75 planes. Most were shot down by U.S. fighter patrols. By 08:00 U.S. fighters had destroyed the screen of Japanese fighters and were hitting ships. By evening, they had sunk the carriers [Zuikaku](#), [Zuiho](#), and [Chiyoda](#), and a destroyer. The fourth carrier, [Chitose](#) and a cruiser were disabled and later sank.



The Japanese aircraft carriers [Zuikaku](#), left, and (probably) [Zuiho](#) come under attack by dive bombers early in the battle off Cape Engaño.

Kurita passed through [San Bernardino Strait](#) at 03:00 on 25 October and headed along the coast of [Samar](#). The only thing standing in his path were three groups (Taffy 1, 2 and 3) of the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Admiral [Thomas Kinkaid](#). Each group had six [escort carriers](#), with a total of more than 500 planes, and seven or eight destroyers or [destroyer escorts](#) (DE). Kinkaid still believed that Lee's force was guarding the north, so the Japanese had the element of surprise

when they attacked Taffy 3 at 06:45. Kurita mistook the Taffy carriers for large fleet carriers and thought he had the whole Third Fleet in his sights. Since escort carriers stood little chance against a battleship, Adm. [Clifton Sprague](#) directed the carriers of Taffy 3 to turn and flee eastward, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire, and used his destroyers to divert the Japanese battleships. The destroyers made harassing torpedo attacks against the Japanese. For ten minutes *Yamato* was caught up in evasive action. Two U.S. destroyers and a DE were sunk, but they had bought enough time for the Taffy groups to launch planes. Taffy 3 turned and fled south, with shells scoring hits on some of its carriers and sinking one of them. The superior speed of the Japanese force allowed it to draw closer and fire on the other two Taffy groups. However, at 09:20 Kurita suddenly turned and retreated north. Signals had disabused him of the notion that he was attacking the Third Fleet, and the longer Kurita continued to engage, the greater the risk of major air strikes. Destroyer attacks had broken the Japanese formations, shattering tactical control, and two of Kurita's heavy cruisers had been sunk. The Japanese retreated through the San Bernardino Strait, under continuous air attack. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was over.<sup>[77]</sup>

The battle secured the beachheads of the [U.S. Sixth Army](#) on Leyte against attack from the sea, broke the back of Japanese naval power and opened the way for an advance to the [Ryukyu Islands](#) in 1945. The only significant Japanese naval operation afterwards was the disastrous [Operation Ten-Go](#), in April 1945. Kurita's force had begun the battle with five battleships; when he returned to Japan, only *Yamato* was combat-worthy. Nishimura's sunken *Yamashiro* was the last battleship in history to engage another in combat.

#### [\[edit\]](#) [Philippines, 1944–45](#)



[General Douglas MacArthur](#) wading ashore at Leyte

Main article: [Philippines Campaign \(1944–45\)](#)

On 20 October 1944 the [U.S. Sixth Army](#), supported by naval and air bombardment, landed on the favorable eastern shore of [Leyte](#), north of [Mindanao](#). The U.S. Sixth Army continued its advance from the east, as the Japanese rushed reinforcements to the [Ormoc Bay](#) area on the western side of the island. While the Sixth Army was reinforced successfully, the [U.S. Fifth Air Force](#) was able to devastate the Japanese attempts to resupply. In torrential rains and over difficult terrain, the advance continued across Leyte and the neighboring island of Samar to the north. On 7 December U.S. Army units landed at Ormoc Bay and, after a major land and air

battle, cut off the Japanese ability to reinforce and supply Leyte. Although fierce fighting continued on Leyte for months, the U.S. Army was in control.

On 15 December 1944 landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of [Mindoro](#), a key location in the planned [Lingayen Gulf](#) operations, in support of major landings scheduled on [Luzon](#). On 9 January 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, [General Krueger](#)'s Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile (32 km) beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking [Clark Field](#), 40 miles (64 km) northwest of [Manila](#), in the last week of January.



U.S. troops approaching Japanese positions near Baguio, Luzon, 23 March 1945

Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the [Bataan Peninsula](#), and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on 3 February 1945, elements of the [1st Cavalry Division](#) pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.

As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On 16 February paratroopers and amphibious units assaulted the island fortress of [Corregidor](#), and resistance ended there on 27 February.

In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France. Of the 250,000 Japanese troops defending Luzon, 80 percent died.<sup>[78]</sup>

[Palawan Island](#), between [Borneo](#) and Mindoro, the fifth largest and western-most Philippine Island, was invaded on 28 February with landings of the [Eighth Army](#) at [Puerto Princesa](#). The Japanese put up little direct defence of Palawan, but cleaning up pockets of Japanese resistance lasted until late April, as the Japanese used their common tactic of withdrawing into the mountain jungles, dispersed as small units. Throughout the Philippines, U.S. forces were aided by Filipino guerrillas to find and dispatch the holdouts.

The U.S. Eighth Army then moved on to its first landing on Mindanao (17 April), the last of the major Philippine Islands to be taken. Mindanao was followed by invasion and occupation of [Panay](#), [Cebu](#), [Negros](#) and several islands in the [Sulu Archipelago](#). These islands provided bases for the U.S. Fifth and [Thirteenth Air Forces](#) to attack targets throughout the Philippines and the [South China Sea](#).

## [\[edit\]](#) Final stages

See also: [End of World War II in the Pacific](#)



## [\[edit\]](#) Iwo Jima, February 1945

Main article: [Battle of Iwo Jima](#)

The battle of Iwo Jima ("Operation Detachment") in February 1945, was a victory by 70,000 American Marines over 22,000 Japanese defenders.<sup>[79]</sup> Iwo Jima was a small island (only 8 square miles) but was on the route of the B-29s from Saipan to Japan and could provide emergency airfields. The strategy of Lt. General Tadamichi Kuribayashi was not to win, but to make the Americans suffer far more than they could endure. He took advantage of the volcanic island's thousand caves and an ample supply of concrete, to build a vast underground defensive network interconnected by deep tunnels. His hidden artillery, mortars and machine guns survived the bombardment and stunned wave after wave of oncoming Marines. Each pillbox in a mutually-supportive grouping had to be destroyed by frontal assault. The Japanese fought to the last man, killing 6,000 Marines and wounding 20,000 more. Historians debate whether it was strategically worth all those casualties.<sup>[80]</sup>

On February 23 the 28th Marines planted the flag on Mount Suribachi; watching in awe, Navy Secretary James Forrestal exclaimed that this dramatic moment guaranteed "there will be a Marine Corps for the next 500 years!" The photograph<sup>[81]</sup> raising the flag is often cited as the most reproduced photograph of all time and become the archetypal representation not only of that battle, but of the entire Pacific war. It helped make the battle iconic in America as the epitome of heroism in desperate hand-to-hand combat.<sup>[82]</sup>

[\[edit\]](#) **Allied offensives in Burma, 1944–45**

Main article: [Burma Campaign 1944-1945](#)



British [Royal Marines](#) land at Ramree

In late 1944 and early 1945, the Allied South East Asia Command launched offensives into Burma, intending to recover most of the country, including [Rangoon](#), the capital, before the onset of the monsoon in May.

The Indian XV Corps advanced along the coast in Arakan province, at last capturing [Akyab Island](#) after failures in the two previous years. They then landed troops behind the retreating Japanese, inflicting heavy casualties, and captured [Ramree Island](#) and [Cheduba Island](#) off the coast, establishing airfields on them which were used to support the offensive into Central Burma.

The Northern Combat Area Command resumed its advance in northern Burma, and in late January 1945, they linked up with Chinese armies attacking westwards from [Yunnan](#) province. The Ledo Road was completed, linking India and China, but too late in the war to have any significant effect.

The [Japanese Burma Area Army](#) attempted to forestall the main Allied attack on the central part of the front by withdrawing their troops behind the [Irrawaddy River](#). Lieutenant General [Heitarō Kimura](#), the new Japanese commander in Burma, hoped that the Allies' lines of communications would be overstretched trying to cross this obstacle. However, the advancing British Fourteenth Army under Lieutenant General [William Slim](#) switched its axis of advance to outflank the main Japanese armies.



[Gurkha](#) troops of Fourteenth Army crossing the Irrawaddy on 27 January 1945.

During February, Fourteenth Army secured bridgeheads across the Irrawaddy on a broad front. On 1 March, units of [IV Corps](#) captured the supply centre of [Meiktila](#), throwing the Japanese into disarray. While the Japanese attempted to recapture Meiktila, [XXXIII Corps](#) captured [Mandalay](#). The Japanese armies were heavily defeated, and with the capture of Mandalay, the Burmese population and the [Burma National Army](#) which the Japanese had raised, turned against the Japanese.

During April, Fourteenth Army advanced 300 miles (480 km) south towards Rangoon, the capital and principal port of Burma, but was delayed by Japanese rearguards 40 miles (64 km) north of Rangoon at the end of the month. Slim feared that the Japanese would defend Rangoon house-to-house during the monsoon, placing his army in a disastrous supply situation, and in March he had asked that a plan to capture Rangoon by an amphibious force, [Operation Dracula](#), which had been abandoned earlier, be reinstated.<sup>[83]</sup> *Dracula* was launched on 1 May, but Rangoon was found to have been abandoned. The troops which occupied Rangoon linked up with Fourteenth Army five days later, securing the Allies' lines of communication.

The Japanese forces which had been bypassed by the Allied advances attempted to break out across the [Sittang River](#) during June and July to rejoin the Burma Area Army which had regrouped in [Tenasserim](#) in southern Burma. They suffered 10,000 casualties, half their strength. Overall, the Japanese lost some 150,000 men in Burma. Only 1,700 prisoners were taken.<sup>[84]</sup> The Allies were preparing to make amphibious landings in Malaya when word of the Japanese surrender arrived.

### [\[edit\]](#) Liberation of Borneo



US LVTs land Australian soldiers at Balikpapan on 7 July 1945

Main article: [Borneo Campaign \(1945\)](#)

The Borneo Campaign of 1945 was the last major campaign in the [South West Pacific Area](#). In a series of amphibious assaults between 1 May and 21 July, the [Australian I Corps](#), under General [Leslie Morshead](#), attacked [Japanese](#) forces occupying the island. Allied naval and air forces, centred on the [U.S. 7th Fleet](#) under Admiral [Thomas Kinkaid](#), the [Australian First Tactical Air Force](#) and the U.S. [Thirteenth Air Force](#) also played important roles in the campaign.

The campaign opened with a landing on the small island of [Tarakan](#) on 1 May. This was followed on 1 June by simultaneous assaults in the north west, on the island of [Labuan](#) and the coast of [Brunei](#). A week later the Australians attacked Japanese positions in [North Borneo](#). The attention of the Allies then switched back to the central east coast, with the last major amphibious assault of World War II, at [Balikpapan](#) on 1 July.

Although the campaign was criticised in Australia at the time, and in subsequent years, as pointless or a "waste" of the lives of soldiers, it did achieve a number of objectives, such as increasing the isolation of significant Japanese forces occupying the main part of the [Dutch East Indies](#), capturing major [oil](#) supplies and freeing Allied prisoners of war, who were being held in deteriorating conditions.<sup>[85]</sup> At one of the very worst sites, around [Sandakan](#) in Borneo, only six of some 2,500 British and Australian prisoners survived.<sup>[84]</sup>

### [\[edit\]](#) Okinawa



[USS Bunker Hill](#) burns after being hit by two [kamikazes](#). At Okinawa the kamikazes caused 4900 American deaths.

*Main article:* [Battle of Okinawa](#)

The largest and bloodiest American battle came at Okinawa, as the U.S. sought airbases for 3000 B-29 bombers and 240 squadrons of B-17 bombers for the intense bombardment Japan's home islands in preparation for a full-scale invasion in late 1945. The Japanese, with 115,000 troops augmented by thousands of civilians on the heavily populated island, did not resist on the beaches--their strategy was to maximize the number of soldier and Marine casualties, and naval losses from Kamikaze attacks. After an intense bombardment the Americans landed on April 1, 1945, and declared victory on June 21.<sup>[86]</sup> The supporting naval forces were the targets for 4,000 sorties, many by Kamikaze suicide planes. U.S. losses totaled 38 ships of all types sunk and 368 damaged with 4,900 sailors killed. The Americans suffered 75,000 casualties on the ground; 94% of the Japanese soldiers died along with many civilians.<sup>[87]</sup>

### [\[edit\]](#) Landings in the Japanese home islands

*Main article:* [Japan campaign](#)

Hard-fought battles on the [Japanese home islands](#) of [Iwo Jima](#), [Okinawa](#), and others resulted in horrific casualties on both sides but finally produced a Japanese defeat. Of the 117,000 Japanese troops defending Okinawa, 94 percent died.<sup>[78]</sup> Faced with the loss of most of their experienced

pilots, the Japanese increased their use of kamikaze tactics in an attempt to create unacceptably high casualties for the Allies. The U.S. Navy proposed to force a Japanese surrender through a total naval blockade and air raids.<sup>[88]</sup>

Towards the end of the war as the role of strategic bombing became more important, a new command for the [U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific](#) was created to oversee all U.S. strategic bombing in the hemisphere, under [United States Army Air Forces](#) General [Curtis LeMay](#). Japanese industrial production plunged as nearly half of the built-up areas of 64 cities were destroyed by [B-29 firebombing](#) raids. On 9–10 March 1945 alone, about 100,000 people were killed in a [fire storm](#) caused by an [attack on Tokyo](#). In addition, LeMay also oversaw [Operation Starvation](#), in which the inland waterways of Japan were extensively mined by air, which disrupted the small amount of remaining Japanese coastal sea traffic.

### [\[edit\]](#) Soviet invasion and the Atomic bomb

*Main articles:* [Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki](#), [Soviet–Japanese War \(1945\)](#), and [Soviet invasion of Manchuria \(1945\)](#)



The mushroom cloud from the [nuclear explosion over Nagasaki](#) rising 60,000 feet (18 km) into the air on the morning of 9 August 1945.

On 3 February 1945 the Soviet Union agreed with Roosevelt to enter the Pacific conflict. It promised to act 90 days after the war ended in Europe and did so exactly on schedule on 9 August by [invading Manchuria](#). A battle-hardened, one million-strong Soviet force, transferred from Europe<sup>[*citation needed*]</sup>, attacked Japanese forces in [Manchuria](#) and quickly defeated the Japanese [Kantōgun](#) (Kwantung Army group).<sup>[89]</sup>

On 6 August 1945, the B-29 [Enola Gay](#) dropped an [atomic bomb](#) on the Japanese city of [Hiroshima](#), in the first [nuclear attack](#) in history. On 9 August another was dropped on [Nagasaki](#). This was the last nuclear attack. More than 240,000 people died as a direct result of these two bombings.<sup>[90]</sup> The necessity of the atomic bombings has long been debated, with detractors claiming that a naval [blockade](#) and [bombing campaign](#) had already made invasion, hence the atomic bomb, unnecessary.<sup>[91]</sup> However, other scholars have argued that the bombings did obviate invasion, including a [planned Soviet invasion](#) of [Hokkaidō](#), or a prolonged blockade and

bombing campaign, any of which may have exacted even higher casualties among Japanese civilians.<sup>[90]</sup>

### [\[edit\]](#) Surrender



[Douglas MacArthur](#) signs the formal [surrender of Japanese forces](#) on the [USS Missouri](#), 2 September 1945.

The effects of the "Twin Shocks"—the [Soviet entry](#) and the [atomic bombing](#)—were profound. On 10 August the "sacred decision" was made by Japanese Cabinet to accept the [Potsdam terms](#) on one condition: the "prerogative of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler". At noon on 15 August, after the American government's intentionally ambiguous reply, stating that the "authority" of the emperor "shall be subject to" the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers", the Emperor broadcast to the nation and to the world at large the rescript of surrender,<sup>[92]</sup> ending the Second World War.

"Should We continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization." - Emperor Hirohito.<sup>[citation needed]</sup>

In Japan, 14 August is considered to be the day that the Pacific War ended. However, as Imperial Japan actually surrendered on 15 August, this day became known in the English-speaking countries as "[V-J Day](#)" (Victory in Japan).<sup>[93]</sup> The formal [Instrument of Surrender](#) was signed on 2 September 1945, on the battleship [USS Missouri](#), in [Tokyo Bay](#). The surrender was accepted by General Douglas MacArthur as "[Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers](#)", with representatives of several Allied nations, from a Japanese delegation led by [Mamoru Shigemitsu](#) and [Yoshijiro Umezu](#).

Following this period, MacArthur went to Tokyo to oversee the postwar development of the country. This period in Japanese history is known as [the occupation](#).

### [\[edit\]](#) War crimes

*Main articles:* [Japanese war crimes](#), [Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal](#), and [Allied war crimes during World War II](#)

[Japanese](#) soldiers killed millions of civilians and prisoners of war from surrounding nations.<sup>[94]</sup> At least 20 million Chinese died during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).<sup>[95][96]</sup>



Australian POW moments before his execution

[Unit 731](#) was one example of wartime atrocities committed on a civilian population during World War II, where experiments were performed on thousands of [Chinese](#) civilians and [Allied](#) prisoners of war. In military campaigns, the Japanese army used [biological weapons](#) on Chinese, killing around 400,000 Chinese civilians.<sup>[97]</sup> [The Rape of Nanking](#) is another example of atrocity committed by Japanese soldiers on a civilian population.<sup>[98]</sup>

According to the findings of the [Tokyo tribunal](#), the death rate of Western prisoners was 27.1%, seven times that of POWs under the Germans and Italians.<sup>[84]</sup> The most notorious use of forced labour was in the construction of the Burma–Thailand [Death Railway](#). A widely publicised example of institutionalised sexual slavery are "[comfort women](#)", a euphemism for the 200,000 women who served in the Japanese army's camps during World War II. Some 35 Dutch comfort women brought a successful case before the Batavia Military Tribunal in 1948.<sup>[99]</sup> To this day, Japan still denies these war crimes as Prime Minister [Shinzō Abe](#) claimed "The fact is, there is no evidence to prove there was coercion."<sup>[100]</sup>

The [Three Alls Policy](#) (*Sankō Sakusen*) was a Japanese [scorched earth](#) policy adopted in China, the three alls being: "*Kill All, Burn All and Loot All*". Initiated in 1940 by [Ryūkichi Tanaka](#), the *Sankō Sakusen* was implemented in full scale in 1942 in north China by [Yasuji Okamura](#).

According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, the scorched earth campaign was responsible for the deaths of "more than 2.7 million" Chinese civilians.<sup>[101]</sup>

## [\[edit\]](#) Pacific War campaigns

(Flags indicate the country, or countries, taking the offensive.)

## [\[edit\]](#) Second Sino-Japanese war

Before 1941 and inclusion in the Pacific War :

- 1937-07-07 – 1937-07-09 [Marco Polo Bridge Incident](#)
- 1937-08-13 – 1937-11-26 [Battle of Shanghai](#)
- 1937-09-01 – 1937-11-09 [Battle of Taiyuan](#)
- 1937-12-09 – 1938-01-31 [Battle of Nanjing](#)

- 1938-03-24 – 1938-05-01 [Battle of Xuzhou](#)
- 1938-06-11 – 1938-10-27 [Battle of Wuhan](#)
- 1939-03-17 – 1939-05-09 [Battle of Nanchang](#)
-  1939-04-20 - 1939-05-24 [Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang](#)
-  1939-09-13 - 1939-10-08 [Battle of Changsha \(1939\)](#)
-  1939-11-15 - 1940-11-30 [Battle of South Guangxi](#)
-  1940-05-01 - 1940-06-18 [Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang](#)
-  1941-01-30 - 1941-03-01 [Battle of South Henan](#)
-  1941-03-14 - 1941-04-09 [Battle of Shanggao](#)
- 1941-05-07 – 1941-05-27 [Battle of South Shanxi](#)
-  1941-09-06 - 1941-10-08 [Battle of Changsha \(1941\)](#)

After inclusion in the Pacific War :

-  1941-02-24 - 1942-01-15 [Battle of Changsha \(1942\)](#)
-  1942-05-14 - 1942-09-07 [Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign](#)
-  1943-05-12 - 1943-06-03 [Battle of West Hubei](#)
-  1943-11-02 - 1943-12-20 [Battle of Changde](#)
- 1944-04-17 - 1944-12-10 [Operation Ichi-Go](#)
-   1945-04-09 - 1945-06-07 [Battle of West Hunan](#)

### [Franco-Thai War](#)

- October 1940 – 9 May 1941

### [Soviet-Japanese Border Wars](#)

- 1938-07-29 – 1938-08-11 [Battle of Lake Khasan](#)
- 1939-05-11 – 1939-09-16 [Battle of Khalkhin Gol](#)

### [\[edit\]](#) Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia and Pacific

- 1940-09-22 [Invasion of French Indochina](#)
- 1941-12-07 (12-08 [Asian Time](#)) [Attack on Pearl Harbor](#)
- 1941-12-08 [Japanese Invasion of Thailand](#)
- 1941-12-08 [Battle of Guam \(1941\)](#)
- 1941-12-07 Japan declares war on the United States and the United Kingdom; 1941-12-08 The United States and the United Kingdom declare war on Japan
- 1941-12-08 – 1941-12-25 [Battle of Hong Kong](#)
-  1941-12-08 – 1942-01-31 [Malayan Campaign](#)
- 1941-12-10 [Sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse](#)
- 1941-12-11 – 1941-12-24 [Battle of Wake Island](#)
- 1941-12-16 – 1942-04-01 [Battle of Borneo \(1941–42\)](#)
- 1941-12-22 – 1942-05-06 [Battle of the Philippines](#)
- 1942-01-01 – 1945-10-25 Transport of POWs via [hell ships](#)
- 1942-01-11 – 1942-01-12 [Battle of Tarakan](#)<sup>[102]</sup>

- ● 1942-01-23 [Battle of Rabaul \(1942\)](#)
- ● 1942-01-24 [Battle of Balikpapan \(1942\)](#)<sup>[103]</sup>
- 1942-01-25 [Thailand](#) declares war on the Allies
- ● 1942-01-30 – 1942-02-03 [Battle of Ambon](#)<sup>[104]</sup>
- ● 1942-01-30 – 1942-02-15 [Battle of Singapore](#)
- ● 1942-02-04 [Battle of Makassar Strait](#)
- ● 1942-02-14 – 1942-02-15 [Battle of Palembang](#)<sup>[105]</sup>
- ● 1942-02-19 [Air raids on Darwin](#), Australia
- ● 1942-02-19 – 1942-02-20 [Battle of Badung Strait](#)<sup>[106]</sup>
- ● 1942-02-19 – 1943-02-10 [Battle of Timor \(1942-43\)](#)<sup>[41][107]</sup>
- ● 1942-02-27 – 1942-03-01 [Battle of the Java Sea](#)<sup>[42]</sup>
- ● 1942-03-01 [Battle of Sunda Strait](#)<sup>[108]</sup>
- ● 1942-03-01 – 1942-03-09 [Battle of Java](#)<sup>[43]</sup>
- ● 1942-03-31 [Battle of Christmas Island](#)<sup>[109]</sup>
- ● 1942-03-31 – 1942-04-10 [Indian Ocean raid](#)
- 1942-04-09 [Bataan Death March](#) begins
-  1942-04-18 [Doolittle Raid](#)
- ● 1942-05-03 [Japanese invasion of Tulagi](#)
-  1942-05-04 – 1942-05-08 [Battle of the Coral Sea](#)
- ● 1942-05-31 – 1942-06-08 [Attacks on Sydney Harbour area](#), Australia
-  1942-06-04 – 1942-06-06 [Battle of Midway](#)

[\[edit\]](#) **Allied offensives**

[See Atlas of Battle Fronts from July 1943 to August 1945 at Half-Month intervals](#)



1943-07-01




1943-12-01




1944-05-01



1944-11-01



1945-03-01



1945-08-01

**[South East Asian campaigns:](#)** 1941-12-08 – 1945-08-15

-  [Burma Campaign:](#) 1941-12-16 – 1945-08-15
-  1945-05-15 – 1945-05-16 [Battle of the Malacca Strait](#)

## [New Guinea campaign](#)

- 1942-01-23 – [Battle of Rabaul](#)
- 1942-03-07 – [Operation Mo](#) (Japanese invasion of mainland [New Guinea](#))
-  1942-05-04 – 1942-05-08 [Battle of the Coral Sea](#)
-  1942-07-01 – 1943-01-31 [Kokoda Track Campaign](#)
-  1942-08-25 – 1942-09-05 [Battle of Milne Bay](#)
-  1942-11-19 – 1943-01-23 [Battle of Buna-Gona](#)
-  1943-01-28 – 1943-01-30 [Battle of Wau](#)
-  1943-03-02 – 1943-03-04 [Battle of the Bismarck Sea](#)
-  1943-06-29 – 1943-09-16 [Battle of Lae](#)
-  1943-06-30 – 1944-03-25 [Operation Cartwheel](#)
-  1943-09-19 – 1944-04-24 [Finisterre Range campaign](#)
-  1943-09-22 – 1944-01-15 [Huon Peninsula campaign](#)
-  1943-11-01 – 1943-11-11 [Attack on Rabaul](#)
-  1943-12-15 – 1945-08-15 [New Britain campaign](#)
-  1944-02-29 – 1944-03-25 [Admiralty Islands campaign](#)
-  1944-04-22 – 1945-08-15 [Western New Guinea campaign](#)

## [Madagascar Campaign](#)

-  1942-05-05 – 1942-11-06 [Battle of Madagascar](#)

## [Aleutian Islands Campaign](#)

-  1942-06-06 – 1943-08-15 [Battle of the Aleutian Islands](#)
-  1942-06-07 – 1943-08-15 [Battle of Kiska](#)
-  1943-03-26 – [Battle of the Komandorski Islands](#)

## [Guadalcanal Campaign](#)

-  1942-08-07 – 1943-02-09 [Battle of Guadalcanal](#)
- 1942-08-09 [Battle of Savo Island](#)
-  1942-08-24 – 1942-08-25 [Battle of the Eastern Solomons](#)
-  1942-10-11 – 1942-10-12 [Battle of Cape Esperance](#)
- 1942-10-25 – 1942-10-27 [Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands](#)
-  1942-11-13 – 1942-11-15 [Naval Battle of Guadalcanal](#)
- 1942-11-30 [Battle of Tassafaronga](#)

## [Solomon Islands campaign](#)

- 1943-01-29 – 1943-01-30 [Battle of Rennell Island](#)
-  1943-03-06 [Battle of Blackett Strait](#)
-  1943-06-10 – 1943-08-25 [New Georgia Campaign](#)
- 1943-07-06 [Battle of Kula Gulf](#)
- 1943-07-12 – 1943-07-13 [Battle of Kolombangara](#)

-  1943-08-06 – 1943-08-07 [Battle of Vella Gulf](#)
-  1943-08-17 – 1943-08-18 [Battle off Horaniu](#)
-  1943-08-15 – 1943-10-09 [Land Battle of Vella Lavella](#)
-  1943-10-06 [Naval Battle of Vella Lavella](#)
-  1943-11-01 – 1945-08-21 [Battle of Bougainville](#)
-  1943-11-01 – 1943-11-02 [Battle of Empress Augusta Bay](#)
-  1943-11-26 [Battle of Cape St. George](#)

### [Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign](#)

-  1943-11-20 – 1943-11-23 [Battle of Tarawa](#)
-  1943-11-20 – 1943-11-24 [Battle of Makin](#)
-  1944-01-31 – 1944-02-07 [Battle of Kwajalein](#)
-  1944-02-16 – 1944-02-17 [Attack on Truk](#)
-  1944-02-16 – 1944-02-23 [Battle of Eniwetok](#)

### [Bombing of South East Asia, 1944-45](#)

-  [Operation Cockpit](#) 1944-04-19
-  [Operation Transom](#) 1944-05-17
-  [Bombing of Bangkok](#) 1944-05-20
-  [Operation Matterhorn](#) 1944-06-05 – May 1945
-  [Operation Meridian](#) 1945-01-24 – 1945-01-29

### [Mariana and Palau Islands campaign](#)

-  1944-06-15 – 1944-07-09 [Battle of Saipan](#)
-  1944-06-19 – 1944-06-20 [Battle of the Philippine Sea](#)
-  1944-07-21 – 1944-08-10 [Battle of Guam](#)
-  1944-07-24 – 1944-08-01 [Battle of Tinian](#)
-  1944-09-15 – 1944-11-25 [Battle of Peleliu](#)
-  1944-09-17 – 1944-09-30 [Battle of Angaur](#)

### [Philippines campaign](#)

-  1944-10-20 – 1944-12-10 [Battle of Leyte](#)
-  1944-10-24 – 1944-10-25 [Battle of Leyte Gulf](#)
-  1944-11-11 – 1944-12-21 [Battle of Ormoc Bay](#)
-  1944-12-15 – 1945-07-04 [Battle of Luzon](#)
-  1945-01-09 [Invasion of Lingayen Gulf](#)
-  1945-01-31 – 1945-02-08 [Recapture of Bataan](#)
-  1945-02-03 – 1945-03-03 [Battle of Manila](#)
-  1945-03-18 – 1945-07-30 [Battle of the Visayas](#)
-  1945-03-10 – 1945-08-15 [Battle of Mindanao](#)

### [Volcano and Ryukyu Islands campaign](#)

-  1945-02-16 – 1945-03-26 [Battle of Iwo Jima](#)
-  1945-04-01 – 1945-06-21 [Battle of Okinawa](#)
-  1945-04-07 [Operation Ten-Go](#)

### [Borneo campaign](#)

-  1945-05-01 – 1945-05-25 [Battle of Tarakan](#)
-  1945-06-10 – 1945-06-15 [Battle of Brunei](#)
-  1945-06-10 – 1945-06-22 [Battle of Labuan](#)
-  1945-06-17 – 1945-08-15 [Battle of North Borneo](#)
-  1945-07-07 – 1945-07-21 [Battle of Balikpapan](#)

### [Japan campaign](#)

-  1945-07-22 [Battle of Tokyo Bay](#)
-  1945-08-06 – 1945-08-09 [Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki](#)

### [Soviet invasion of Manchuria](#)

-  1945-08-08 – 1945-09-02 [Soviet invasion of Manchuria](#)

### [\[edit\] Command areas](#)

The command structures of the Pacific War varied, reflecting the different roles of various belligerent nations, and often involving different geographic scopes. These included the following:

- Purely American commands:
  - [Pacific Ocean Theater](#)
  - [South West Pacific Theater](#)
  - [South-East Asian Theater](#)
- Other Allied commands:
  - [American-British-Dutch-Australian Command](#)
  - [Far East Command \(Soviet Union\)](#), the Soviet command during the war against Japan in 1945
- Japanese commands:
  - [Japanese Combined Fleet](#), the Japanese command which oversaw naval operations
  - [Southern Expeditionary Army Group](#), the Japanese army command in the South West Pacific and South East Asia

### [\[edit\] See also](#)



[World War II portal](#)



[War portal](#)



- [Battle between HMAS Sydney and German auxiliary cruiser Kormoran](#)
- [European Theatre of World War II](#)
- [Japanese holdout](#)
- [Operation Downfall](#)
- [Pacific Theater of Operations](#)
- [Pacific War Museum](#)
- [Timeline WW II — Pacific Theater](#)

## [edit] Footnotes

1. <sup>^</sup> Complete list of nations which fought on the Allied side in the Pacific War (including lesser contributors): The [Republic of China](#), The United States, The United Kingdom (including the [Fiji Islands](#), [Hong Kong](#), the [Straits Settlements](#) and [other colonial forces](#)), [Tonga](#) (a British protectorate), Australia (including the [Territory of New Guinea](#)), the [Commonwealth of the Philippines](#) (under the protection of the United States), [British India](#), the [Netherlands](#) (including colonial forces from the [Dutch East Indies](#)), the [Soviet Union](#), [New Zealand](#), [Canada](#), [Mexico](#), and [Mongolia](#). [Vichy French](#) forces briefly resisted the Japanese in Indochina in 1940 and also [fought against Thailand](#) in 1940. As a supporter of the [Axis Powers](#), the Vichy regime allowed the Japanese to use bases in [French Indochina](#) beginning in 1941. [Free French Naval Forces](#) contributed to Allied effort with several [warships](#), such as the [Triomphant](#) or the [Savorgnan-de-Brazza](#). After the [Liberation of France](#), the French battleship [Richelieu](#) was sent to the Pacific. The main allies against the Japanese Empire are listed in this reference.<sup>[1]</sup>  
Guerrilla Organizations which fought for the Allies include [Chinese Red Army](#), [Hukbalahap](#), [Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army](#), Manchurian [Anti-Japanese Volunteer Armies](#), the [Korean Liberation Army](#), and the [Viet Minh](#)
2. <sup>^</sup> Complete list of nations and groups which fought on the Axis side in the Pacific War (including lesser contributors): The [Empire of Japan](#) (including [Taiwan under Japanese rule](#) and [Korea under Japanese rule](#), [Thailand](#), the puppet government of [Manchukuo \(Manchuria\)](#), [Mengjiang](#), [Wang Jingwei regime](#), and other Chinese collaborationist governments and organizations, [Ba Maw Regime](#), the [Provisional Government of Free India](#), the puppet [Second Philippine Republic](#), and other states in the [Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere](#)).
3. <sup>^</sup> 3.8 million Chinese military casualties 1937-45 (3.2 million Nationalist/-allied and 580,000 Communist),<sup>[4]</sup> 354,523 United States casualties (106,207 killed, 248,316 wounded and missing),<sup>[5]</sup> 52,000 British casualties including 12,000 deaths in captivity,<sup>[citation needed]</sup> 86,838 British Indian casualties (this casualty figure is for all theatres of World War Two that Indian troops fought in),<sup>[6][page needed]</sup> 17,501 Australian casualties,<sup>[7][page needed]</sup> 57,000 casualties from the Philippine Commonwealth,<sup>[citation needed]</sup> around 9,400 Dutch casualties including 8,500 who died in captivity (likely not including colonial forces),<sup>[citation needed]</sup> 578 New Zealander casualties,<sup>[8]</sup> 63,225 Soviet casualties (20,797 killed and missing, 42,428 wounded and sick), 5000 French military casualties in Indochina, 300 Mongolian casualties<sup>[9]</sup> and 5 Mexican deaths<sup>[10]</sup> [Malaria](#) was the most important health hazard encountered by U.S. troops in the South Pacific during World War II, where about 500,000 men were infected.<sup>[11]</sup>
4. <sup>^</sup> Over 17 million Chinese civilian deaths 1937-45,<sup>[4]</sup> around 4 million civilian deaths from the Dutch East Indies,<sup>[6][page needed]</sup> two million Indochinese civilians,<sup>[12]</sup> around 1.5 million British Indian civilian deaths, 1/2 to one million Filipino civilian and hundreds of thousands of Burmese, Malayan, Pacific etc. civilian deaths.<sup>[6][page needed]</sup>

5. <sup>^</sup> [2,133,915 Japanese military deaths 1937-45,](#)<sup>[13]</sup> [1.18 million Chinese collaborator casualties 1937-45 \(432,000 dead\),](#)<sup>[citation needed]</sup> [22,000 Burmese casualties,](#)<sup>[citation needed]</sup> [5,600 Thai casualties,](#)<sup>[citation needed]</sup> and [2,615 Indian casualties.](#)<sup>[citation needed]</sup>
6. <sup>^</sup> [580,000 Japanese civilian deaths,](#)<sup>[6][page needed]</sup> [378,000 Korean and 300 Thai civilian deaths.](#)<sup>[citation needed]</sup>

## [\[edit\]](#) Citations

1. <sup>^</sup> [The Avlon Project: A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949 Interim Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Moscow](#). Retrieved on 30 September 2009.
2. <sup>^</sup> [A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949 Interim Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Moscow](#). Retrieved 30 September 2009.
3. <sup>^</sup> L, Klemen (1999-2000). ["Lieutenant-General Hein Ter Poorten"](#). *Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/terpoorten.html>.
4. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> ["Chinese People Contribute to WWII"](#). <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/celebrations/128172.htm>. Retrieved 2009-04-23.
5. <sup>^</sup> [The National World War II Museum, New Orleans](#)<sup>[dead link]</sup>
6. <sup>^</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> <sup>c</sup> <sup>d</sup> Dower, John W (1987), *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. Pantheon
7. <sup>^</sup> Dear, I.C.B and Foot, M.R.D. (editors) (2005). "Australia". *The Oxford Companion to World War II*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 66. [ISBN 9780192806703](#).
8. <sup>^</sup> ["Honouring NZ's Pacific War dead"](#). Beehive. 2005-08-15. <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/honouring+nz039s+pacific+war+dead>. Retrieved 2010-10-31.
9. <sup>^</sup> ["Russia and USSR in Wars of XX century"](#). И.И.Ивлев. Archived from [the original](#) on 2008-05-05. [http://web.archive.org/web/20080505031426/http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5\\_10\\_1.html#5\\_10\\_51](http://web.archive.org/web/20080505031426/http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_51). Retrieved 2008-07-11.
10. <sup>^</sup> ["Leyte Gulf: The Mexican Air Force"](#). <http://www.avalanchepress.com/MexicanAirForce.php>.
11. <sup>^</sup> ["Science and the Pacific War: science and survival in the Pacific, 1939-1945"](#). Roy M. MacLeod (2000). p.51. [ISBN 0792358511](#)
12. <sup>^</sup> ["Vietnam needs to remember famine of 1945"](#). Mailman.anu.edu.au. <http://mailman.anu.edu.au/pipermail/hepr-vn/2008-August/000188.html>. Retrieved 2010-10-31.
13. <sup>^</sup> Bren, John (2005-06-03) ["Yasukuni Shrine: Ritual and Memory"](#) *Japan Focus*. Retrieved on 2009-06-05.
14. <sup>^</sup> Williamson Murray, Allan R. Millett [A war to be won: fighting the Second World War](#), Harvard University Press, 2001, page 143
15. <sup>^</sup> ["Prime Minister Winston Churchill's Broadcast on War with Japan"](#). British Library of Information. December 8, 1941. <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411208ewp.html>. Retrieved March 6, 2011. "...we shall regard an attack on you as an attack upon ourselves"
16. <sup>^</sup> John Costello, *The Pacific War: 1941-1945*, Harper Perennial, 1982
17. <sup>^</sup> [B. H. Liddell Hart](#), *History of the Second World War*, Putnum, New York, 1971
18. <sup>^</sup> Japan Economic Foundation, *Journal of Japanese trade & industry, Volume 16*, 1997
19. <sup>^</sup> David Williams, [Defending Japan's Pacific War: The Kyoto Philosophers and the Idea of a Post-White World](#), RoutledgeCurzon, 2004
20. <sup>^</sup> Roy M. MacLeod, [Science and the Pacific War: science and survival in the Pacific, 1939-1945](#), Kluwer Academic Publishing, p. 1, 1999
21. <sup>^</sup> "For fifty-three long months, beginning in July 1937, China stood alone, single-handedly fighting an undeclared war against Japan. On 9 December 1941, after Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, China finally declared war against Japan. What had been for so long a war between two countries now became part of a much wider Pacific conflict." Hsi-sheng Ch'i, in James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, *China's bitter victory : the war with Japan 1937-1945*, M.E. Sharpe, 1992, p. 157
22. <sup>^</sup> Youli Sun, [China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931-41](#), Palgrave MacMillan, p. 11
23. <sup>^</sup> ["WW2 People's War - Timeline"](#). BBC. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a1141958.shtml>. Retrieved 2010-10-31.

24. [^ "Map of the Pacific Theater".](http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20pacific/ww2%20pacific%20%20maps/ww2%20asia%20map%2016.jpg)  
<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20pacific/ww2%20pacific%20%20maps/ww2%20asia%20map%2016.jpg>. Retrieved 2010-10-31.
25. [^ Edward J. Drea, \*Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939\* \(2005\)](#)
26. [^ Carl Boyd, \*Hitler's Japanese confidant: General Ōshima Hiroshi and MAGIC intelligence, 1941-1945\* \(1993\)](#)
27. [^ Jennifer M. Lind \(2010\). "\*Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics\*". Cornell University Press. p.28. ISBN 0801476283](#)
28. [^ \*Kokushi Daijiten\* \("Historical Dictionary"\), 1980: "It was not an official term, but a term of incitement used by the Japanese media, under the guidance of the military, in order to stir up the Japanese people's sense of crisis..." \(Cited by Christopher Barnard, 2003, \*Language, Ideology and Japanese History Textbooks\*, London & New York, Routledge Curzon, p.85.\)](#)
29. [^ <sup>a b c d</sup> Peattie & Evans, \*Kaigun\*](#)
30. [^ <sup>a b</sup> Willmott, \*Barrier and the Javelin\* \(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983\).](#)
31. [^ Willmott, H. P. \*Barrier and the Javelin\* \(Annapolis, 1983\).](#)
32. [^ <sup>a b c</sup> Parillo, Mark P. \*Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II\*. \(United States Naval Institute Press, 1993\).](#)
33. [^ The \*Neutrality Patrol\* had U.S. \*destroyers\* effectively at war, but no state of war had been declared by Congress.](#)
34. [^ "\*The Kingdom of the Netherlands Declares War with Japan\*", \*Inter-Allied Review\* \(Inter-Allied Review via publisher=\[Pearl Harbor History Associates Inc. <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/>\] hosted at ibiblio\), \(purportedly\) 15 December 1941, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/411208c.html>, retrieved 2009-10-03](#)
35. [^ "\*Australia Declares War on Japan\*", \*Inter-Allied Review\* \(Inter-Allied Review via publisher=\[Pearl Harbor History Associates Inc. <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/>\] hosted at ibiblio\), 15 December 1941, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411209awp.html>, retrieved 2009-10-03](#)
36. [^ This is the same McCollum conspiracy theorists accuse of providing a \*blueprint\* for provoking Japan.](#)
37. [^ H. Bix, "The Shōwa Emperor's Monologue and the Problem of War Responsibility", \*Journal of Japanese Studies\*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1992, p. 344.](#)
38. [^ \[1\]<sup>\[\*dead link\*\]</sup>](#)
39. [^ "\*Remembering 1942, The fall of Singapore, 15 February 1942\*". Awm.gov.au. <http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/singapore/transcript.htm>. Retrieved 2010-10-31.](#)
40. [^ Klemen, L \(1999-2000\). "\*The capture of Bali Island, February 1942\*". \*Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942\*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/bali.html>.](#)
41. [^ <sup>a b</sup> Klemen, L \(1999-2000\). "\*The Japanese Invasion of Dutch West Timor Island, February 1942\*". \*Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942\*. \[http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/timor\\\_dutch.html\]\(http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/timor\_dutch.html\).](#)
42. [^ <sup>a b</sup> Klemen, L \(1999-2000\). "\*The Java Sea Battle, February 1942\*". \*Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942\*. \[http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/java\\\_sea.html\]\(http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/java\_sea.html\).](#)
43. [^ <sup>a b</sup> Klemen, L \(1999-2000\). "\*The conquest of Java Island, March 1942\*". \*Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942\*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/java.html>.](#)
44. [^ Womack, Tom \(1999-2000\). "\*An Abandoned Army - The KNIL and The Japanese Invasion of Northern Dutch Sumatra\*". Dutch East Indies Campaign website. \[http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/north\\\_sumatra.html\]\(http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/north\_sumatra.html\).](#)
45. [^ Hoyt, Edwin P. \(1986\). \*Japan's War\*. Da Capo. pp. 262–263. ISBN 0-306-80348-8.](#)
46. [^ <sup>a b c</sup> Blair, \*Silent Victory\*](#)
47. [^ \*Primeministers.naa.gov.au\*](#)
48. [^ Cited in Frank Crowley \(1973\) Vol 2, p.51](#)
49. [^ <http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember.nsf/Web-Printer/C6FD73CC5C579789CA256AC000135979?OpenDocument>](#)

50. <http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember.nsf/Web-Printer/597517651CB0681ACA256D3C0021BBE6?OpenDocument>
51. ["Midget Submarines history at"](http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/japsubs/midgetsubs.htm). Home.st.net.au. <http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/japsubs/midgetsubs.htm>. Retrieved 29 April 2010.
52. ["President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Broadcast to the Nation"](http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/), (purportedly) White House news release ([Pearl Harbor History Associates Inc. <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/>] hosted at ibiblio), (purportedly) 28 April 1942, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420428a.html>
53. [Willmott, \*Barrier and the Javelin\*](#)
54. ["Battle of Midway-Scouting and Early Attacks from Midway, 3–4 June 1942"](http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/midway/mid-1m.htm). History.navy.mil. <http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/midway/mid-1m.htm>. Retrieved 2010-10-31.
55. [thanks in part to faulty aircraft \*torpedoes\*.](#)
56. [By John Murpy in \*Tambor\*](#). Blair, *Silent Victory*, p.246.
57. [Willmott, \*op. cit.\*](#)
58. [Theodore Roscoe, \*United States Submarine Operations in World War II\*](#) (US Naval Institute Press, 1949).
59. [Prange \*et al.\* \*Pearl Harbor Papers\*](#)
60. [<sup>a</sup> <sup>b</sup> Roscoe, Theodore. \*Pig Boats\* \(Bantam Books, 1958\)](#)
61. ; Blair, *Silent Victory*, pp.991-2.
62. [Larry Kimmitt and Margaret Regis, \*U.S. Submarines in World War II\*](#)
63. [The US thereby reversed its opposition to unrestricted submarine warfare. After the war, when moralistic doubts about Hiroshima and other raids on civilian targets were loudly voiced, no-one criticized Roosevelt's submarine policy. \(Two German admirals, \[Erich Raeder\]\(#\) and \[Karl Dönitz\]\(#\), were charged at the \[Nuremberg War Crimes Trials\]\(#\) with violating international law through unrestricted submarine warfare; they were acquitted after proving Allied merchant ships were legitimate military targets, under the rules in force at the time.\)](#)
64. [David Stevens. \*Japanese submarine operations against Australia 1942-1944\*](#). Retrieved 18 June 2007.
65. [Carl Boyd, "The Japanese Submarine Force and the Legacy of Strategic and Operational Doctrine Developed Between the World Wars", in Larry Addington ed. \*Selected Papers from the Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy: 1978\* \(Charleston, 1979\) 27–40; Clark G. Reynolds, \*Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires\* \(1974\) 512.](#)
66. [Farago, Ladislav. \*Broken Seal\*](#).
67. [Chihaya Masataka, in \*Pearl Harbor Papers\*, p.323. Chihaya went on to note, when IJN belatedly improved its ASW methods, the US submarine force responded by increasing Japanese losses.](#)
68. [Blair, \*Silent Victory\*, pp.359-60, 551-2, & 816.](#)
69. [Roscoe, \*op. cit.\*](#)
70. [Blair, p.877.](#)
71. [Uboat.net \*The Monsun boats\*](#). Retrieved 18 June 2007.
72. [The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee \(February 1947\), Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Larry Jewell & Patrick Clancey, ed., \*HyperWar: Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes NAVEXOS P-468\*, \*Hyperwar project\* ed. Patrick Clancey, <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/index.html#contents> \*HyperWar: Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II\*](#)
73. [RD Designs \(1941-12-07\). "Sinkings By Boat". Pigboats.com. <http://www.pigboats.com/ww2/ww2sinkings.html>. Retrieved 2010-10-31.](#)
74. ["Japanese Naval and Merchant Vessels Sunk During World War II By All U.S. Submarines". Valoratsea.com. <http://www.valoratsea.com/JANAC.htm>. Retrieved 2010-10-31.](#)
75. [Blair, Clay, Jr. \*Silent Victory\* \(New York: Bantam, 1976\).](#)
76. [Morison, S. E. \*U.S. Navy in World War Two\*.](#)
77. [L, Klemen \(1999-2000\). "Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita". \*Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942\*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/kurita.html>.](#)

78. <sup>a b</sup> ["Creating military power: the sources of military effectiveness"](#). Risa Brooks, Elizabeth A. Stanley (2007). [Stanford University Press](#). p.41. [ISBN 0804753997](#)
79. <sup>a</sup> Joseph H. Alexander, *Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima* (1994) [a short Marine Corps history](#)
80. <sup>a</sup> Robert S. Burrell, "Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment," *Journal of Military History* Volume 68, Number 4, October 2004, pp. 1143-1186 and rebuttal [in Project MUSE](#)
81. <sup>a</sup> Hal Buell, *Uncommon Valor, Common Virtue: Iwo Jima and the Photograph That Captured America* (2006)
82. <sup>a</sup> Edward T. Linenthal, "Shaping a Heroic Presence: Iwo Jima in American Memory," *Reviews in American History* Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 8-12 [in JSTOR](#)
83. <sup>a</sup> [Slim, William](#) (1956). *Defeat into Victory*. Cassell. pp. 468–469. [ISBN 0552087572](#).
84. <sup>a b c</sup> ["Japanese prisoners of war"](#). Philip Towle, Margaret Kosuge, Yōichi Kibata (2000). [Continuum International Publishing Group](#). pp.47-48. [ISBN 1852851929](#)
85. <sup>a</sup> Grey, Jeffrey (1999). *A Military History of Australia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [ISBN 0521644836](#). Pages 184-186.
86. <sup>a</sup> Joseph H. Alexander, *The final campaign: Marines in the victory on Okinawa* (1996) [short official history online](#)
87. <sup>a</sup> Hiromichi Yahara, *The Battle For Okinawa* (1997), Japanese perspective [excerpt and text search](#)
88. <sup>a</sup> Skates, James. *Invasion of Japan*.
89. <sup>a</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff. The Soviet Manchurian Campaign, August 1945. *Military Affairs*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Oct., 1969), pp. 312-336
90. <sup>a b</sup> Professor Duncan Anderson, 2005, "[Nuclear Power: The End of the War Against Japan](#)" (*World War Two*, BBC History website) Access date: 11 September 2007.
91. <sup>a</sup> See, for example, Alperowitz, G., *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (1995; New York, Knopf; [ISBN 0-679-44331-2](#)) for this argument.
92. <sup>a</sup> Sadao Asada. The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration. *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Nov., 1998), pp. 477-512.
93. <sup>a</sup> ["Chronology of Japanese Holdouts"](#). Wampela.com. <http://www.wampela.com/holdouts/list.html>. Retrieved 2010-10-31.
94. <sup>a</sup> ["Rummel, R.J. "'Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900'" Chapter 3. LIT Verlag Münster-Hamburg-Berlin-Wien-London-Zürich \(1999\)"](#). Hawaii.edu. <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP3.HTM>. Retrieved 2010-10-31.
95. <sup>a</sup> ["Nuclear Power: The End of the War Against Japan"](#). BBC - History.
96. <sup>a</sup> ["Remember role in ending fascist war"](#)
97. <sup>a</sup> Christopher Hudson (2 March 2007). ["Doctors of Depravity"](#). Daily Mail. [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in\\_article\\_id=439776&in\\_page\\_id=1770](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=439776&in_page_id=1770)
98. <sup>a</sup> Chapel, Joseph (2004). ["Denial of the Holocaust and the Rape of Nanking"](#). <http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/classes/133p/133p04papers/JChapelNanjing046.htm>.
99. <sup>a</sup> de Brouwer, Anne-Marie (2005). [Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence](#). Intersentia. p. 8. [ISBN 9050955339](#). <http://books.google.com/?id=JhY8ROsA39kC&dq=war+rape+in+ancient+times>.
100. <sup>a</sup> ["No government coercion in war's sex slavery: Abe"](#), The Japan Times, March 2, 2007
101. <sup>a</sup> Himeta, Mitsuyoshi (姫田光義) (日本軍による『三光政策・三光作戦をめぐって』) (*Concerning the Three Alls Strategy/Three Alls Policy By the Japanese Forces*), Iwanami Bukkuretto, 1996, Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 2000
102. <sup>a</sup> L, Klemen (1999-2000). ["The capture of Tarakan Island, January 1942"](#). *Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/tarakan.html>.
103. <sup>a</sup> L, Klemen (1999-2000). ["The capture of Balikpapan, January 1942"](#). *Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/balikpapan.html>.
104. <sup>a</sup> L, Klemen (1999-2000). ["The Japanese Invasion of Ambon Island, January 1942"](#). *Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/ambon.html>.

105. <sup>^</sup>L, Klemen (1999-2000). "[The battle for Palembang, February 1942](http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/palembang.html)". *Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/palembang.html>.
106. <sup>^</sup>L, Klemen (1999-2000). "[The Badung Strait Battle](http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/BadungStrait.html)". *Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/BadungStrait.html>.
107. <sup>^</sup>L, Klemen (1999-2000). "[The fighting on Portuguese East Timor, 1942](http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/timor_port.html)". *Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942*. [http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/timor\\_port.html](http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/timor_port.html).
108. <sup>^</sup>Visser, Jan (1999-2000). "[The Sunda Strait Battle](http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/SundaStrait.html)". *Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/SundaStrait.html>.
109. <sup>^</sup>L, Klemen (1999-2000). "[The Mystery of Christmas Island, March 1942](http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/christmas.html)". *Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942*. <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/christmas.html>.

## [\[edit\]](#) References

- [Eric M. Bergerud, \*Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific\* \(2000\)](#)
- Clay Blair, Jr. *Silent Victory*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975 (submarine war).
- Thomas Buell, *Master of Seapower: A Biography of Admiral Ernest J. King* Naval Institute Press, 1976.
- Thomas Buell, *The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond Spruance*. 1974.
- John Costello, *The Pacific War*. 1982.
- Wesley Craven, and James Cate, eds. *The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942*. University of Chicago Press, 1958. Official history; Vol. 4, *The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944*. 1950; Vol. 5, *The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki*. 1953.
- Dunnigan, James F., and Albert A. Nofi. *The Pacific War Encyclopedia*. Facts on File, 1998. 2 vols. 772p.
- [Harry A. Gailey. 'The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay \(1995\)](#)
- Gordon, David M. "The China-Japan War, 1931-1945" *Journal of Military History* (January 2006) v 70#1, pp 137–82. Historiographical overview of major books
- Seki, Eiji. (2006). *Mrs. Ferguson's Tea-Set, Japan and the Second World War: The Global Consequences Following Germany's Sinking of the SS Automedon in 1940*. London: [Global Oriental](#). 10-ISBN 1-905246-28-5; 13- ISBN 978-1-905246-28-1 (cloth) (reprinted by [University of Hawaii Press](#)), Honolulu, 2007. [previously announced as \*Sinking of the SS Automedon and the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation\*](#).
- Saburo Hayashi and Alvin Coox. *Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War*. Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Assoc., 1959.
- William B. Hopkins. *The Pacific War: The Strategy, Politics, and Players that Won the War* (2010)
- James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, eds. *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945* M. E. Sharpe, 1992
- Ch'i Hsi-sheng, *Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937–1945* University of Michigan Press, 1982
- Rikihei Inoguchi, Tadashi Nakajima, and Robert Pineau. *The Divine Wind*. Ballantine, 1958. Kamikaze.
- S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan*. 4 vols. London: H.M.S.O., 1957-1965. Official Royal Navy history.
- L, Klemen (1999-2000). "[Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942](http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/index.html)". <http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/index.html>.
- William M. Leary, *We Shall Return: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan*. University Press of Kentucky, 1988.

- Gavin Long, *Australia in the War of 1939–45, Army. Vol. 7, The Final Campaigns*. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1963.
- Dudley McCarthy, *Australia in the War of 1939–45, Army. Vol. 5, South-West Pacific Area—First Year: Kokoda to Wau*. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1959.
- D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*. Vol. 2. Houghton Mifflin, 1972.
- Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell [Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941–1942, United States Army Center of Military History](#), Washington, D. C., 1990
- Miller, Edward S. (2007). *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945*. US Naval Institute Press. [ISBN 1591145007](#).
- Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961; Vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions. 1949; Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal. 1949; Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. 1950; Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls. 1951; Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas. 1962; Vol. 12, Leyte. 1958; vol. 13, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas. 1959; Vol. 14, Victory in the Pacific. 1961.
- Masatake Okumiya, and Mitso Fuchida. *Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan*. Naval Institute Press, 1955.
- E. B. Potter, and Chester W. Nimitz. *Triumph in the Pacific*. Prentice Hall, 1963. Naval battles
- E. B. Potter, *Bull Halsey* Naval Institute Press, 1985.
- E. B. Potter, *Nimitz*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
- John D. Potter, *Yamamoto* 1967.
- Gordon W. Prange, Donald Goldstein, and Katherine Dillon. *At Dawn We Slept*. Penguin, 1982. Pearl Harbor
- —, et al. *Miracle at Midway*. Penguin, 1982.
- —, et al. *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History*.
- Seki, Eiji (2007). *Sinking of the SS Automedon And the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation*. University of Hawaii Press. [ISBN 1905246285](#).
- Henry Shaw, and Douglas Kane. *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Vol. 2, Isolation of Rabaul*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1963
- Henry Shaw, Bernard Nalty, and Edwin Turnbladh. *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, Central Pacific Drive*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953.
- E.B. Sledge, [With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa](#). Presidio, 1981. Memoir.
- J. Douglas Smith, and Richard Jensen. *World War II on the Web: A Guide to the Very Best Sites*. (2002)
- Ronald Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* Free Press, 1985.
- John Toland, *The Rising Sun*. 2 vols. Random House, 1970. Japan's war.
- Ian W. Toll. *Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942* (2011)
- H. P. Willmott. *Empires in the Balance*. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1982.
- H. P. Willmott. *The Barrier and the Javelin*. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1983.
- Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*, Cambridge University Press. [ISBN 0-521-44317-2](#). (2005).
- William Y'Blood, *Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980.
- Harries, Meirion; Susie Harries (1994). *Soldiers of the Sun : The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army*. New York: [Random House](#). [ISBN 0-679-75303-6](#).

[\[edit\]](#) External links



Wikimedia Commons has media related to: [Pacific War](#)

- [Film Footage of the Pacific War](#)
- [La politique de la sphère de coprosperité de la grande Asie orientale au Japon \(French\)](#)
- [Animated History of the Pacific War](#)
- [Canada at the Pacific War](#) — Canadians in Asia & the Pacific
- [The Pacific War Series](#) – at The War Times Journal
- [Morinoske: Japanese Pilot testimonials - and more](#)
- [Imperial Japanese Navy Page](#)
- [The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II](#)

<a href="#">[show]</a> <b>v</b> · <b>d</b> · <a href="#">eWorld War II</a>	
•	
<b><a href="#">Allies (Leaders)</a></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Ethiopia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">China</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Czechoslovakia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Poland</a></li><li>• <a href="#">United Kingdom</a></li><li>• <a href="#">India</a></li><li>• <a href="#">France</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Australia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">New Zealand</a></li><li>• <a href="#">South Africa</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Canada</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Norway</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Belgium</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Netherlands</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Luxembourg</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Greece</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Yugoslavia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Soviet Union</a></li><li>• <a href="#">United States</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Philippines</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Mexico</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Brazil</a></li></ul>
<b><a href="#">Axis and Axis-aligned</a></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Bulgaria</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Reorganized National Government of China</a></li></ul>

	<a href="#"><u>(Leaders)</u></a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#"><u>Croatia</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Finland</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Germany</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Hungary</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Iraq</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Italy</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Italian Social Republic</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Japan</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Manchukuo</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Romania</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Slovakia</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Thailand</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Vichy France</u></a></li></ul>
	<a href="#"><u>Resistance</u></a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#"><u>Albania</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Austria</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Baltic States</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Belgium</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Czech lands</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Denmark</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Estonia</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Ethiopia</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>France</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Germany</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Greece</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Hong Kong</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>India</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Italy</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Jewish</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Korea</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Latvia</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Luxembourg</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Netherlands</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Norway</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Philippines</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Poland (Anti-communist)</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Romania</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Thailand</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Soviet Union</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Slovakia</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Western Ukraine</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Vietnam</u></a></li><li>• <a href="#"><u>Yugoslavia</u></a></li></ul>

<a href="#">Prelude</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Africa</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Asia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Europe</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">1939</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Invasion of Poland</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Phoney War</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Winter War</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Atlantic</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Changsha (1939)</a></li><li>• <a href="#">China</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">1940</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Weserübung</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Netherlands</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Belgium</a></li><li>• <a href="#">France</a></li><li>• <a href="#">UK</a></li><li>• <a href="#">North Africa</a></li><li>• <a href="#">British Somaliland</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Baltic States</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Moldova</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Indochina</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Greece</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Compass</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">1941</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">East Africa</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Invasion of Yugoslavia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Yugoslav Front</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Greece</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Crete</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Soviet Union (<i>Barbarossa</i>)</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Finland</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Lithuania</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Middle East</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Kiev</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Leningrad</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Moscow</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Sevastopol</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Pearl Harbor</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Hong Kong</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Philippines</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Changsha (1941)</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Malaya</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Borneo</a></li></ul>

1942

- [Burma](#)
- [Changsha \(1942\)](#)
- [Coral Sea](#)
- [Gazala](#)
- [Midway](#)
- [Blue](#)
- [Stalingrad](#)
- [Dieppe](#)
- [El Alamein](#)
- [Torch](#)
- [Guadalcanal](#)

1943

- [End in Africa](#)
- [Kursk](#)
- [Smolensk](#)
- [Solomon Islands](#)
- [Sicily](#)
- [Lower Dnieper](#)
- [Italy](#)
- [Gilbert and Marshall](#)
- [Changde](#)

1944

- [Monte Cassino](#) and [Shingle](#)
- [Narva](#)
- [Cherkassy](#)
- [Tempest](#)
- [Ichi-Go](#)
- [Normandy](#)
- [Mariana and Palau](#)
- [Bagration](#)
- [Western Ukraine](#)
- [Tannenberg Line](#)
- [Warsaw](#)
- [Eastern Romania](#)
- [Yugoslavia](#)
- [Paris](#)
- [Gothic Line](#)
- [Market Garden](#)
- [Estonia](#)
- [Crossbow](#)
- [Pointblank](#)
- [Lapland](#)
- [Hungary](#)
- [Leyte](#)
- [Bulge](#)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Burma</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">1945</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Vistula-Oder</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Iwo Jima</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Okinawa</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Surrender of Italy</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Berlin</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Czechoslovakia</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Budapest</a></li><li>• <a href="#">West Hunan</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Surrender of Germany</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Manchuria</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Philippines</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Borneo</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Atomic bombings</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Surrender of Japan</a></li></ul>
<b>General</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Air warfare of World War II</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Attacks on North America</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Blitzkrieg</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Comparative military ranks</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Cryptography</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Home front</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Manhattan Project</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Military awards</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Military equipment</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Military production</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Nazi plunder</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Technology</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Total war</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Strategic bombing</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Bengal famine of 1943</a></li></ul>
<a href="#">Aftermath</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Effects</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Expulsion of Germans</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Operation Paperclip</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Operation Keelhaul</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Occupation of Germany</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Morgenthau Plan</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Territorial changes</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Soviet occupations</a> (<a href="#">Romania</a>, <a href="#">Poland</a>, <a href="#">Hungary</a>, <a href="#">Baltic States</a>)</li><li>• <a href="#">Occupation of Japan</a></li><li>• <a href="#">First Indochina War</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Indonesian National Revolution</a></li><li>• <a href="#">Cold War</a></li></ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Decolonization</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Popular culture</a></li> </ul>
<a href="#">War crimes</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">German and Wehrmacht war crimes</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">The Holocaust</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Italian war crimes</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Japanese war crimes</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Unit 731</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Allied war crimes</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Soviet war crimes</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">United States war crimes</a></li> </ul>
<a href="#">War rape</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">German military brothels</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Camp brothels</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Rape during the occupation of Japan</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Comfort women</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Rape of Nanking</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Rape during the occupation of Germany</a></li> </ul>
<a href="#">Prisoners</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Nazi crimes against Soviet POWs</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Italian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Japanese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Japanese prisoners of war in World War II</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Polish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">Romanian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union</a></li> <li>• <a href="#">German prisoners of war in the United States</a></li> </ul>

[show]v · d · e **States and territories in the sphere of influence of the [Empire of Japan](#) during [World War II](#)**

 <a href="#">State of Burma</a>	 <a href="#">Dadao Municipal Government</a>	 <a href="#">Kingdom of Laos</a>	 <a href="#">Taiwan under Japanese rule</a>
 <a href="#">Kingdom of Cambodia</a>	 <a href="#">East Hebei Provisional Autonomous Council</a>	 <a href="#">Manchukuo</a>	 <a href="#">Kingdom of Thailand</a>
 <a href="#">Provisional Government of China</a>	 <a href="#">Second Philippine Republic</a>	 <a href="#">Thailand</a>	 <a href="#">Empire of Vietnam</a>

 <a href="#">Reformed Government of China</a>	<a href="#">Government of Free India</a>	<a href="#">Republic Korea under Japanese rule</a>	<a href="#">Reorganized National Government of China</a>
--	--	--	--

[show]v · d · [eEmpire of Japan](#)



Figure 133 Robert Glass during World War II.

Robert W Glass (1922 - )

**is your uncle**

[Ora Ethel Barngrover \(1888 - \)](#)

mother of Robert W Glass

[Charles W Glass \(1920 - \)](#)

son of Ora Ethel Barngrover

[Bettie Glass](#)



Figure 134 Bob Glass is in the front row.

**Pal Hodo** WWII Served in Japan




Figure 3 Pal Hodo served in Japan in World War II



**U.S. Veterans Gravesites, ca.1775-2006** about Pal Hodo

Name:	<b>Pal Hodo</b>
Service Info.:	S1 US NAVY WORLD WAR II
Birth Date:	14 Dec 1927
Death Date:	10 Jan 1994
Service Start Date:	15 Jun 1945
Interment Date:	13 Jan 1994
Cemetery:	Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery
Cemetery Address:	2900 Sheridan Road St. Louis, MO 63125
Buried At:	Section 1c Site 2247

Pal Hodo (1927 - 1994)

**is your son**

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)

**U.S. Veterans Gravesites, ca.1775-2006** about Earl Edward Douglas

Name:	<b>Earl Edward Douglas</b>
Service Info.:	PVT US ARMY WORLD WAR II
Birth Date:	6 Dec 1906
Death Date:	19 Jun 1980
Service Start Date:	15 Jan 1944
Interment Date:	20 Jun 1980
Cemetery:	Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery
Cemetery Address:	2900 Sheridan Road St. Louis, MO 63125
Buried At:	Section R Site 1559

Earl Edward Douglas (1904 - 1980)

**husband of aunt of husband of daughter**

[Mary Clara Richardson \(1908 - 1985\)](#)

wife of Earl Edward Douglas

[Jacob Francis Richardson \(1876 - 1957\)](#)

father of Mary Clara Richardson

[John Homer Richardson \(1905 - 1967\)](#)

son of Jacob Francis Richardson

[Cornelius Carl Richardson \(1932 - 2005\)](#)

son of John Homer Richardson

[Betty Lavern Hodo \(1935 - \)](#)

wife of Cornelius Carl Richardson

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)

**U.S. Veterans Gravesites, ca.1775-2006** about Mary C Douglas

Veterans Day – A Tribute to the Military Service of our Ancestors RESEARCH DRAFT 2013

Name:	<b>Mary C Douglas</b>
Service Info.:	PVT US ARMY
Birth Date:	21 Oct 1908
Death Date:	10 Jun 1985
Relation:	Wife of Douglas, Earl Edward
Interment Date:	12 Jun 1985
Cemetery:	Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery
Cemetery Address:	2900 Sheridan Road St. Louis, MO 63125
Buried At:	Section R Site 1559

Mary Clara Richardson (1908 - 1985)

**aunt of husband of daughter**

[Jacob Francis Richardson \(1876 - 1957\)](#)

father of Mary Clara Richardson

[John Homer Richardson \(1905 - 1967\)](#)

son of Jacob Francis Richardson

[Cornelius Carl Richardson \(1932 - 2005\)](#)

son of John Homer Richardson

[Betty Lavern Hodo \(1935 - \)](#)

wife of Cornelius Carl Richardson

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)

**U.S. World War II Draft Registration Cards, 1942** about Arthur William Tipton

Name:	<b>Arthur William Tipton</b>
Birth Date:	12 Mar 1888
Birth Place:	Roudin, Illinois
Residence:	Bloomington, Illinois
Race:	White

Arthur Tipton (1888 - )

**is your grand uncle of daughter**

[John Tipton \(1852 - 1910\)](#)

father of Arthur Tipton

[Lucy B Tipton \(1885 - 1910\)](#)

daughter of John Tipton

[Ida Mae Tipton \(1907 - 1984\)](#)

daughter of Lucy B Tipton

[Betty Lavern Hodo \(1935 - \)](#)

daughter of Ida Mae Tipton

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)

Name:	<b>Robert Hall</b>
Birth Date:	15 Feb 1888
Birth Place:	Gallatin, Illinois
Residence:	Tamms, Illinois
Race:	White

Robert Martin Hall (1888 - 1957)

**uncle of husband**

[George Henry Hall \(1866 - 1917\)](#)

father of Robert Martin Hall

[Euell L Hall \(1891 - 1925\)](#)

son of George Henry Hall

[Edgar L Hall \(1914 - 1973\)](#)

son of Euell L Hall

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)

**U.S. World War II Army Enlistment Records, 1938-1946** about Carl E Koeplinger

Name:	<b>Carl E Koeplinger</b>
Birth Year:	1922
Race:	White, Citizen ( <i>White</i> )
Nativity State or Country:	Ohio
State of Residence:	Ohio
County or City:	Lucas
Enlistment Date:	26 Apr 1944
Enlistment State:	Indiana
Enlistment City:	Fort Benjamin Harrison
Branch:	No branch assignment
Branch Code:	No branch assignment
Grade:	Private
Grade Code:	Private
Term of Enlistment:	Enlistment for the duration of the War or other emergency, plus six months, subject to the discretion of the President or otherwise according to law
Component:	Selectees (Enlisted Men)
Source:	Civil Life

Carl E Koeplinger (1922 - )

**uncle of wife of son**

[John Carl Koeplinger \(1875 - 1938\)](#)

father of Carl E Koeplinger

[Harold George Koeplinger \(1904 - 1975\)](#)

son of John Carl Koeplinger

[Judith Ellen Koeplinger \(1943 - 1967\)](#)

daughter of Harold George Koeplinger

[Ernest Lenard Hall \(1940 - \)](#)

husband of Judith Ellen Koeplinger

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)

**U.S. World War II Draft Registration Cards, 1942** about Conrad Eichman

Name:	Conrad Eichman
Birth Date:	10 Sep 1895
Birth Place:	Toledo, Ohio
Residence:	Lucas, Ohio
Race:	White

Conrad Eichman (1895 - 1980)

**husband of paternal grandmother of wife of son**

[Mabel M Wing \(1884 - 1978\)](#)

wife of Conrad Eichman

[Harold George Koeplinger \(1904 - 1975\)](#)

son of Mabel M Wing

[Judith Ellen Koeplinger \(1943 - 1967\)](#)

daughter of Harold George Koeplinger

[Ernest Lenard Hall \(1940 - \)](#)

husband of Judith Ellen Koeplinger

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)

**U.S. World War II Army Enlistment Records, 1938-1946** about Olin M Tipton

Name:	<b>Olin Maxwell Tipton</b>
Birth Year:	1919
Race:	White, Citizen ( <i>White</i> )
Nativity State or Country:	Missouri
State of Residence:	Missouri
County or City:	Ripley
Enlistment Date:	22 Jul 1942
Enlistment State:	Missouri
Enlistment City:	Jefferson Barracks
Branch:	Branch Immaterial - Warrant Officers, USA
Branch Code:	Branch Immaterial - Warrant Officers, USA
Grade:	Private
Grade Code:	Private
Term of Enlistment:	Enlistment for the duration of the War or other emergency, plus six months, subject to the discretion of the President or otherwise according to law
Component:	Selectees (Enlisted Men)
Source:	Civil Life
Education:	3 years of high school
Civil Occupation:	Farm hands, general farms
Marital Status:	Single, without dependents
Height:	66
Weight:	141

Olin M Tipton (1919 - 2009)

**stepson of aunt**

[Jethero Preston Tipton \(1895 - 1974\)](#)

father of Olin M Tipton

[Gracie A Tipton \(1888 - 1973\)](#)

wife of Jethero Preston Tipton

[John Tipton \(1852 - 1910\)](#)

father of Gracie A Tipton

[Lucy B Tipton \(1885 - 1910\)](#)

daughter of John Tipton

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)

Kermit Wilson, Opal Duke's cousin was at Battle of Bulge, wounded  
**1930 United States Federal Census** about Kermit E Wilson

Name:	Kermit E Wilson		
Home in 1930:	Buckhorn, View Map	Baxter,	Arkansas
Age:	10		
Estimated birth year:	abt 1920		
Relation to Head of House:	Son		
Father's name:	Marcy J Wilson		
Mother's name:	E May Wilson		
Race:	White		
Occupation:			
Education:			
Military service:			
Rent/home value:			
Age at first marriage:			
Parents' birthplace:	View image		
Neighbors:	View others on page		
Household Members:	Name		Age
	Marcy J Wilson		32
	E May Wilson		31
	Kermit E Wilson		10
	Hays E Wilson		8
	Carman C Wilson		4
	Vernon L Wilson		4/12
		1	

Kermit E Wilson (1920 - )

**is your 1st cousin 1x removed**

[James Marcy Wilson \(1897 - 1979\)](#)

father of Kermit E Wilson

[Thomas Thompson Wilson \(1866 - 1955\)](#)

father of James Marcy Wilson

[Cora Delores Wilson \(1907 - 1976\)](#)

daughter of Thomas Thompson Wilson

[Opal Isabel Duke](#)

daughter of Cora Delores Wilson

[Bettie Glass](#)

## **WWII "Old Man's Draft" Registration Cards**

You may be surprised to learn that your grandfather or great-grandfather registered for the draft in 1942 even though he was technically too old to serve. In 1942, the Selective Service initiated a "Fourth Registration" of the draft. Unlike other registrations for World War II service, however, this one targeted older men, not to fight in battle, but to use their skills on the home front.

Out of seven draft registrations tied to World War II, only the Fourth Registration is available online. It is one of our newest sets of military records started on Fold3. Since men between the ages of 45 and 64 were required to register, it became known as the "Old Man's Draft." About 13 million men filled out draft cards, including President Roosevelt, then 60, who listed the American people as his employer.

The registration took place on April 27, 1942, at draft boards around the country, and was intended to provide the government with a register of manpower. Those who registered were later mailed questionnaires for more detailed information about their occupations and specific skills.

While the registration was a great resource for the government, anyone locating a relative in these records today will discover many interesting details about him including employment, address, birth date and place, telephone number, and his physical characteristics. A signature is also on every card.

[Discover more about the "old men" in your family during World War II.](#)






Figure 138 Photo from Veterans Museum in Branson.



Figure 139 Photo from Veterans Museum in Branson.



Figure 140 Photo from Veterans Museum in Branson.



Figure 141 Photo from Veterans Museum in Branson.

[U.S. World War II Army Enlistment Records, 1938-1946](#)

about [Johnie G Tipton](#)

**Name:** Johnie G Tipton

**Birth Year:** 1926

**Race:** White, citizen (White)

**Nativity State or Country:** Missouri

**State of Residence:** Missouri

**County or City:** Shannon

**Enlistment Date:** 10 Oct 1944

**Enlistment State:** Missouri

**Enlistment City:** Jefferson Barracks

**Branch:** No branch assignment

**Branch Code:** No branch assignment

**Grade:** Private

**Grade Code:** Private

**Term of Enlistment:** Enlistment for the duration of the War or other emergency, plus six months, subject to the discretion of the President or otherwise according to law

**Component:** Selectees (Enlisted Men)

**Source:** Civil Life

**Education:** Grammar school

**Civil Occupation:** Unskilled miscellaneous occupations, n.e.c.

**Marital Status:** Single, without dependents

**Height:** 00

000

Johnie Glean Tipton (1925 - 2005)

**stepson of aunt**

[Jethero Preston Tipton \(1895 - 1974\)](#)

father of Johnie Glean Tipton

[Gracie A Tipton \(1888 - 1973\)](#)

wife of Jethero Preston Tipton

[John Tipton \(1852 - 1910\)](#)

father of Gracie A Tipton

[Lucy B Tipton \(1885 - 1910\)](#)

daughter of John Tipton

[Ida Mae Tipton](#)



Figure 142 Photo from Veterans Museum in Branson.



Figure 143 Jay Short son of Albert was killed in WW II

Albert Short (1895 - 1964)

**is your grand uncle**

[Katherine E Whittington \(1867 - 1926\)](#)

mother of Albert Short

[Euell L Hall \(1891 - 1925\)](#)

son of Katherine E Whittington

[Edgar Leonard Hall \(1914 - 1973\)](#)

son of Euell L Hall

[Ernest Lenard Hall](#)

Still searching for more information:

**Hayes Wilson**, , Opal Duke's cousin

**Delbert Wilson**, Opal's cousin

**James Richard Bates**, USA, Helicopter Mechanic

**Dan Richardson** USA, MP